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CCAS Statement of Purpose

Critical Asian Studies continues to be inspired by the statement of purpose formulated in 1969 by its parent organization, the Committee of Concerned Asian Scholars (CCAS). CCAS ceased to exist as an organization in 1979, but the BCAS board decided in 1993 that the CCAS Statement of Purpose should be published in our journal at least once a year.

We first came together in opposition to the brutal aggression of the United States in Vietnam and to the complicity or silence of our profession with regard to that policy. Those in the field of Asian studies bear responsibility for the consequences of their research and the political posture of their profession. We are concerned about the present unwillingness of specialists to speak out against the implications of an Asian policy committed to ensuring American domination of much of Asia. We reject the legitimacy of this aim, and attempt to change this policy. We recognize that the present structure of the profession has often perverted scholarship and alienated many people in the field.

The Committee of Concerned Asian Scholars seeks to develop a humane and knowledgeable understanding of Asian societies and their efforts to maintain cultural integrity and to confront such problems as poverty, oppression, and imperialism. We realize that to be students of other peoples, we must first understand our relations to them.

CCAS wishes to create alternatives to the prevailing trends in scholarship on Asia, which too often spring from a parochial cultural perspective and serve selfish interests and expansionism. Our organization is designed to function as a catalyst, a communications network for both Asian and Western scholars, a provider of central resources for local chapters, and a community for the development of anti-imperialist research.

Passed, 28–30 March 1969
Boston, Massachusetts
ABSTRACT: Taiwan has dramatically improved its response to domestic violence within the last fifteen years, becoming the first East Asian country to pass major legislation criminalizing domestic violence. Ethnographic research on the origins, development, and operations of the domestic violence prevention movement shows how individuals from diverse backgrounds acted collectively to achieve this social reversal. Activists have profited from feminist social networks, the growing economic and political power of women, domestic violence models from other countries, a unified vision of creating new legislation, and an atmosphere open to change. Their efforts were catalyzed by three widely publicized cases regarding violence against women and culminated in the passage of the Domestic Violence Prevention and Treatment Act in 1998. The domestic violence prevention movement in Taiwan provides a valuable case study of social change and a model for other East Asian countries interested in passing similar legislation.

Introduction

In 1993, the horrific story of a woman stabbing her husband to death made headlines all over Taiwan, shocking a society that was then relatively unaccustomed to violent crime. As the media began to delve more deeply into the case of the woman, Deng Ruweng, details of domestic abuse emerged. Deng Ruweng’s story became a cautionary tale, awakening the general consciousness to the issue of domestic violence against women in Taiwan.

Lin A’qi first raped Deng Ruweng when she was a ninth grader. After repeated sexual assaults, Ruweng became pregnant with A’qi’s first child. She eventually moved in with A’qi, thus beginning what would be a long history of abuse. On various occasions, Ruweng tried to escape by
running back to her father’s house, but A’qi always found ways to coerce her into returning. Once, he threw their one-year-old son on top of a van and then proceeded to accelerate and brake sharply, causing the boy to nearly fall off. Another time, he went to her father’s house, destroyed everything inside, and assaulted Ruweng’s father. Although A’qi was reported to the police, nothing was done except friends were asked to mediate the situation. Finally, to save her family from further harm, Ruweng agreed to marry A’qi.

The abuse worsened after marriage. When intoxicated, A’qi would beat Ruweng and their children. Once he grabbed his one-month-old son by the feet and lowered the infant’s head into a washing machine still in operation. When Ruweng tried to stop him, he beat her up. In March 1993, he beat his second son so severely that the boy’s scalp was torn in three different places and his arm was seriously injured. Ruweng tried to leave home again, but A’qi stopped her by threatening to harm her entire family and pour acid on her two sisters, rape them, and then sell them to a brothel. He frequently called her sisters to demand sexual intercourse. He also threatened to burn down her house and bury her brother alive.

On 27 October 1993, Ruweng learned from one of her sisters that A’qi had unsuccessfully tried to rape her sisters. A’qi returned home drunk that night and the two fought. After the fight, which resulted in another beating for Ruweng, A’qi retired to the bedroom to sleep. At around 9 p.m., Ruweng took a hammer and fruit knife to the bedroom. She bludgeoned A’qi’s head with the hammer and stabbed him multiple times. A’qi died from massive hemorrhaging in his heart and lungs. After repositioning the body and cleaning herself, Ruweng called A’qi’s sister to notify the police because she wished to turn herself in.

Upon hearing the details of Ruweng’s case, many women’s organizations and lawyers in Taiwan came to her aid during her criminal trial in February 1994. After lengthy trials and appeals, the courts finally reduced the standard homicide sentence to three years.¹

Deng Ruweng’s case shocked the Taiwanese public and contributed, as we will see, to increased attention being paid to domestic violence in Taiwan. Although extreme in its brutality, Deng Ruweng’s story is unremarkable in its basic plotline: social institutions and political and economic forces make escape from abusive relationships difficult for women. When Ruweng and her family sought help, few measures were in place to help them. This highly publicized case made the public realize that something had to change.

History

Taiwan has a long history of patriarchy and the subordination of women. Deeply rooted Confucian patriarchal institutions, which encompass all stages of a woman’s life at work and in the household, help justify domestic violence because women are perceived as lesser figures who can be controlled and — in some situations — abused. With its emphasis on maintaining social harmony through the strict adherence to a hierarchical system, Confucianism places
greater importance on the family over the individual, and on men over women. Although Confucianism is not the driving force of the patriarchal system, it is certainly a reflection of that system.

The historical context of patriarchy in Taiwan (as in other parts of Confucian-influenced East Asia) makes Taiwan’s passage of the Domestic Violence Prevention and Treatment Act (DVPTA) in 1998 and the recent increase in social service efforts all the more worthy of examination. How was this all achieved? As we will see, the feminist social network in Taiwan played an enormous role in the domestic violence prevention movement of the last fifteen years, from its fledgling beginnings in the mid-1980s to the passage of the DVPTA and other efforts today. Much of the movement’s success was due to the approach activists adopted to ensure women’s safety. Instead of working within existing structures and traditions, activists argued that these structures and traditions were the very reason women’s safety was threatened and the structures therefore had to be changed. Many institutional changes resulted directly from the activist efforts of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and individual women who occupied positions of political power. As they encountered domestic violence in their work with children, the elderly, and teenage prostitutes, women’s NGOs began to pay closer attention to this problem, seeing it to be a factor that underlies many other social issues. Initially they provided direct services to victims; later they realized the need for structural changes, e.g., in the form of legislation. Since the end of martial law in Taiwan in 1987, women’s NGOs have helped draft legislation regarding gender equality and child protection, such as the Act of Equal Working Rights for Two Sexes and the Juvenile Prostitution Prevention Act.2

Domestic violence is a major issue around the world and its prevention is crucial to the promotion of women’s rights.3 The UN Division for the Advancement of Women states that

Acts or threats of violence, whether occurring within the home or in the community, or perpetrated or condoned by the State, instill fear and insecurity in women’s lives and are obstacles to the achievement of equality and for development and peace. The fear of violence, including harassment, is a permanent constraint on the mobility of women and limits their access to resources and basic activities.4

Organizations mentioned in this article

Awakening Foundation = Funü Xinzhi Jijinhui
Garden of Hope Foundation = Li Xin Shehui Fuli Shiye Jijinhui
Homemakers’ Union Environmental Protection Foundation = Caituan Faren Zhufu Lianmeng Huanjing Baohu Jijinhui
Modern Women’s Foundation (MWF) = Xiandai Funü Jijinhui
National Organization for Women = Xin Nüxin Lianhehui
Peng Wanru Foundation = Peng Wanru Wenjiao Jijinhui
Taipei Women’s Rescue Foundation (TWRF) = Funü Jiuyuan Jijinhui
Taiwan’s movement to take legal and social actions to prevent and treat domestic violence demonstrates that dramatic social changes are possible, and in a relatively short period of time. However, before we can recommend that Taiwan’s success be replicated elsewhere, we first need to examine what happened in Taiwan, including its rapid economic development, democratization, and the strong influences it felt from Japan, China, and the United States. In an effort to understand the coordination of larger social processes and individual actions that resulted in the passage of the DVPTA, I conducted interviews in Taipei for ten weeks in the summer of 2002 with individuals active in the women’s rights movement. My research reveals that the success of the movement derived from long-term organizational networks that allowed motivated individuals to capitalize on larger political-economic changes to promote their cause.

The Status of Women in Taiwan

The passage of the DVPTA is all the more striking when one understands the aspects of Taiwan’s society that tolerated and encouraged domestic violence against women. In the late imperial past, neo-Confucian principles provided ideological support for the indigenous Chinese system of petty capitalism, which defined patrilineal extended families, not individuals, as the basic economic unit. To control the products of women’s labor, men had to control women. Thus, women were treated as possessions that could be bought, sold, rented out, worked, and beaten. In addition, the state enforced parental authority and thereby contributed to how families treated women. For example, parents could drag their children into court or have them thrown in prison for being disobedient. Under this system, senior men, who headed the household, subordinated the needs of women (and junior males) to the needs of the family, as defined by the family head.

Vestiges of this system extend to present-day Taiwan. Noting the lengths that women go to in tolerating offensive male behavior, an administrator at the Modern Women’s Foundation (MWF) observed: “The men are usually loud and women usually tolerate this. Many people feel that women should just endure whatever treatment they receive from their husbands because their husbands work all day for the family.” Another administrator at the MWF noted that because Taiwanese culture emphasizes family cohesion — even at the expense of personal safety — domestic violence has been strictly a family issue that was supposed to be resolved only within the family. Most of those I interviewed said that their neighbors and family members hardly ever discussed the issue of domestic violence. A social worker told me that a government domestic violence center initially thought that abuse was an acceptable means of expressing anger because she had witnessed her parents hitting each other as she was growing up and no adult had ever openly censured this behavior. Another social worker, from the Taipei Women’s Rescue Foundation (TWRF), had vivid memories of her neighbors fighting. Once, when she was still a child, a pair of shoes was thrown at her house by her neighbors, who were fighting next door. Her mother immediately threw the shoes back and locked the door behind her because she was afraid that her daughter would try to raise an alarm. Her mother did not...
wish to become involved with another family’s problems and was also concerned for her daughter’s safety.

Virtually all Han Chinese women in Chinese societies marry. Anthropologist Arthur P. Wolf found that among all women born between 1891 and 1920 in the nine Hai-shan districts in Taiwan only 6.2 percent of daughters and 8.3 percent of adopted daughters were unmarried at the age of thirty. It used to be that marriage was practically the only way other than prostitution for women to secure economic support. If a woman was abused in marriage, her parents could do little else than shame the other family because most parents were unwilling to support their daughters for the rest of their lives. Moreover, once women were settled in their husbands’ households, their worth depended upon their reproductive capacity. During the early to mid twentieth century, women had to bear four or five children before they were no longer at risk from being divorced by their husbands, even though divorce was severely frowned upon. Given the strain of hard work, friction with their husband’s families, and the rigors of childbirth, women held conflicting views about marriage and bearing children. On the one hand, marriage was “the only career open” to women and carried with it respectability and some semblance of security. On the other hand, Chinese women frequently compared marriage to prison. Indicative of the extent of women’s sense of powerlessness, some unhappy wives chose suicide as a means of escape and revenge; this drastic action put an end to their suffering and at the same time brought “ghostly” retribution upon those who supposedly drove them to choose death.

In Taiwan, before the 1980s and the beginning of the domestic violence prevention movement, cultural attitudes and political-economic constraints prevented most women from leaving abusive relationships. These constraints included, but were not limited to, the economic instability of single mothers and divorcées, lack of social welfare support from the government, and legal barriers (e.g., the difficulty of attaining a divorce and child custody). Employment opportunities began to open up for women after Taiwan industrialized in the 1920s, but even with this advance few working women could survive on their own because most of them had to remit wages to their natal or marital families. The insecurities of women in Taiwan today stem from the discrimination they face in the workplace and the relative lack of support they receive from the government. Regardless of their level of education, for instance, women are paid less, are less likely to attain top administrative positions, and are often fired upon marriage. As for government services and financial aid for women, as recently as 1994, during a national conference on government social welfare policy, the president and prime minister advocated the idea of “family-centered welfare,” encouraging women to rely on their families and less on the government for support.

Particularly before the 1980s, if a Taiwanese woman decided to end her marriage officially, she faced many legal obstacles. First, divorce was socially stigmatized. Where Confucian ideals stressed the importance of a unified family, women were unlikely to divorce and remarry. Second, alimony payments were rarely awarded or enforced. Third, divorced and separated women usually
lost custody of their children. Recent studies have shown that while judges may take child abuse into account when deciding custody cases, they take spousal abuse more lightly. If spousal abuse is considered at all, wives have the burden of proving that abuse occurred. Strong social pressures have discouraged abused women from reporting violence to the police, and prosecutors generally do not investigate cases unless a spouse filed a formal complaint.

As Taiwanese women have become educated and economically independent, more of them have chosen to divorce abusive husbands. Taiwan now has one of the highest divorce rates in Asia, about 2.73 divorces per thousand in 2002. By comparison, China had 0.79 divorces per thousand in 2003. Also, although women still earn only 70 percent on average of what men earn, their economic situation is higher than the average throughout the rest of Asia. The number of employed women has sharply increased over the last ten years from a total of 35.6 percent to 48.4 percent, and the education gap between men and women has fallen significantly.

Women in Taiwan today also stand a better chance of retaining child custody and thus filing for divorce is becoming less inhibiting. In 1994, the Taiwan Council of Grand Justices declared unconstitutional the practice of automatically giving fathers the prime parental right in custody and, in 1996, the Council adopted the “best interests of the child” standard for custody cases. Women also began to organize. In 1971, pioneering feminist Lu Xiulian (who became Taiwan’s vice president in 2000) published seven essays on the problems of traditional sex roles and how modern Taiwanese society should strive
for a new feminism, or gender equality, and Taiwan’s feminist movement began to take off.28 Even though martial law (1947-1987) prohibited the existence of formal organizations, women were gaining activist experience by organizing into informal groups, ostensibly for religious, business, or environmental purposes that were not politically threatening.29 In 1982, another activist, Li Yuanzhen, a professor of Chinese literature, began to publish a monthly magazine, *Awakening*, for the purpose of “raising female consciousness, encouraging self-development, and voicing feminist opinion.”30 Although feminism still functioned below the public radar, more and more women were becoming educated about gender issues through feminist publications, lectures, and knowledge brought back from women’s organizations in other countries.


The first stage of the social movement against domestic violence formally began when a dozen women’s groups registered as NGOs after the ruling Nationalist Party lifted martial law on 15 July 1987. Registration gave these groups political legitimacy and expanded their advocacy base. In addition to grassroots organizations, women’s groups also took the form of political party affiliates, religious affiliates, or subunits of larger international organizations.31 The emerging social network also included women in high political positions such as Taipei High Court Judge Gao Fengxian and Legislator Pan Weigang.

Mobilization of various groups toward ending underage prostitution illustrates the intricate social network in which NGOs existed: although organizations typically pursued their own goals, they united for what they considered to be important issues. In 1987, the Awakening Foundation and thirty-one human rights, religious, indigenous peoples, and women’s groups demonstrated against the abuse of child prostitutes in Snake Alley, in Taipei’s Wan Hua District.32 The movement spread throughout Taiwan, capturing the attention of the media and the public.33

Women’s groups used various measures to publicize the issue of domestic violence. A social worker at the Garden of Hope Foundation described her organization’s efforts to gain more government support through meetings and seminars with government personnel. She explained why domestic violence was a problem that required government attention and funds. NGOs also publicized their opinions among the social worker population through newsletters and seminars. If nothing else worked, they held news conferences to air their concerns in a public forum. These women’s groups were also politically savvy enough to write feminist platforms and campaign for candidates who supported their cause during election years.34 In 1987, in response to growing pressure from women’s NGOs, the Taipei City Government Bureau of Social Affairs founded the Northern District Service Center for women to deal with all forms of domestic violence, including marital violence and child abuse. In 1989, it established the Taipei City Social Agency Carnation Hotline. These efforts represented the first steps the government took to combat domestic violence. After
1990, the Northern District Service Center became more established and focused primarily on abused women by providing specific, professional services.

Most of the people I interviewed did not cite domestic violence as one of their original reasons for choosing to work in the social service sector. Like the public, they considered women to be less disadvantaged than children, the disabled, the elderly, and teenage prostitutes. The social worker at the Garden of Hope Foundation explained that she chose to work on elder abuse issues because she felt that “the elderly have less of a voice than women.” As women began to gain more political clout, education, and employment opportunities, people felt that they should be able to fend for themselves.

When NGOs began to encounter more cases of domestic abuse in their social services work, however, they came to a deeper understanding of domestic violence as contributing to other social ills such as the involvement of adolescent girls engaged in sex work. After realizing that most of these girls came from troubled families, one organization — the TWRF — started to address underlying family problems, like domestic violence. They thus developed direct services that included hotlines, legal aid, counseling, shelter referrals, court and medical accompaniment services, and financial support.

The MWF was established in a similar manner. During her work in the early eighties as a Taipei City Government representative, MWF founder Pan Weigang tried to promote women’s dignity and development by teaching women how to balance careers and family life. Pan’s contact with female victims of violence, particularly victims of sexual assault, soon made her realize that it was unrealistic to address abstract issues like women’s dignity when basic safety needs remained unmet. Thus, she and a group of her friends shifted their work toward victims of sexual violence. In 1987, they established the MWF with NT $1,000,000 of their own money.

An administrator at a government prevention center told me that after many years in social work she began to understand that domestic violence was about power and control and that it included verbal abuse and suicide threats. Another social worker at a government-sponsored prevention center took greater interest in domestic violence when she began reading feminist essays and discussing them with friends. After wondering why women were treated the way they were in Taiwanese society, she started working for women’s welfare services.

Women’s NGOs soon realized how difficult it is to address domestic violence with only direct services. An administrator at the MWF observed, “One person can only do so much. For example, if I didn’t sleep and I worked twenty-four hours a day, I might be able to only help one hundred victims a year. This is not very effective. We had to push the government to create a system to deal with domestic violence.” Moving beyond the provision of direct services, NGOs began engaging in advocacy for women and created educational or research programs to teach the public about domestic violence.

The government’s social service sector also began to see a need to create an overarching system for domestic violence. Judge Gao Fengxian, a Taiwan High Court judge, was one official who noted the weaknesses in Taiwan’s traditional
codes for dealing with domestic violence cases. (Gao would later draft the DVPTA.) The legal code before the DVPTA lacked preventative measures; it addressed only the aftermath of domestic violence. The desire to preserve family integrity made enforcement ineffective and inconsistent because the victim’s own family and friends often put personal safety issues aside and advised the victim to stay in the relationship and to not file a police report. Law enforcement officials still considered domestic violence to be a private affair. Even if officers witnessed violence, they were unwilling to detain the abuser for further investigation. Besides the lack of preventative measures and effective enforcement, there was no comprehensive legal system that specifically handled domestic violence; regulations were spread haphazardly throughout civil and criminal legislation.37

In response to the efforts of women’s groups and the large number of calls made to government domestic violence hotlines in the early nineties, the Judicial Yuan commissioned Judge Gao to study domestic violence law in the United States. Following studies in the United States from June 1993 to April 1994, Gao brought back to Taiwan domestic violence-related articles and legislation from various states. Despite this initiative, in the absence of public concern about domestic violence, the government moved very slowly, with no certainty that it would ever enact strong measures.

**Development of Public Awareness and Specific Goals, 1993-1997**

The second stage of the domestic violence prevention movement was characterized by a striking change in how the public thought about violence against women. This change in awareness was a result of the media attention given the case of Deng Ruweng38 and the murders of Peng Wanru and Bai Xiaoyan (described below). The women’s movement used these three cases to combine issues of domestic violence against women with issues of violence against women outside the home under the broader umbrella of women’s rights. Activists felt that the public had to learn that unjust social structures and cultural attitudes were among many factors that contributed to the brutal treatment of women.

Women’s NGOs and policy-makers then worked together to develop specific legislative goals (e.g., criminalizing domestic violence and creating a domestic violence prevention council), capitalizing on current events to push for domestic violence legislation that encompassed all social groups. Under pressure from women’s NGOs, government legislators and the Judicial Yuan began considering the creation of legislation that would specifically handle domestic violence cases. In 1994, the Ministry of the Interior under the Executive Yuan requested women’s NGOs, primarily the Awakening Foundation, to examine domestic violence against women so that a yet-to-be-established government committee could understand and eventually develop the best way to respond to the issue. The NGOs worked on a marital violence report from December 1994 to June 1995 that covered the situation in Taiwan but also included information from the United States, the United Kingdom, and Hong Kong. The report concluded that Taiwan needed comprehensive domestic violence legislation so...
that the government would have greater authority and responsibility in handling domestic violence cases.  

Meanwhile, in February 1995, the Judicial Yuan sent Judge Gao to Guam for the 11th South Pacific Judicial Conference, a forum in which judicial leaders worked together to improve communication on judicial matters. Coincidentally, there had been an international domestic violence conference in Guam a few days prior to her arrival. A judge in Guam assisted Judge Gao in acquiring the U.S. Model Code on Domestic and Family Violence (1995). She had been impressed with the United States for being the first country to address sexual harassment, another problem that plagued Taiwan.

According to those I interviewed, the main concepts that activists in Taiwan wished to transmit from the United States were protection orders and forcing abusers to leave the house. In addition, by studying what worked and what did not work in the United States, Taiwanese policy-makers could try to avoid repeating mistakes. Judge Gao worked closely with women’s NGOs in the drafting of the DVPTA in September 1995 because the DVPTA contained so many foreign concepts, like supervised visitation and mandatory arrests, that were unfamiliar to the Taiwanese. In February 1996, Legislator Pan Weigang, founder of the MWF, led a group of four women, including Judge Gao, to San Francisco, Los Angeles, and Seattle to study how U.S. courts, police stations, municipal governments, and civil organizations handled domestic violence. After returning to Taiwan in July 1996, Pan then organized an official drafting committee of over forty people — professors, lawyers, public officials, social workers, and judges — to revise the DVPTA. Ten members of the committee were female judges from the Chinese Female Judges’ Association. On 13 July 1996, the committee called a press conference, publicly announcing the beginning of the formal drafting process of the DVPTA. The press conference was a tactical move to keep domestic violence and legislative processes in the public eye.

During the drafting process, many difficulties surfaced in adapting a U.S. model to the Taiwanese legal system. At first, legal professionals, scholars, and judges did not want to accept legislation created under America’s common law system because Taiwan operates under a civil law system. The United States, for instance, gives a great deal of power to courts for interpreting the law, while in Taiwan, courts have a smaller role in legal interpretation and its laws are thus more detailed because verdicts are lifted directly from codes and past cases. Second, some judges argued that certain aspects of U.S. law seemed too difficult to enforce, e.g., protection orders. Because Taiwan is a small and densely populated island, protection orders that require people to keep certain distances apart seemed unrealistic. It is also difficult to secretly relocate victims in Taiwan because abusers are easily able to find out from schools, friends, or family members where the victims live.

As the process of revision continued, another horrifying event gripped the public’s attention: the rape and murder of Peng Wanru. Peng Wanru was a passionate feminist and director of the Department of Women’s Development for the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP). Before working for the government, she had been an active member of women’s NGOs, including the Homemakers’
Union Environmental Protection Foundation and the Awakening Foundation. Later on, she worked tirelessly with women’s NGOs and the government to change discriminatory practices against women and she advocated the designation of at least one-fourth of elected seats in the National Legislature for women. After leaving a conference in Gaoxiong on 30 November 1996, Peng Wanru disappeared. A few days later, authorities found her body; she had been brutally raped and stabbed thirty times. Her killers were never apprehended, and it was never clear whether she was killed for her feminist work.

The murder of Peng Wanru awakened the public to the issues of women’s safety and violence in general in Taiwan. Women’s NGOs held a press conference on the morning of 20 December 1996 to announce that they had collected thousands of signatures in support of a Women’s Rights Day and that there would be a major feminist event on 21 December.42 That day, three thousand demonstrators, most of them women, held a public remembrance for Peng Wanru. The demonstration was the largest in the history of the feminist movement in Taiwan15 and it caught the attention of print media such as the Zhongguo Shibao [China Times Evening News] and the Zhongyin Ribao [Central Daily].

After Peng Wanru’s murder, women’s groups focused on the issue of sexual violence against women. The first time sexual violence legislation appeared in the Legislative Yuan had been in April 1994. MWF members, most prominently Legislator Pan Weigang, drafted and proposed the Sexual Assault Prevention Act (SAPA), which preceded the DVPTA. When the SAPA was first sent to the Legislative Yuan in 1994, many male legislators voiced their concern that the SAPA would lead to the breakdown of marriage as an institution, particularly because husbands could now be accused of marital rape. The minister of justice worried that the SAPA would change some of the provisions of the criminal code, such as those pertaining to marital rape, and he said he preferred to make changes in the criminal code rather than include these articles in the SAPA. Judge Gao suggested a compromise to Legislator Pan: one part of the SAPA would deal with the prevention and treatment of sexual violence and the other part would deal with revisions in the criminal code that should be sent back to the minister of justice. Legislator Pan agreed to the revisions and the SAPA quickly passed its first, second, and third readings in the legislature within one week. President Li Denghui announced the passage of the SAPA on 22 January 1997. In May 1997, the Peng Wanru Foundation was established in order to protect women’s personal safety, promote equal opportunity education, and encourage the participation of women and communities in political affairs.44

Only four-and-a-half months after Peng’s death, on 14 April 1997, 17-year-old Bai Xiaoyan, the daughter of a Taiwanese celebrity, was kidnapped on her way to school. Pai’s body was later found in a drainage ditch; she had been raped and tortured before she died. Police killed two of her murderers as they tried to escape capture; the third was executed after a criminal trial. Because it followed so shortly after the murder of Peng Wanru, Bai Xiaoyan’s death further infuriated the public about personal safety. On 4 May 1997,45 fifty thousand people marched through the streets of Taipei to protest the recent acts of violence and...
what the marchers considered to be a lack of government action. At first, the protestors’ demands were not taken seriously. President Li was slow to respond and when a private remark of his about foreign policy being more important than a schoolgirl’s killing was leaked to the press, public anger increased. People complained of the rift between the government’s priorities and the actual needs of Taiwanese society.

President Li’s focus in May 1997, for example, was on finding political allies abroad and gaining representation for Taiwan in the United Nations rather than on dealing with the domestic problem of public safety.47

Two weeks after the 4 May demonstration a second protest march brought one hundred thousand people onto the streets. Protest organizers stated: “We have a very humble request; we want a government that can safeguard the safety and welfare of women and children.”48 President Li, Taiwan’s first popularly elected president, suffered a major political blow. He finally responded to the protestors’ demands by promising that the minister of the Executive Yuan would resign in July and by appointing a woman to head the Ministry of the Interior.49

Although public support for passage of the DVPTA was increasing — particularly after the high-profile murder cases — some members of the Legislative Yuan were still hesitant to change existing structures for fear of undermining cultural traditions (among other reasons). The main points of contention centered around preserving the family unit and trying not to encroach on the civil rights of male abusers. Some legislators believed that the intention of the DVPTA should be to improve family harmony and relations. They worried that the second draft of the DVPTA would lead to family breakdowns, with its emphasis on protection orders and other mechanisms for separating couples. Another perceived threat to the traditional family structure was the idea of broadening the target population of the DVPTA to include cohabiting unmarried couples. Although U.S. legal codes considered domestic violence in all types of relationships, some Taiwanese dissenters were afraid that the DVPTA would encourage couples to live together without getting married, hence undermining the institution of marriage. Due to the conservative backlash among legislators, the final draft of the DVPTA ended up not including cohabitating couples.50

Critics also charged that the DVPTA infringed upon the abuser’s civil rights. Legislators protested against forcing abusers to leave the house, giving police officers broad powers of arrest, and forcing abusers to seek treatment. They felt that the DVPTA should follow existing criminal codes and not create new specialized protocols for domestic violence or else judges would have difficulty passing judgments and issuing warrants. Dissenters did not like the concept of
the “warrant-less arrest policy,” which was practiced in the United States, Australia, and New Zealand. Women’s groups responded to these concerns. First, they countered that the protection of victims was beyond maintaining family integrity. Moreover, they argued, the existence of domestic violence would inevitably lead to family breakdown. Second, they supported broadening officers’ powers of arrest because officers often had to make quick decisions in domestic violence situations and they needed to be given the authority to make warrant-less arrests. In the end, Taiwan’s Judicial Yuan eventually rejected the broadening of police powers of arrest for fear that it might result in the abuse of the civil rights of male perpetrators.51

In order to expedite the passage of the DVPTA, the drafting committee compromised on certain issues (e.g., protecting the civil rights of abusers), so the final legislation would not be perceived to be a drastic divergence from Taiwanese culture. The committee presented the third draft to the Legislative Yuan in September 1997.

The DVPTA and Its Consequences

Taiwan’s Legislative Yuan passed the DVPTA on 28 May 1998 and the president made the official announcement on 24 June 1998. The greatest impact of criminalizing domestic violence in Taiwan was to foster the idea that the government had the right and the responsibility to intervene in family affairs. As a result, the government allocated more money to domestic violence prevention and treatment, and government sectors, such as law enforcement and the judiciary, were given new responsibilities, such as responding appropriately to domestic violence cases. One year after the passage of the DVPTA, the Taipei City Government established the Domestic Violence and Sexual Assault Prevention Center on the eighth floor of the Taipei Xinyi police station, marking a major departure from Taiwan’s family-centered welfare system, which expected families to provide most services.52 The most prominent characteristic of the new government center was its integration in one over-the-counter arrangement of various professional services, including sexual assault prevention services. The city of Taipei alone went from having virtually no domestic violence social service agencies in the mid-1980s to having nine organizations by 2002.

The DVPTA required city governments to allocate part of their budgets to domestic violence work and to establish domestic violence prevention centers. For the fiscal year 1999-2000,53 Taipei’s city government alone spent NT$14.0 million54 on sexual assault prevention operations and NT$107.5 million on domestic violence prevention operations. The Ministry of Interior Affairs also budgeted NT$4.0 million and NT$1.25 million for sexual assault and domestic violence work, respectively.55 Domestic violence funds support 24-hour hotlines, emergency shelter placement and accompaniment, assistance in applying for protection orders, medical exams and treatment, and assistance in obtaining evidence of abuse, legal aid, psychological counseling and referrals, occupational counseling and living-arrangement referrals, safeguarding evidence of sexual assault, batterer treatment programs and referrals, and domestic violence educational programs.56
How much financial aid the government decides to grant to other organizations depends on the number of cases delegated to these organizations by the government center and on whether or not the organizations effectively and successfully satisfy victims’ needs. The definition of what constitutes “effective” or “successful” services is not set in stone; measurements vary from case to case. For example, the number of women who divorce or separate from their abusers is not the sole indicator of success. It is also a mark of success that victims who need assistance in applying for a protection order receive legal aid and that those who suffer from a psychological disorder receive counseling.

In addition to providing new direct government services for victims of domestic violence, the DVPTA also specified new responsibilities for service workers and officials. For example, social service workers have to establish domestic violence centers, create domestic violence databases, and provide information to relevant officials, professionals, and victims. Police have to be more responsive to victims’ needs, particularly in offering protection and enforcing protection orders. Judges have to issue protection orders and gain a better understanding of domestic violence dynamics in civil and criminal court cases. Medical personnel have to assist victims and create treatment programs for battered victims. Education authorities have to establish programs and departments to educate students and faculty members about domestic violence. The Domestic Violence Prevention Council, created by the Ministry of Interior Affairs in April 1999, oversees and coordinates these prevention and treatment efforts.

However, as with any groundbreaking legislation, activism does not stop with the passage of the law; the third — and ongoing — phase in Taiwan’s domestic violence prevention movement focuses on the implementation and funding of the DVPTA. Women’s NGOs are now focusing their efforts in these areas: revising domestic violence legislation, educating the government and general public, and integrating professional services to deliver the most comprehensive assistance to victims, such as cooperation between medical professionals and social workers.

Although Taiwan’s public service sectors have made great strides forward under the DVPTA, they still face difficulties in putting these relatively new ideals into practice, particularly due to persistent misconceptions about domestic violence among law enforcement officials and judges. The role of law enforcement officials is also critical because police are usually the first ones to arrive on the scene of a domestic situation. Unfortunately, however, many police officers still do not understand the spirit of the DVPTA. They believe that physical injuries, such as a broken arm or an eye injury, have to be evident before an action can be labeled domestic violence. In other words, minor physical injuries, like a slap in the face, or verbal and emotional abuse, do not count. Other police officers believe that domestic violence should be handled by family members and not by officials, especially given that police are already overworked with what they consider to be more serious crimes. About half of the people I interviewed recalled multiple situations in which a woman called the police about a domestic emergency, only to have responding officers make little effort to help her before
quickly leaving. Consequently, victims were often beaten more severely after the police departed. Officers who do try to follow the domestic violence protocol are often frustrated by victims who do not wish to see their husbands arrested. Nevertheless, the frequency of these situations is diminishing. The number of domestic violence cases in which officers helped victims apply for legal protection has been steadily increasing, from 6,022 in 2000, to 7,636 in 2001, and 7,701 in 2002.57

Some women’s NGOs prefer to maintain open communication and dialogue with the government rather than publicly berate it for its shortcomings. According to one supervisor at a government center, women’s NGOs and lawyers resort to protests and news conferences only after seminars, meetings, and research projects have failed. For example, NGOs and activists first try to counter law enforcement obstacles by holding seminars about domestic violence and talking to the administrative superiors of police officers.

Despite these educational efforts some judges still fail to understand victims’ situations and they refuse to grant protection orders or take the word of the victim that a domestic situation is dangerous; these judges require further proof, as under the old laws: tape recordings of verbal abuse, injury reports, and witnesses, for example. Sometimes when a woman requests a protection order, the judge advises her to drop the request in an effort to keep her family intact. Women’s NGOs contend that too many judges focus on this part of the law at the expense of the victim’s safety. Since 2002, activists have been trying to delete the part of the law that emphasizes the need to preserve family harmony — a stipulation that was originally included as a compromise. NGOs have tried through seminars and protests to make judges understand that domestic violence is never an appropriate way of resolving household conflicts. One women’s NGO stationed members in courtrooms to ensure fair treatment of victims. When seminars and protests proved ineffective, they criticized judges in the media, urging them to safeguard victim’s rights by, for instance, issuing protective orders. Eventually, judges became more aware of women’s NGOs and, when working on domestic violence cases, they began to take into consideration what the activists were saying. The greater issuance of protective orders is evidence of progress in this regard: at the end of 2000, 13,691 petitions for protective orders had been filed, and 8,493 had been issued by judicial departments.58

In addition to these efforts, NGOs have also tried to educate public service sector workers. Some of the larger organizations, like the MWF, focus on educating legal professionals, law enforcement officials, judges, teachers, and medical personnel. Other organizations concentrate on educating school authorities, given that so many children are witnesses to or victims of domestic abuse. There are now programs in some Taipei middle and high schools that try to educate students about domestic violence, but as a social worker from the TWRF noted, teachers and other education authorities still hesitate to discuss the issue in schools because they do not want to interfere with parents or jeopardize the school’s reputation. Before the 1990s, schools rarely acknowledged cases of domestic violence, let alone offered support services. In the autumn of 2002, the TWRF implemented an experimental counseling program for children who wit-
ness violence in their homes; this pilot program is due to be evaluated in late 2004. At present, too little is known about domestic violence counseling in schools to draw conclusions about its efficacy.

One social worker at the MWF, noting the lack of coordination and communication between different professional fields in Taiwanese culture, suggested that activists ought to teach professionals how to integrate their services to the best interests of victims. For instance, doctors in the past seldom worked with judges or social workers. A victim would request an injury report from her doctor in order to apply for a protection order, but her doctor might not want to help her because he did not want to “get into trouble.” NGOs give lectures to professionals who might be associated with victims in order to help them understand the importance of cooperation.

Taiwan’s economic situation is also relevant. When Taiwan’s economy was strong, the government allocated more money to domestic violence prevention. However, recent financial troubles have resulted in government funds being diverted to employment-generation programs rather than to an expansion of domestic violence prevention services. With reduced government financial support, the Domestic Violence Prevention Council (DVPC) cannot afford to increase staffing or to establish new domestic violence centers.

In addition, local governments do not always use effectively the funds they do have for domestic violence or social welfare programs. The DVPC recently carried out a survey examining how much was being spent on domestic violence and sexual assault cases in local governments around Taiwan. The survey revealed that after the passage of the DVPTA some local governments are still unwilling to build new prevention and treatment centers for battered women because they do not consider domestic violence crucial enough to address with limited funds. They spend most of their social welfare budgets on the elderly, young children, and pregnant women, regardless of financial need. Some domestic violence centers that have existed since the late 1980s and early 1990s still only offer rudimentary services. For example, many counties only have one social worker per center.

How much money the government decides to devote to a social cause depends on how important the public perceives it to be. If the issue is being constantly discussed in society and is given extensive media coverage, the government is more likely to fund related social programs. Nevertheless, women’s NGOs are still trying to keep the domestic violence issue in the public eye. As a social worker at the TWRF said, “we tell the public that [if they] don’t handle this issue right now, it will cost society and the government more in the future.” To this end, NGOs utilize news conferences, seminars, books, television programs, advertisements, radio shows, billboards, ads on buses and in rapid transit stations, films, and lectures in middle school and high school. Another social worker at the TWRF described attempts to directly educate victim’s families. She counsels family members who call hotlines and offers them literature that explains how victims must make the decision to leave by themselves and that family members should provide whatever support victims need. Another strategy is to target university populations. According to an administrator at a government
center, college curricula began to include courses in the 1990s that addressed domestic violence. Sometimes, by enlisting the help of university volunteers to carry out advocacy work, organizations create self-propagating educational programs: volunteers learn about domestic violence and then spread this information to other students. When discussions and media attention fail, organizations resort to tougher tactics such as encouraging legislators to boycott government budget proposals in order to force the government to allocate more funds to domestic violence centers.

Women’s NGOs still have to walk a fine line when employing these strategies. Several administrators at women’s NGOs told me how difficult it is for organizations that receive substantial government funding to turn around and chastise the government for inadequate support. Therefore, many women’s NGOs try to stay financially independent, through private donations and proceeds from raffles and corporate fundraising activities. Unfortunately, as is the case with most nonprofits, financial independence is not easy to achieve. Without media attention and expressions of public outrage, ordinary people are unwilling to spend their own money or support central government funding on domestic violence prevention. Part of this reluctance stems from continuing beliefs that child and elder abuse are more serious problems and the thinking that abused women must not have fulfilled their responsibilities as mothers and wives. Businesses hold similar views.

The wide disparity in services between urban and rural areas is another factor to consider. Rural areas have fewer resources, are less populated, and have fewer educational opportunities. Because rural communities are so small and tightly knit, police officers are more likely to be the family members or friends of abusers and are therefore reluctant to make arrests for domestic violence. Women’s and social service organizations have had to alter their strategies in these areas. One government center that focuses on local rural Aborigines has tried to compensate for the lack of domestic violence education by going directly to people’s homes and discussing available resources, offering free services and classes, and leaving information about domestic violence in public areas. Other NGOs try to teach local community leaders how to establish their own domestic violence prevention programs to aid victims in both rural and urban areas.

Despite setbacks and difficulties, public perceptions about domestic violence have changed markedly since passage of the DVPTA. First, the media have begun to report domestic violence incidents and condemn batterers more frequently. As an administrator at the MWF noted, in the year after the DVPTA was passed, newspapers reported more than 130 deaths attributed to domestic violence. Judge Gao recalled stories of husbands killing wives, wives killing husbands, and parents killing children. Second, according to those I interviewed, the public realized that domestic violence is a crime — a public issue, not only a family issue. Thus, rates of reporting to the authorities have increased. The National Police Administration found that the number of domestic violence cases reported to local police officers had been rising since the passage of the DVPTA: from 11,030 cases in 2000, to 15,382 in 2001, and 17,376 in 2002.59 A social
worker from a government center said that even her traditionally minded father-in-law from a rural village in Taiwan now believes hitting people is inappropriate. Even though they do not have a profound notion of the definition of domestic violence or an awareness of possibilities for prevention or treatment, people understand from the media that husbands cannot hit their wives or else they will be reported to law enforcement officials and punished. Another social worker from a government center commented that younger people (i.e., those under the age of forty) have a better grasp of what constitutes domestic violence and what services are available to them. The younger the female victims, the more likely they are to seek outside help or divorce their husbands. Education and the media have taught younger women that outside help is available and that they can be economically independent of their husbands. Women over forty are less likely to seek outside help because their lives are more settled, they have fewer job skills, adhere to cultural traditions, have more children, and did not receive any domestic violence education in school.

The Success of the Social Movement

Over the last fifteen years, Taiwan has experienced a whirlwind of social change. The recent fruits of the domestic violence prevention movement — criminalization of domestic violence, passage of protective legislation, and creation of necessary social services for the abused — resulted from individuals acting collectively to achieve their ends. The success of these actions required the following social conditions:

• better employment opportunities and education, enabling women to bring in external income — income they could take with them if they wanted to leave abusive relationships;
• the organization — by middle- and upper-class women — of informal networks that were culturally and politically accepted under martial law;\(^60\)
• the lifting of martial law and Taiwan’s subsequent democratization;\(^61\)
• freedom of the press, which allowed women’s NGOs to criticize government failings and publicize major issues in domestic violence;
• and easy access to the Internet.

In the early 1990s, women’s organizations and the government researched the issue in Taiwan and in other countries, like the United States, that had already developed domestic violence legislation. With a ready social network, growing economic and political power, domestic violence models from other countries, the unifying goal of creating legislation, and an atmosphere open to change, all concerned individuals needed was a chance spark to ignite coordinated collective action by activists, the government, and the public. This chance spark appeared in the cases of Deng Ruweng, Peng Wanru, and Bai Xiaoyan.

Yet no matter how outraged the public felt over the three cases, the movement would not have culminated in such groundbreaking legislation had feminist networks not already been in place in Taiwan and had they not been prepared to utilize the opportunities provided by current events. Women’s NGOs managed to combine top-down and bottom-up approaches to prevent and treat domestic violence: with public and media support at crucial times, they pushed...
for legislation that criminalized abuse, and they developed services to help victims on a more direct level. NGOs used Deng Ruweng’s example as justification for government intervention in family matters and for the creation of legislation that specifically handled domestic violence cases. After the deaths of Peng Wanru and Bai Xiaoyan, feminist networks organized demonstrations that captured media attention and forced the government to respond; these women had already had the experience of mobilizing members of large informal networks that operated below the radar of martial law (like environmental groups) in the 1980s. Finally, as local community groups, women’s NGOs understood the cultural compromises that needed to be made in the drafting process in order to adapt the universal human right of personal safety to Taiwanese culture. NGOs stress that professionals and government officials had to understand domestic violence problems within the native cultural context before they could propose solutions.

Taiwan’s domestic violence prevention movement and the DVPTA in particular are beginning to have an impact beyond Taiwan’s borders. Described by several social workers and administrators at women’s NGOs as the first of its kind in Asia, the DVPTA has captured the attention of other Asian nations, particularly Japan. When the U.S. model code was formulated in 1995, Japanese academics did not think that it would work in their culture even though Japan had serious problems with violence against women. However, when Taiwan passed the DVPTA, Japanese academics and women’s NGOs were excited that they might be able to pass a similar act. They visited Taiwanese NGOs, academics, and political officials to better understand how to set up counseling programs and domestic violence legislation. In addition, they invited Judge Gao to Japan to speak on the topic of domestic violence. Japan eventually passed protective legislation in 2001, although domestic violence was defined only as physical abuse.

Understanding how individuals came together in a feminist social network to pass the DVPTA, the first of its kind in Asia, shows the positive potential of mobilizing in a world where women’s political-economic situations are improving and information is increasingly globalized. These individuals observed feminist movements that succeeded in other cultures and formed their own local networks and strategies to achieve similar ends, recognizing that “each of [their] capabilities may be concretely realized in a variety of different ways, in accordance with individual tastes, local circumstances, and traditions.” The domestic violence prevention movement in Taiwan has clearly met the challenge of organizing individuals to act collectively against patriarchal structures, bringing changes that have significantly improved women’s lives in Taiwan.

Notes
2. I thank an anonymous reviewer for providing this information.
3. According to the Population Information Program and the Center for Health and Gender Equity in the United States, “around the world at least one woman in every three has been beaten, coerced into sex, or otherwise abused in her lifetime. Most often the abuser is a member of her own family.” (L. Heise, M.


5. Although Japan has had tremendous cultural, economic, and political influence on Taiwan (e.g., Japanese colonization from 1895 to 1945), Taiwan has led the way over Japan in terms of the domestic violence prevention movement.

6. I interviewed fifteen professionals at three government-run and six private women’s organizations. This self-selected, nonrandom sample included several leaders in the movement. It did not include accused abusers and people who opposed the DVPTA. Understanding of the opposition was derived from leaders in the movement and secondary sources.


9. Ibid.


22. URL: http://www.nationalmaster.com/graph-T/peo_div_rat/ASI.

23. Huang, “Taiwanese Women Rebelling by Filing for Divorce.”


25. Ibid., 6.


27. Liu, *Mother or Father*, 1.
34. Ku, “Current Status of Women in Taiwan.”
38. When Deng Ruweng went on trial in October 1993, the media turned a spotlight on her case. Many of the people I interviewed remembered how almost everybody had heard about Deng Ruweng. One administrator at a government center noted that women’s NGOs began to prioritize this case in their educational campaigns about domestic violence.
40. Judge Gao had determined that the most comprehensive and progressive domestic violence laws came from common law countries like the United States and New Zealand. Note that the U.S. model code is not really law; it is a “code” designed to help other nations establish a similar legal response to domestic violence.
44. In 1997 the Peng Wanru Foundation and many other nongovernmental organizations established an information website to cover women’s movements in Taiwan and throughout the world (http://www.womenet.org.tw/). Unfortunately, the feminist news website was closed in March 1999.
45. May 4 is a significant date in Chinese history. On 4 May 1919, hundreds of thousands of students, and working- and middle-class Chinese protested in Beijing against feudalism and Western imperialism. One anonymous reviewer who participated in this protest said that “the date was chosen simply because it was a Sunday. There was no intention to echo the historical Chinese students’ and working class movement.” However, for others in Taiwan, such resonance may have occurred, intended or not.

48. The 18 May demonstration was organized by about 550 citizen groups. The May 1997 demonstrations marked the first time in Taiwanese history that two large-scale protests were held within a brief period of two weeks, mobilizing a record number of demonstrators.

49. President Li also appointed two new cabinet members in response to demands from NGOs: Liu Zhaoxuan, minister of transport, and Ma Yingjiu, minister of justice. Huang, “Taipei Association for the Promotion of Women’s Rights.”


51. Ibid., 109-12.


53. Updated data related specifically to domestic violence are unavailable. Expenditures are given only for the larger category of social welfare.

54. Equivalence of NT$ and US$ in 1999 was NT$33 to US$1.


56. Ibid., 4.


59. “NPA Reports Rise in Domestic-Violence Cases Nationwide.” The increase in the number of calls to hotlines is another indicator of heightened public consciousness about domestic violence. After the trial of Deng Ruweng, the Taipei City Social Agency Carnation Hotline, which had been established in 1989 for the protection of women and children, experienced a sharp increase in the number of domestic violence calls it received per month: from two hundred in March 1994 to about four or five hundred in May 1994. (See Gao, *Jiating Baoli*, 187.) From 1991 through 1993, before Deng Ruweng’s case came to public attention, the Carnation Hotline received 2,600 to 2,700 domestic violence calls per year. (See ibid., 73.)

60. It was only from the mid to late eighties — when the government began to democratize and adopt an open attitude toward Taiwan’s various ethnic groups (Hoklo, Mainlanders, Hakka, Aborigines) — that feminist organizations could overcome ethnic and linguistic barriers to extend their support base.

61. The post-martial law democratization of Taiwan provided a political opportunity for the establishment of feminist organizations, some of which were closely associated with other movements like the Homemakers’ Union Environmental Protection Foundation. See Weller, *Alternate Civilities*, 114.