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CCAS Statement of Purpose

Critical Asian Studies continues to be inspired by the statement of purpose formulated in 1969 by its parent organization, the Committee of Concerned Asian Scholars (CCAS). CCAS ceased to exist as an organization in 1979, but the BCAS board decided in 1993 that the CCAS Statement of Purpose should be published in our journal at least once a year.

We first came together in opposition to the brutal aggression of the United States in Vietnam and to the complicity or silence of our profession with regard to that policy. Those in the field of Asian studies bear responsibility for the consequences of their research and the political posture of their profession. We are concerned about the present unwillingness of specialists to speak out against the implications of an Asian policy committed to ensuring American domination of much of Asia. We reject the legitimacy of this aim, and attempt to change this policy. We recognize that the present structure of the profession has often perverted scholarship and alienated many people in the field.

The Committee of Concerned Asian Scholars seeks to develop a humane and knowledgeable understanding of Asian societies and their efforts to maintain cultural integrity and to confront such problems as poverty, oppression, and imperialism. We realize that to be students of other peoples, we must first understand our relations to them.

CCAS wishes to create alternatives to the prevailing trends in scholarship on Asia, which too often spring from a parochial cultural perspective and serve selfish interests and expansionism. Our organization is designed to function as a catalyst, a communications network for both Asian and Western scholars, a provider of central resources for local chapters, and a community for the development of anti-imperialist research.

Passed, 28–30 March 1969
Boston, Massachusetts
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Some Long-Term Effects of U.S. Control over the Philippines

By Herbert P. Bix
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On the Possibility and Desirability of a Theory of Modernization

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Comments on Dore

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Letters to the Editors

Some Thoughts on Language Study in Taiwan

The second issue of the CCAS Newsletter is a great success in publicizing controversy within the field. One is tempted at many points to leap into the fray, and I shall be surprised if there is not a vigorous response from the readership. The editors deserve our thanks.

Some of the urge to moral purity that has helped to generate these discussions is born, understandably, of personal frustration. The present draft law has already immeasurably damaged personal lives and American education. Jon Livingston's stated fear of becoming "an indentured killer-mercenary" or going to jail, he acknowledges (p. 11), impels him to a "hyper-moralistic tone."

It is difficult to argue for rationality and detachment when so many are touched personally by the ponderous inequities of the present system. But at the same time, it is evident that moral purity passionately pursued engenders a kind of self-defeating myopia. Take, for example, Richard Kagan's article, "Can We Study Chinese in Taiwan?" (p. 5). For him it has become "implicitly imperialistic" to learn Mandarin in a country where most of the people speak the Taiwan dialect. The Mandarin speakers with whom the American student studies, by their very identity, are "active agents in perpetuating the goals of Nationalist and U. S. foreign policy -- the perennial return to the Mainland and the relegation of Taiwan to the interests of the minority of ruling mainlanders." Language study and the cultural concerns of mainlanders thus constitute a "trap," from which the best escape "is to assert a non-academic objective for one's language and training." Once freed from "academic" restrictions, Mr. Kagan seems to argue, the student can then immerse himself in Taiwanese language, life and culture. He thus gains the moral satisfaction of identifying with the oppressed victims of Nationalist despotism.

Mr. Kagan's message appears to be that any serious "academic" effort to learn Mandarin on Taiwan is inconsistent with one's moral obligation to oppose the Nationalist government and its "imperialist" American support. But the fact remains, undisputed I hope, that deeper knowledge of Mainland China is of urgent importance both in scholarship and public affairs. A fluency in Mandarin is a valuable tool to further this knowledge. Taiwan offers the American student the opportunity both to speak the language in a living environment and, in many cases, the chance to discuss his professional interests with leading scholars or even with major participants in historical events.

Such contacts with mainlanders may be "academic" in the sense that I believe Mr. Kagan is using the word. But there is no reason why they should limit a student's "involvement" or dull his moral sensibilities. Indeed, it is precisely by contact with mainlanders in their own language that one can best understand the psychology of the Taiwan version of Chinese authoritarianism. And moral concern must be based on understanding if it is to have meaning.

The politically significant tensions within mainland society on Taiwan will be hidden from the moral purist who regards every mainland as a conscious agent of Chiang Kai-shek. Here, after all, is a classic example of the exile mentality in its full range of human expression: sense of superiority ("Taiwanese are dirty"), dreamy nostalgia ("Life was better in Peking"), fantasy plans for the future ("When we return... ") and all the political and social distortions that attend the exile condition.

Many of these mainland refugees came to Taiwan in 1949 because they thought it the least painful of two terrible choices. Many have been more the victims than the "agents" of the Nationalist government. Some have felt humiliated by crude government propaganda. Some have gone to prison for speaking too freely. Some (and this may include some Inter University Program language teachers) seek out foreigners not to proselytize for Chiang Kai-shek but as protection for themselves. If they support the government it is because they find nothing else to cling to, but they may be poignantly ambivalent about it.

Nor does serious study with mainlanders preclude active contact with Taiwanese. Mandarin is not as ideal a medium as the local language (or in some cases Japanese), but it will open many doors. Some of the happiest and most informative hours I remember from my year with the I.U.P. program (1958-59) were spent exclusively with Taiwanese. Another student in the program at that time married a Taiwanese girl. No barriers there!
For American students in Taiwan, I see no useful distinction between what is "academic" and what is "moral" or "involved." It is valuable to study Taiwanese language and culture, and I hope more students will do so. It is also essential to study Mandarin and learn what we can about the rest of China. Both activities should enhance our professional understanding and our moral concern.

Charlton M. Lewis
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January 24, 1969

To the Editors:

I should like to raise, for general consideration, one consequence of U.S. China policy which affects American scholars daily and directly--the presence in every university or college where China is studied of politically unfree students. I hesitate to comment extensively on the nature of the Chinese student body; it clearly varies from place to place and is perhaps no more factionalized and paranoid than the American left in general and for some of the same reasons. In the case of Chinese students, however, severe repression is a reality and not a possibility. Few American students can be unaware of the fact that the system of informal spies which permeates Taiwan has overseas branches throughout the United States. It is a safe assumption that no student from Taiwan, particularly if he is Taiwanese, can comfortably engage in public discussion of political issues unless he has permanently abandoned any intention of returning to the island. Two recent cases on Taiwan illustrate the danger of participation in legitimate American university activity on the part of returning Taiwanese students. In August 1968 a Mr. Chen Yu-hsi was tried and sentenced to seven years imprisonment for, apparently, having read "the Thoughts of Mao... in the Oriental section of the University of Hawaii's East-West Center Library" and for having written articles for a journal deemed left-wing by the Nationalist government. (See The Nation, letter to the editor from Prof. Robert Merideth, December 2, 1968). In the summer of 1966 Huang Ch'i-ming, a graduate student at the University of Wisconsin, home on a brief filial visit, was arrested and convicted on the charge of having attended meetings in Madison where "the problem of Formosa" was discussed. (See my article, "Formosa: 'Solidarity of Gloom'", The Nation, March 4, 1968.)

Suppose both Huang and Chen were guilty as charged. What does this mean about Chinese centers across the country? It means that we study with and among students who are under direct threat of imprisonment, afraid to discuss subjects of vital mutual concern. It means that we tolerate in our midst a disgusting atmosphere of fear and repression. It means that China centers have double standards for academic freedom--if you are Chinese keep your mouth shut, for we cannot help you if you get into trouble. Should American universities continue to accept students who cannot openly engage in the kind of intellectual exchange we pride ourselves in encouraging? Should we allow a foreign government to infringe upon the right of free speech on our campuses? Should we not insist that no student from Taiwan may attend an American academic institution unless he, and we, are guaranteed that he will be free to attend and participate in all aspects of American university life including such organizations as the CCAS?

These are not rhetorical questions and I appeal to others in the profession for their opinions. I would not want to shut off admissions to students from Taiwan. That would be a bitterly ironic result of an effort to relieve them from fear and repression. I would guess, however, that Nationalist authorities are vulnerable on this issue. I assume that they are at least as anxious as others on Taiwan to give their children the widest opportunities and that they see study in America as a positive advantage. They would be most reluctant to see that avenue blocked. What pressure can be put on them? Should pressure be applied?

If there are others who share my concern with this problem I would welcome their responses.

Yours,
(Signed)

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January 20, 1969
America and the Peace Talks

During the 'cleaning house' period of a new administration, we are usually barraged with predictions of how all the changes will affect policy. New appointees and their past records are carefully scrutinized by the prognosticators. Such is the case with the newly chosen implementers of American Vietnam strategy. Henry Cabot Lodge is noted for his unbending anti-Communism. Henry Kissinger comes through as the hard-nosed intellectual with new, realistic solutions for the Vietnam dilemma. Ellsworth Bunker is the behind-the-scenes diplomat deferring punctiliously to Saigon's grievances. And yet what is most striking after two months of transition and new faces added to or replacing the old, is that the political climate in Washington and Paris and the traditionally defined objectives of American policy in Asia are basically unchanged. Looking at the resumption of the Peace Talks in Paris, it is already clear that basic American assumptions -- and not personalities -- will determine the American position in the months ahead.

Regardless of surface idiosyncrasies, the basic American approach to negotiation -- with its heavy 'pragmatic' emphasis -- will continue to be at odds with the 'theoretical' approach of the NLF and North Vietnamese. To compare the negotiating methods of the two sides is to compare opposites. The Vietnamese Marxist approach -- fashioned under the influence of French formalism -- is historical and juridical, giving weight to precedent and the written documents of the past. Argument is based upon consistent principles established from the outset, with discussion proceeding logically from general to specific. While political considerations are given priority over military ones, the two are related dialectically. In the present discussions, the DRV and the NLF have insisted upon discussing general political principles and aims -- namely, independence from foreign influence, the composition of a coalition government in the South, and reunification -- before proceeding to specific military issues relating to buffer zones and ceasefire arrangements.

The American approach is pragmatic and concrete. It is less concerned with the history and legal subtleties of a situation than with its immediate manifestations. If there are
broad, all-embracing principles in the American position, they are usually subject to various interpretations (e.g. the principle of 'self-determination'). Discussion proceeds from specific to general, with priority given to immediate military problems of buffer zones and ceasefire controls before discussion of long-range political aims. The result is a kind of piecemeal negotiation in which problems are dealt with 'as they come', so that no one, not even the American delegation, knows quite where everything will end up. Jacques Decorney of Le Monde points out the differences in the two negotiating styles as they appeared last summer: "One perceives that the delegation from Hanoi has gradually erected a kind of juridical and political corpus which is complete and coherent, while the delegation from Washington has thrown out a certain number of ideas and propositions reflecting less a diplomatic strategy than an unstable American-Saigonese reality."

In addition to being haphazard, the American approach puts its opponents at a disadvantage. Although Americans assume that military problems--being more pressing--should be resolved prior to and separate from political issues, the fact is that any agreement reached on military terms necessarily prejudices the terms for a political settlement. Things military and political, in other words, are inextricably related. In a politically conscious Asia where nationalism, modernization, and revolution are finding expression in both violent and peaceful channels, separating political and military questions is like separating lips and teeth, ends and means, 'substance' and 'function'. The two are parts of the same body and players on the same stage. Yet the relatedness of the two aspects belies one of the key assumptions of American Asian policy, namely the belief that political and military matters are indeed separable and can be solved separately. The assumption in its present form grew out of the Korean War experience, in which conventional military tactics were employed to defend territory. The military solution to the Korean War gave birth to the belief that American military intervention was ipso facto apolitical. It laid the groundwork for America's conception of herself as a 'protective shield' having no prejudicial effect upon the political demeanor of the client country. With little revision, the Korean experience has been used as a model for the Vietnam situation, encouraging the continued use of terms like 'invasion', 'military victory', and 'ceasefire' for a guerrilla war situation.

The military psychology has carried over to the peace talks even after the discrediting of the term 'military victory'. Henry Kissinger's January 1969 article in Foreign Affairs is a sophisticated defense of the old political-military dichotomy. He supports a separation of the talks into military and political categories, believing that the North Vietnamese and American delegations should settle the military issues--issues of withdrawal--while the NLF and Saigon are left with "a maximum incentive" to arrive at a political compromise. Just how this maximum incentive is to be attained is never clear. Can it be assumed that the removal of 'external forces' will remove the causes of conflict? Will not mutual withdrawals by North Vietnamese and United States troops merely be turning the clock back to 1964 and leaving intact the same conditions for civil war as existed at that time? Kissinger warns of the danger of Americans becoming involved in the "morass of complexities" associated with Vietnamese politics. Yet the warning is late in coming. There is still a clinging to the old apolitical conception of American intervention, a faith in the blending of involvement and non-involve-ment, as though in Vietnam such a thing were possible.

The military-solution approach has thus become a pillar of the American negotiating position. It is, moreover, crucial to point out the extent to which military solutions introduced by the United States involve implicit political concessions by the DRV and NLF. A broad example may be seen in the American insistence upon agreement over military provisions of the 1954 Geneva Accords (e.g. recognition of the DMZ) without equal consideration for political provisions of the Accords, in particular, terms for eventual re-unification. Both sides quite correctly claim to be following the Geneva Agreements. Yet whereas the Agreements consist of both political and military sections, the former embodying long-range principles and the latter the prerequisites for immediate disengagement of French and Viet-minh forces and preparation for national elections, the American negotiators hark back exclusively to the military provisions. Insisting that the North Vietnamese bestow initial recognition on the military provisions of the document is forcing them to concede to the legitimization, at an international conference, of the American military interpretation of the Geneva Accords.
The North Vietnamese, mindful of legal precedent and giving primacy to political interpretation (of the treaty), cannot concede on such a basic issue.

Furthermore, the opening American demand for recognition of the demilitarized zone implies a specific political concession: the emphasizing of division between North and South. The North Vietnamese conceded to a temporary dividing line between the two zones in 1954, and the United States is now asking that they renew the provision. However, North Vietnam is sensitive to the fact that temporary demarcation lines tend to be viewed as national boundaries after only a short passage of time. The de facto separation of North and South after 1954--in spite of the explicit provision stating that "the military demarcation line is provisional and should not in any way be interpreted as constituting a political or territorial boundary"--is a bitter reminder of that fact. The North Vietnamese are reluctant to commit the same error twice in a row.

'Mutual' withdrawal of American and North Vietnamese forces is certainly a key item on the United States agenda, yet even an issue as fundamental as this has its legal complications. If America insists upon the 'mutual' withdrawal of forces, the implication would be that the United States and North Vietnamese military forces are both equally 'external' and equally guilty of interference. The North Vietnamese, however, are unlikely to consider themselves 'external'. The Geneva Accords, after all, look to the reunification of Vietnam, referring to the inhabitants of both zones as "the Vietnamese people". Vietnam to this day is de jure one nation. Furthermore there is some question as to whether Ho Chi Minh legally was bound by the military provisions of the Treaty after the regime in the South refused to cooperate with the provision to hold free elections in 1956. Finally, intervention by North Vietnamese regular units (not openly admitted by the North in order to allow for a possible de facto political solution) did not come until 1965, in response to the American bombing of the North. It is unlikely, then, that the North Vietnamese will permit the equation of American interference with their own, a concession that would be tantamount to accepting the American 'invasion' theory and justifying American intervention.

The issue of military controls can be expected to cause the same conflict of attitudes. Where and how are the withdrawals of troops to be watched? What group, international or otherwise, should supervise such movements? To what government or power (e.g. the prospective coalition government?) should it be responsible? Should its purpose be to defuse only the present state of war or ought it to bear a permanent, preventive function? These are a few of the issues the negotiators will confront in the flesh. On the surface, controls seem merely to involve diminishing the possibility of war by discouraging infractions. To the Vietnamese, however, the question of controls is tied closely to sovereignty and the way a future South Vietnamese entity will conduct itself internally and externally. Since Western imperialism is a bitter part of their history (especially in China and Vietnam), they view strong controls imposed by a Western nation as a threat to sovereignty, and as capable of transforming the future Southern government into a garrison state, a Cold War buffer zone. Strict controls limiting movement across borders could discourage future contact between North and South. Internally such controls might constitute an effort to extinguish revolutionary movements and maintain a status quo at all costs. An opening statement by Dean Rusk at the Laos Conference in 1961 provides some substance to the suspicions of Asian nationalists: control machinery must "have full access to all parts of the country, without the need for the consent of any civil or military officials, national or local....it must be able to act on any complaints from responsible sources, including personnel of the control body itself, responsible civil and military officials in Laos, the governments of negotiating countries, and of the members of this conference." The idea of a control commission being responsible to external powers over the head of a future coalition government—as stated above—is obviously anathema to a Vietnamese nationalist.

Amid the irreconcilables, what is the likelihood of compromise? The question rests heavily on the position the Americans will take on a political solution. American negotiators will likely make their discussion of political questions contingent on tacit concessions by Hanoi on certain military issues. As mentioned above, any written concessions Hanoi yields on the military front will affect the political outcome; so we can expect a long merry-go-round of unwritten understandings and de facto
arrangements, whereby the United States and North Vietnam would gradually reduce hostilities and the United States would confront the political issue.

America has been predictably silent on political issues. The truth of the matter is that America is not yet ready to articulate its political goals because it is not sure of what it can obtain. The maximum expectations of the new administration would probably look to a rejuvenated Saigon regime, fostered in the context of a gradual United States withdrawal, and able to 'bargain' on its own terms with the NLF. Minimum expectations probably envision a South Vietnam which is under substantial NLF and neutralist influence, but which offers no threat to America's presence in Asia and is 'secure from Communism', internal or external. Such a settlement might pop up in the form of a plan to demilitarize and neutralize Southeast Asia. This would probably take the form of a 'regional coalition' in which member nations would unite to form a political and economic neutral entity. Needless to say, the concept of a homogenized Southeast Asia--common in liberal circles--is scarcely suited to the infinite variety and conflict of interest that exist among the nations of the area. Yet the idea seems to be gaining popularity. Its purpose would be to seal the area off from Chinese and North Vietnamese influence, and to assure the continuation of a socio-political status quo in Southeast Asia favorable to an American presence in the Far East, however detrimental such a political 'freeze' might be for the future development of the nations concerned. A neutralized Southeast Asia would offer what the United States has attained previously only by its expensive support of reactionary regimes: the 'containment' of China and the prevention of national Communist revolutions in Asia, goals which are reputedly military, but actually political.

Any American statement purporting to do justice to the political principles of the Geneva Accords--held by the DRV and NLF--while fulfilling minimum American expectations will be ambiguous if not contradictory. The 'reconciling' of opposites by their mutual inclusion in a document is, in fact, a characteristic of many international agreements, including certain sections of the Geneva Accords themselves. It allows the signatory nations to take seriously those provisions they deem most significant. Thus if the United States concedes on the concept of eventual re-unification, it will likely couple it with a strong assertion supporting 'temporary' sovereignty (in South Vietnam), to which it might later ascribe transcendent significance.

The ultimate hitch for both sides will be the issue of military controls. As mentioned earlier, this involves the central matter of sovereignty for the Vietnamese: internal and border controls could prejudice both the nature of the Southern entity and its future policies. For the United States, however, strict controls are the basis for any kind of a 'supervised neutrality' in Southeast Asia. Controls will be viewed as absolute prerequisites in 'sealing off' a South Vietnamese or regional entity from North Asia. The Vietnamese will not wish to preside over the demise of their own sovereignty. It might be presaged, then, that America will turn to indirect means of persuasion. America might deal with China and/or the Soviet Union, assuming they are amenable to American bargaining, to apply the necessary pressure for a Vietnamese concession. Soviet and Chinese pressure upon the Vietminh in 1954 was a major factor in Vietminh compromises with France. Such an eventuality cannot presently be discounted.

America clearly will not give up the predominant position in Asia it inherited from the Japanese after World War II, a position long sustained by America's image of itself as a military protector. In the present peace talks, the United States will not drop its traditional military-political, external-internal distinctions. Yet, exhausted by the present conflict, it may attempt to institutionalize them in such a way as to limit further conflict; hence the concept of demilitarization. America will want to reduce the risk of costly military involvement without, however, altering its basic Asian objectives.
Why do I want Peace?

Why Do I Want Peace? is a speech given by Professor Lý Chánh Trung, one of the foremost Catholic intellectuals in South Viet Nam, at the Saigon Student Union Center, on September 9, 1968. The time and place of its delivery have some significance worth mentioning: the Saigon regime forbids the discussion of peace or of neutrality, and those who do so risk being jailed as "peace pretenders and communist lackeys" (bọn nguy hòa, tay sai công sản). In July 1968, two student newspapers in Saigon, Chợ Tùng (which had advocated neutrality) and Sinh Viên (which had advocated negotiations), were confiscated and their editors and contributors jailed, or killed. According to Tin Tưởng Magazine, No. 41, 1968, Mr. Trần Quốc Chương, a 20 year old medical student and the son of Judge Trần Thúc Linh, who himself authored various articles printed in Thanh Chung (a Saigon daily newspaper which also was closed down), was tied up by three strangers and thrown to the ground from the third floor of his school. The editor of Sinh Viên, Mr. Nguyễn Trọng Côn, was sentenced to five years of hard labor on July 25, 1968, and Mr. Nguyễn Đăng Trương, president of the Saigon Student Union, was sentenced in absentia on August 2, 1968, to ten years of hard labor for having appointed Mr. Côn. Various sources speculated that Mr. Trương had been done away with, because from the day of Mr. Côn's arrest to the time of Mr. Trương's disappearance, he had regularly been present at the Saigon Student Union Center and had shown no sign of any willingness to run away. At the same time, scores of other students were imprisoned. On September 12, 1968, Chánh Dạo (a Saigon daily newspaper) reported that the Saigon regime planned to tear down the huge center where the 25,000 members of the Saigon Student Union met and where they had given temporary shelter to war refugees. The same article went on to say:

"As a first step in executing the above-mentioned plan, the authorities, on the night of August 29, 1968, ordered members of the police forces, with their GMC trucks, to the Student Union Center to force the refugees to move to the Lê Văn Duyệt soccer field in Gò Vấp, in the middle of the night. The war refugees, as well as the students, are extremely confused over this act..."

For this and other reasons, Professor Lý Chánh Trung ventured to voice his opinion on the issue of peace, in spite of the Saigon crack-down on the "peace-niks," partly because he is able to take advantage of his position of being one of the most famous professors in South Viet Nam, and partly because of his being a Catholic. After his speech, many other intellectuals, too, began voicing their hopes publicly, to the annoyance of President Thiệu. In a speech in Khánh Hòa, which was reported in Chánh Đạo, Xây Dưng, and other Saigon newspapers on September 19, 1968, Thiệu angrily emphasized that the only "righteous" stance on peace was the one that he himself, his government, and his National Assembly, had agreed upon, and that he was "determined not to permit the kind of disorderly freedom by which each citizen could advance his own propositions on peace..." Since then, in spite of Thieu's willingness to send a delegation to the peace talks in Paris, many more students and intellectuals have been imprisoned for reasons similar to the ones mentioned above.

Following is the complete translation of Professor Trung's speech, as reported in both the September 12 and 13, 1968, issues of Chánh Đạo. The non-Vietnamese reader, particularly if he is a stickler for exact facts and figures, should be willing to permit Professor Trung's occasional use of what might seem to him somewhat unqualified generalizations, understanding that the speech was delivered in order to make a definite point, in a concise way, and that it was aimed at a Vietnamese audience.
Ladies and Gentlemen,

Students,

I want peace, first of all, because I am a Vietnamese.

Being a Vietnamese, I cannot stand anymore the sight of Vietnamese blood continuing to be spilled more and more each day—not only the blood of the soldiers on both sides, but also the blood of hundreds of thousands of innocent civilians, of old men and old women, of women and children—while a number of other Vietnamese unconcernedly seek after money and eat and make merry in a dissolute manner, as if they were living in Paris or New York, or, to be more exact, on another planet, since the inhabitants of Paris and New York may well concern themselves with the present war in Viet Nam more than they do.

Being a Vietnamese, I can no longer put up with the sight of foreigners who presume to have the right to destroy my country, with the most modern and terrible means, and all in the name of "protecting the freedom" of the people of southern Viet Nam—that is to say, a kind of "freedom" which the inhabitants of the southern part of Viet Nam have been throwing up and vomiting out for the last ten years already, without yet being able to swallow.

Surely, there are many Americans who honestly believe that they have come here to "protect freedom," and I sincerely thank them [for their good intentions]. But they are mistaken, or have been cheated, because if the inhabitants of the southern part of Viet Nam had truly experienced freedom as an automatic result of independence, then they would have had more than enough strength to protect their own freedom without having to inconvenience anybody at all! But, unfortunately, the inhabitants of the southern part of Viet Nam have not been able to enjoy freedom, and have not had the chance to be the masters of their own destiny, precisely because the Americans, in the name of the protectors of freedom, have, in fact, been protecting regimes which stamp out that freedom.

And when these regimes crumbled or failed, not because of "Communist terrorism" but because of their own decomposure, powerlessness, and lack of justice, the only way Americans then knew to "protect freedom" was by the several millions of tons of bombs used to crush to pieces the very land of Viet Nam, and by the gigantic streams of dollars which deluge Vietnamese society in the south—that is to say, by destroying the very roots of the material and spiritual foundations of this country.

Being a Vietnamese, I cannot accept this. And I advise those Americans who are really concerned about protecting freedom to first do it in their own country. They can protect the freedom of the negroes who are rebelling in the "rat nests" areas [city ghettos] and of the Red Indians who are dragging out their dying days as a brave race on their reservations, rather than go to "protect the freedom" of a race of distant yellow people, by the grotesque means just mentioned.

Being a Vietnamese, I only want every Vietnamese to accept every other Vietnamese as a Vietnamese, and not to reserve for themselves alone the two words Viet Nam. After listening to more than 10 years of propaganda, and after coming face to face with the tragic reality of the war, I have become absolutely disgusted with the insults, the ways of looking at people as separate, of dividing people forever into two kinds: one side that is completely bad, and another side that is completely good. I am disgusted at the harm done by exclusivism: be it the exclusive right to be anti-communist, the exclusive right to be patriotic, the exclusive right to make revolution, or the exclusive right to be a real Vietnamese.

Most painful of all is that, as they fight with each other over the two words Viet Nam, both sides, in a like manner, propound the same vocabulary in defining the goals of their struggle: independence, freedom, justice, and democracy. Indeed, the great majority of the Vietnamese people want, above all, to live in a free and independent nation, in a just and democratic society. But both sides [to the conflict] have attached to these goals conflicting meanings, because each side has its own theory and its own procedures for attaining those goals, and each side believes that its theory and its procedures are [exclusively] correct.

According to the principles of rhetoric, whenever there are two contradictory propositions one should expect one of them to be right and the other to be wrong, and likewise, when there are two sides to a conflict there must be one which is right and one which is wrong. In reality, however, because of the intervention of the giant-sized "flock-leaders" [in Vietnamese, this term is used in referring to groups or gangs of people, particularly those with some claim to notoriety] of both sides, and because of the enormous resources that they have so generously scattered on this tiny country, if the war is dragged out, in order to demonstrate who is right and who is wrong, for
another several years, then I am afraid that there will be no Vietnamese left to enjoy the independence, freedom, justice, and democracy, no matter how genuine they may be, of either one side or the other.

Only when both sides come to realize that there is nothing absolute in this world, especially in the realm of politics, and that not every means can be used in reaching their goals, however good and noble these goals may be; only when both sides come to realize that contradictions in politics, however severe, still should not be sufficient cause for Vietnamese to knife and kill each other until completely exterminating themselves, but rather that there may be a more peaceful solution; only when both sides agree to acknowledge the high price that the people are having to pay just in order that each side might demonstrate its legitimacy, or when they deign to recognize all the Vietnamese children who are paying that price through injuries, either to their flesh or to their spirit; only then shall this race of people have the possibility of coming together.

Being a Vietnamese, I naturally want my people to come together, and in order to have this realized, there must be peace. Coming together does not necessarily mean being completely of one mind, and therefore peace does not mean surrender. Coming together means to be unified in spite of differences, to accept these differences in order to come to a peaceful solution, by putting the interests of the people above the interests of parties or ideologies. But how can we come to such a peaceful solution? This is a difficult question, and has been the dead-end to all searches for peace up to now. I am in no position, and neither do I have the ability, to offer a solution.

If there is one thing that is clear, it is that if we abandon the kind of tendency to look at people as separate, as mentioned above, then the search for a solution will be easier. I only want to voice the desire of coming together, a most simple and earnest desire, which I believe is shared by almost all Vietnamese citizens living in this land who do not belong to any particular party other than the "party" of Viet Nam, and who have no other ideology other than that of love for their own people.

In brief, being a Vietnamese, I only want to see the children of Viet Nam agree to live together within the embrace of their mother Viet Nam, under the roof of [the whole of] Viet Nam, and not each of the children trying to drag the common mother, the common roof, to his own side, causing the mother's body to become worn and frayed and her soul to ooze blood, and leaving the house that has been handed down to them by their forefathers to be blown to pieces by foreign bombs!

I want peace because I am also an educator. The mission of an educator is that of developing the person. But how can one develop the person in a society which has become putrefied from the roots up? How can one develop the person when the culture is debauched, when education is going downhill, and when the sole ideal of an increasing number of youths, both male and female, is to be able to dress like Americans, make money like Americans, and make love like Americans!

How can I help to develop the person when I myself feel that, in the midst of this war, I am no longer a human being, when the rice that I eat is a hand-out from foreigners, when the words that I lecture and the articles that I write seem to have no more relevance to the realities about me, and do not have any meaning even to myself, besides the very concrete and bitter meaning of the twenty to thirty 500-piaster bills—which are losing their value every day—not that my lectures and articles may bring me in a month's time?

How can one develop the person when the traces of humanity in oneself and in others are being destroyed every day by the war, and when, confronted with whatever matter, a person's soul becomes callous, perverse, and indifferent?

Just before the Tết Mậu Thân [lunar new year, 1968] sixty-five university professors issued an appeal for a cease-fire and for peace negotiations. In their appeal they wrote: "There is nothing which so strongly conflicts with education as does violence, destruction, killing, and the moral debasement caused by the war."

Truly, there is nothing more in conflict with education than war. The profession of education is a peaceful profession, because education means cultivating the person through the use of words. But nobody can say anything anymore, and nobody can hear anything anymore amidst the roar of bombs and bullets. There is no more purpose in [the profession of education] other than the monthly salary, and we educators will become nothing more than people who vend their words, their knowledge, and their degrees. In the West, Socrates, the first educator and an educator for all time, who lived nearly 2,500 years ago, compared that kind of people to prostitutes. I do not want to be a prostitute, so that is another reason why I want peace.
Lastly, I want peace because I am a Catholic. My religion is a religion of peace. My Lord died on the Cross 1968 years ago, in order to teach humans beings the lesson of love, which is the lesson of peace. From that day on, the Cross has stood for reconciliation, the reconciliation between God and man, as well as reconciliation between men themselves. From childhood, the Church has taught me that I must carry the Cross and follow in the footsteps of Jesus Christ, "bringing light to dark places, and taking love to wherever there is hatred." The Church has never had to take the Cross to strike others on the head, no matter under what justification.

In former centuries, there were Westerners who shouldered their guns to go and plunder foreign lands, saying that they were protecting and promoting the religion of God. During this century, there have likewise been Westerners who, bringing their bombs and bullets, came to destroy other countries, saying that they were protecting "Christian civilization." And not long ago, there was a Cardinal--fortunately he has been called to an audience with God [meaning he died]--who called the American soldiers the "soldiers of Jesus Christ." [He implies Cardinal Spellman.]

Such are the brazen people who are able to tell lies without embarrassment. For spiritual strength never needs the protection of violence, and, furthermore, their civilization does not have a gram of substance left that makes it worthy of being called Christian! It is they who have dirtied the appearance of Christianity all over the world with their rationalizations about "protecting Christianity," and it is also they who have made people revolted at the word freedom. In reality they are not protecting anything besides their own interests and ambitions. They stick the label of Christianity over those interests and ambitions and have thus justified their dark designs.

Luckily, their influence is becoming weaker each day, and in the Viet Nam war when they take out that old label, which was already used in Hitler's time, namely "protecting Christian civilization," then the true words of the Church ring out, loud and clear. They are words of peace.

Indeed, since the war in Viet Nam "escalated," the Pope not only has unceasingly sought for peace through his earnest verbal appeals, but he has also been directly and personally involved in the search for attaining a peace for the Vietnamese people, who are behind him in his search.

When Pope Paul VI wrote in his pastoral letter of April 4, 1966: "We appeal in Christ's name: Please stop, meet with one another, go to the negotiating table, and negotiate with all sincerity." And when the Congress of Bishops of Viet Nam unanimously and solemnly repeated these words in the two statements of October 7, 1966 and January 5, 1968, all Catholics, even those of average intelligence, could then understand that the Church had decisively chosen the way of peace, and that the Vietnamese Catholics should, together with other Vietnamese, take more responsibility in contributing to the attainment of peace.

If there are Catholics who explain the above appeal in keeping with their own private inclinations, that is their own affair. There is one thing that I ask of them, however, and that is not to accuse those Catholics who support peace as "peace pretenders and communist lackeys," as they did in a noisy campaign a year ago. As for me, I would like to mention here once again the appeal which Father Hoang Quynh [Father Hoang Quynh was the arch-conservative anti-communist priest who brought a great number of northern Catholics south in 1954, and who supported Diem faithfully during the latter's reign] sent to the whole Vietnamese Catholic population on April 12, 1967. In this appeal, Father Hoang Quynh said:

"The people's interest now is to stop the war, and to establish a genuine peace in justice and honor. All Vietnamese agree to this. The eternal interest of the Church is also peace, because only in peace can one hope to put into practice the altruism which is the reason for the Church's being.... Being Catholics, we should not doubt the clear-sightedness and the impartiality of the Pope.

"Being Vietnamese, we should have the responsibility of directing all our efforts towards serving the country and the Vietnamese people in those ways which we believe are most worthy. Therefore, not only should we give complete obedience to the Pope, but we should also have the responsibility of strengthening our ranks so as to support him in his efforts to attain peace for Viet Nam. As Vietnamese, and as Catholics, we are obligated to take on this responsibility, because we believe that this is a genuine way to peace, not only of the Church, for the Church, but also of the people, for the people...
"A genuine peace can only be a peace of the Vietnamese, for the Vietnamese. A genuine peace will have to arise from a sincere reconciliation in the interests of the welfare of the whole people, and not in the interests of any one minority, and it will have to be in the name of the conscience of all humanity, and not of any affiliation to or doctrine of any one country. Lastly, this peace will have to be a peace guaranteed in a sincere and enduring way, within both a national and an international context."

If the support of peace through sincere negotiations between Vietnamese and other Vietnamese is a ploy of "peace pretenders and communist lackeys," then Father Hoang Quỳnh himself, one who was already leading anti-communist campaigns in this country even when the most aggressive of the anti-communist leaders of southern Viet Nam today were still unable to wipe their noses clean [i.e., when still in their infancy], is also a "peace pretender, and a communist lackey."

I wish to conclude that from the standpoint of being a Vietnamese, an educator, and a Catholic, I can only choose the way of peace, since it is my people, my profession, and my religion which do not allow me any other choice. And so I think that I have the right and the responsibility to voice here my simple and earnest desire, which is to be able to see the people come together, independent, rich and strong, all the way from the Nam Quan Pass [on the Chinese border] to the Land's End of Càmau, to be able to see my profession become a kind of mission and not just a source of profit, and to be able to see my Church grow strong in faith and love, valued within the hearts of a people who has again found brotherhood and consideration for one another.

Perhaps my words will anger those who are determined to fight on to the last Vietnamese, but I cannot say otherwise, since this is the voice of my conscience. And when I do this, I am also obeying the order of the Congress of Bishops of Viet Nam as given in their statement of January 5, 1968:

"A Catholic must be honest in every situation and should say yes when there is something to say yes to, and say no when there isn't, and not intentionally distort the truth or perpetuate falsehood out of any private interest or allegiance to party, nation, or even religion."

Say yes when there is something to say yes to, say no when there isn't. I sincerely voice my hope, like the low croak of a frog during a drought, to beg Heaven to give my people a heavy shower of rain to extinguish the smoke and fires of war, to put out the flames of hatred, so that human love can flower with the green rice sprouts, on fields where there will be no more chemical defoliants...
The Nixon-Mao Pact

An American reader of Chinese language newspapers during the 1968 Presidential election campaign might be surprised to discover how much Hubert Humphrey and Richard Nixon had to say about China. Humphrey was cited on behalf of coexistence, improving relations and ending present trade restrictions. Nixon was cited on behalf of solving "the China problem" in the next eight years and visiting China if he were given a visa. Since the question of China was not a prime issue in the voters' minds in November 1968, Chinese leaders might very well believe that Nixon and Humphrey introduced the issue in a genuine effort to communicate with Peking. That is, Chinese leaders might well speculate that there are potential American foreign policy developments which call for talks between Washington and Peking. But specifically why has China offered to re-open talks with the USA and to work towards a treaty of peaceful co-existence with President Nixon? Although it is hazardous to speculate about the foreign policy motives and objectives of leaders about whose views we know almost as little as we did of Lyndon Johnson's in November 1964, such speculation may be a matter of life and death.

So far three major explanations for the Chinese initiative have been proposed. First it is suggested that the cultural revolution is moderating and a new, more moderate leadership is therefore moving towards a less militant foreign policy. But despite the fact that the personnel most involved in Chinese foreign policy--Mao Tse-tung, Chou En-lai, Ch'en Yi, etc. --have hardly changed in twenty years, nonetheless there clearly had been a change from mid 1967. Riots in Hong Kong and Burma, denunciations of Cambodia and Ceylon, calls for revolution in India and Thailand and Indonesia reached a qualitatively different level at that time when Red Guards had control of the Foreign Ministry and the Foreign Office was under attack for conservatism. Local embassy people fearful of not seeming revolutionary enough were therefore properly and prudently violent and extreme. Foreign revolutionaries took advantage of this to try to commit the Chinese to their cause. Today with the pressures of the most radical Red Guards at least temporarily removed, the foreign policy professionals are back at their primary business which is not creating disorder and insulting people from foreign embassies but protecting China's most vital interests.

Second, it has been suggested that the Chinese are now convinced that they cannot prevent a settlement of the war in Vietnam. Therefore they need a new line to replace their militant one of backing the revolutionary war until it is fought to a conclusion in Vietnam. But it is still unclear how fast that war will end or what a solution will look like. Furthermore, if the war ends with a withdrawal of American troops, why can't the Chinese claim that the Vietnam settlement proves that wars of national liberation will be victorious and should be pressed elsewhere? Yet it is true that peace in Vietnam would necessitate some fundamental rethinking of Chinese foreign policy, for the war in Vietnam kept Russia and America from uniting more fully against China.

By the end of 1965 Chinese leaders could not help but see that their previous attempts to ally with anti-colonial nations had failed. Military coups in Indonesia, Algeria and Ghana ended that effort. Only the war in Vietnam saved China from virtually complete isolation. It made it difficult for Moscow to consider a renewal of Wasington's proposal--formally conveyed by Averell Harriman--to bomb China's nuclear installations. China's possiblest foreign policy specialists must worry this way. For if China and Russia no longer share a common cause in Vietnam, what security does China have that the major powers will not join together, encircle and attack China's military centers? Clearly Chinese foreign policy makers must undertake a new search for security, one which was delayed by the war in Vietnam.
Third, it has been suggested that China wishes to probe the new President for points of weakness. But there is no evidence that the Chinese see Nixon, a man who has talked of using nuclear weapons against China, as other than a truculent man. Rather a weak and isolated China desirous of continuing its creation of a revolutionary society at home sees new opportunities for joint action between Peking and Washington which would permit both governments to get on with their major concerns. Let us look a bit closer at what Chinese leaders may feel are new possibilities and joint interests.

Russia’s invasion of Czechoslovakia opened up these new possibilities. China and China’s European ally, Albania, denounced the invasion as old fashioned imperialism. They went on to denounce the Warsaw Pact as an aggressive military alliance. Rumania and Czechoslovakia by their independent actions were weakening the Warsaw Pact just as France had weakened NATO. Growing antagonisms in the western camps permit China to search there for new friends, just as Albania now looks for other Balkan countries fearful of Russia. They have even approached Yugoslavia, previously enemy one. Clearly, the world seems changed to China and her friends. Former enemies may now seem like potential friends. China bruits abroad its support for East European independence and its opposition to the Russian troops on China’s borders. Albanian leaders were taken to inspect Chinese troops near the Sino-Soviet border. It seems that the Chinese are doing their best to tell us that they do not believe we are enemy number one, that they do believe that we may have some interests in common, containment of the Soviet Union and movement towards national independence in East Europe.

In addition Chou En-lai has made clear that the Russian invasion of Czechoslovakia— which is called by the Chinese the equivalent of the American invasion of Vietnam—has brought American-Russian relations to a new historical stage in which they "are finding it harder and harder to get along." That is, the steps toward national independence of a France as well as of a Czechoslovakia have placed the European alliances of Russia and America "in a process of disintegra-

tion." If either of the two super powers should try to push a particular European ally into line, it may alienate its other allies and may frighten its enemy into a counter-move thus "sharpening and deepening...the contradictions of the two big imperialist powers, America and the Soviet Union." Such changes may make it more difficult for America and West Europe peacefully to contain the Soviet Union.

The Chinese have noted how Moscow has tried to reassure Washington that the Warsaw Pact troops do not threaten West Europe. And they have watched Washington increase its NATO assurances to Germany. China may want to suggest to President Nixon that it may be able to help make those assurances more credible. For many years now German leaders have told their counterparts in the USA that one sure way of restraining the USSR is to improve relations with China so that people in Moscow can not be sure of their long border with China. Germany has taken steps in that direction by becoming China's largest trading partner in Europe. In fact Moscow claims that scientists from Bonn are aiding China with her development of nuclear-armed missiles.

In addition Chinese leaders apparently are now convinced that America can not do all it wants in Asia. They have watched Johnson refuse to run, watched foreign aid cut, watched Americans more and more insist on the need to concern themselves with domestic problems. In India, which concerns China very much, the US has not come through with the financial aid New Delhi desired. One Chinese commentator noted in this regard that "the United States does not have the strength equal to its will." This explanation might be worthy of little emphasis except that the November 15 Peking Review explained Richard Nixon's election in the same way.

Nixon was 'elected' after he called for the necessity to 'reduce our commitments around the world in the areas where we are overextended' and to 'put more emphasis on the priority areas,' namely Europe and other areas. This is a striking manifestation that U.S. imperialism...is compelled to 'change horses' while crossing a turbulent stream.
If America is forced to reduce its commitment to Asia—as the governments of Thailand, Cambodia and the Philippines also believe—then China may want to discuss with Nixon the nature of that reduction. Increased Chinese stress on Russian deals with Japan, India and Indonesia, that is, the other larger countries in Asia, may indicate that China's great fear is of being surrounded by an adventurous Russian enemy, one that has sent troops into Hungary and Czechoslovakia and has tried to subvert other Communist governments in Yugoslavia, Albania and China itself. The Chinese are very concerned with their northern and western borders shared by an unfriendly USSR. They may be willing to join with the USA in an effort to keep south and southeast Asia independent and neutral in order to direct their energies to the area of major danger. A decade of American efforts at detente with the Soviet Union has partially blinded Americans to the danger of Russia as an expansionist power. The invasion of Czechoslovakia may help make Washington understand and perhaps share Peking's concern.

Speculation in Washington as reported in the New York Times of December 1, 1968 has it that China is interested in making concessions not in the south but "on its Eastern flank" in return for mutual deterrence of the Soviet Union. And it is true that in one recent anti-American diatribe Peking's only demand with regard to Taiwan was the removal of American forces from the Taiwan Straits, that is, a virtual acceptance of the political status quo. Nonetheless it is doubtful if Chinese leaders have missed President Nixon's endless statements of a need for American strength in the Pacific, that is, in an area defined as including Taiwan. Nixon's claims of America's role as "a Pacific power" have not been missed and have been happily cited by Australia's leader.

Nixon's emphasis on the need to contain a Chinese "attempt to expand through the area of the Pacific" should mean to the Chinese leaders that in the debate over whether America is over-extended in southeast Asia, a debate which is carried out often in terms of whether America is an Asian or a Pacific power, Nixon has agreed that America is not an Asian power, that is, that it is over-committed in southeast Asia. Nixon, after all, has referred to SEATO as an "anachronistic relic."

Nixon has long been committed to the MacArthur position that Asians should fight Asians, that Americans should not fight ground wars in Asia. That view has led him as it did Dulles before him, to look to the big bang as a solution. Nixon—as do perhaps the governments of Thailand and Cambodia—wants to see a new Asian defense alliance formed with a fully armed Japan at the center. But what if the domestic politics of Japan, Indonesia, et al. prevent the creation of such an alliance? If Nixon is against our present commitments and Japan will not take up the slack, will he turn to the threat of massive retaliation or to the search for areas of cooperation with China? Does China want to deal in a concrete way on southeast Asia in order to negate an American-felt necessity for a Japanese military presence replacing the American presence?

The Chinese, of course, know that Nixon is a man in the John Foster Dulles tradition of nuclear brinkmanship. They know that he believes that nuclear threats ended the Korean war and prevented a war in the Formosa Straits. Of course they also know that those beliefs are ill-founded, that in Korea in 1950 and 1953, Vietnam in 1954 and the Formosa Straits in 1958, that then as now, the Chinese will risk that dreaded American attack when they believe their most vital interests are at stake.

But at this moment (as Robert Kennedy suggested in the 1962 crisis over Russian missiles in Cuba) some Chinese leaders may have reasonably decided to ignore Nixon's aggressive message in preference for his message that offers some hope of international compromise and stability and a peace satisfactory to both parties. Since it is in our interests too, that such negotiations succeed, we should not try to reap propaganda victories from obstacles to them, but should quietly and persistently go about helping these leaders achieve objectives which we both share.

Unfortunately the shock to Americans of the defeat of their protege Chiang Kai-shek has left the USA emotionally involved with China. It is difficult to believe that Richard Nixon and his advisers will prove reasonable. One has to have a deep understanding of the American psyche and the ideology of her leaders to know why it is not likely that Washington will accept Peking's offer to help check the Soviet Union, protect the national independence of the small states of Asia and provide for the further security of our major allies in Europe. The Chinese mistake is to treat the United States as a rational power.
REVIEW: Lucian Pye, The Spirit of Chinese Politics

The most appropriate review of Professor Pye's "psychocultural" study of Chinese politics would be an analysis of his personal motives for writing it. This might be approached via his childhood experiences as a missionary's son in China, or, alternatively, through his connections with the CIA in adult life. However, since this review argues that such an analysis (i.e., the method of his book) is unfair and irrelevant because it is an attempt to discredit ideas without examining the truth they may contain, I will try to set an example by confronting instead the ideas he presents and the assumptions which underlie them.

The thesis of the book, briefly summarized, is that the Chinese suffer from the cultural repression of their aggressive instincts, in a manner analogous to the repression of sexual drives in Western culture; and that as a result of this, the Chinese feel an extreme ambivalence towards political authority which inhibits rational solutions of the problems their nation faces as a developing country.

The first assumption which should be examined is the central one of the place of "psychocultural" studies in social science. What the author means by "psychocultural" (the word has apparently been coined by him) is defined in the first page of his preface: "This is an essay about the unique national and personality traits that have inspired and shaped Chinese political culture from the time of the Manchus to the present rule of Mao Tsetung...we shall be particularly concerned with those attitudes and sentiments most crucial in determining the successes and failures of the Chinese in modernization." (p. vii)

In the preface, probably the best part of the book, Professor Pye is properly modest about the role of psychological studies. His desire to "enrich, supplement, and expand the dimensions of Chinese studies" cannot be criticized; nor can his description of his work as "an interpretative and largely speculative essay." Psychocultural explanations, he points out, are only one dimension of the problem, and must eventually be "integrated" with the study of political institutions and economic factors (although the critic may question whether these separate studies will automatically converge when they are put together at some later date. It is more likely, as in the study at hand, that a deliberate exclusion of such external factors will rob the psychological approach of the validity it should have).

This laudable modesty, however, is left to the preface, and the text itself marches forward with strident authority and with a very misleading air of the definitive. The underlying assumption of the entire work is of the primacy and causative importance of psychological factors, a premise which is never made explicit and is even disavowed in the preface. From another of the author's writings we find a franker statement of this idea: "The implication is that in underdeveloped countries there is a vicious circle at the subjective level, which is more crucial to the problem of national development than the more manifest vicious circle of poverty, ill-health, and illiteracy." (my italics).

What is wrong with this statement? Let us recall that psychoanalysis, the "parent discipline" of psychocultural studies, is required to explain only those actions and perceptions which conflict with, or deny, reality. Rational actions do not require a psychological explanation. Presumably, a healthy political culture would be one which made decisions autonomously, with a proper regard for the external limits of its power and the goals it has chosen for itself. A "psychocultural" explanation is proper and useful only when a society behaves in a way that is patently irrational and unnecessarily self-destructive. To maintain this of the Chinese, who have long been recognized as a supremely pragmatic, materialistic people, would require at the very least some attempt at proof. But
Pye assumes that the Chinese behave irrationally, and further assumes that the reader shares this assumption. He gets away with this only because so few Western social scientists have dared attempt a rational explanation of current (Communist) Chinese actions.

Professor Pye is poorly qualified to analyze the irrationalities in Chinese behavior on two counts. He has not tried to understand the goals of the Chinese leadership, but insists on measuring their actions by his own image of development, the Western pluralist model which the Chinese explicitly reject. Even worse is his view of the realities of international relations, which is at least as distorted as that of Mao Tse-tung.

The most important illustration of the distortion of reality, and how this meshes with his abuse of psychological tools, is his treatment of Western imperialism in China. By ignoring the reality behind this emotion-charged concept, he can label all aspects of the Chinese perception of and response to Western imperialism as irrational, and therefore assume that they must somehow be traceable to the early socialization process. Because he is confident his view of reality is the correct one, he can make such pronouncements as "they released such a flood of emotion as to make all reality irrelevant" (p. 67) and that their hostility is "out of proportion to the intensity of the political issues involved" (p. 112).

Throughout his book, Professor Pye reveals an ignorance (willful or not) of both the basic facts and accepted interpretations of Chinese history, and of new developments in social science which challenge the models he accepts without question. Furthermore, he lacks the perspective on his own nation and society which would introduce a saving relativism into his discussion of Chinese excesses and irrationalities. The second major (although unstated) premise which underlies the entire book, is the ethnocentric assumption that the Western capitalistic countries represent the only model for development—in political, social, and psychological as well as technical aspects, and that any developing country which deviates from the model is ipso facto irrational, and on a dead-end road.

To illustrate: Chapter Two, "The Comforts of Hierarchy and Ideology," makes the rather obvious point that Confucianism is not Western pluralism. The chapter is studded with political science jargon, such as "interest articulation," "processing of inputs," and "conflict management," all of which presumably belong to a "modern" nation-state and all of which the Chinese have not got, in Pye's view. Such language assumes that, in the "modern" pluralist state, all the important interests will be able to organize in private groups and compete peaceably and fairly in the political arena, and that the policies which issue as "outputs" will be some calculable compromise of the competing interests. The question which needs to be asked is, even if such a political system were possible for developing countries, would it be able to promote the economic development necessary for such countries' survival and autonomy? The pluralist model appears valid (for the U.S. as well as for China) only if one does not look too closely at the specific class interests which are competing, and at the grave implications for economic development and egalitarian goals of letting such interests compete freely according to their respective strengths. When considered in this light, "pluralism" is revealed as a device for perpetuating the status quo with modifications, if any, tending to the advantage of the more powerful interest groups. As such, this is probably the poorest imaginable political system for a country desiring rapid economic development. The importance which the Chinese attach to political power (p. 26) as a means of redressing inequalities and changing the status quo seems quite rational to me; but Pye prefers to see this, too, as psychologically determined and hence, by implication, not rational. The Chinese, in his view, have a "confused" faith that political power can be used for constructive developments. This opinion, which obviously has its roots in his distaste for their present brand of power (Communist), ignores all the constructive achievements which political power has in fact accomplished for China.

One of the most comical aspects of this book is Pye's insistence that Chinese reality be measured not only by ethnocentric Western standards, but by social science concepts which he accepts as absolutes even though their usefulness has never been more than tentatively established! Is Mao's irrational hubris to be gauged by the fact that he is refusing to accept the "routinization of charisma" (p. 83)? I would suggest that the massive social experimentation now going on in China should be used to enrich, confirm, or correct the hypotheses of Max Weber and others; and that to make a Procrustean bed of current social science concepts is to guarantee that they will remain sterile and unable to accommodate a changing reality.
Pye's view of the role of the treaty ports in Chinese history provides another example of distortion attributable to his ideological bias. Let us quote at length:

"Western behavior in some fields could be seen as self-sacrificing and genuinely charitable, but arrangements that had once been beneficial to the Chinese eventually had to be identified as damaging to the self and extremely unjust. This was true, for example, of the complex pattern of relations involving the treaty ports, the foreign concessions, and the explicit treaty provisions covering the legal status of Western nationals. In the nineteenth century these arrangements provided a modus vivendi for regulating relations between two quite different civilizations, and the Chinese clearly realized that they gave some protection and that they bottled up the 'foreign devils' in their enclaves and isolated them from the main body of Chinese society. In time, however, these arrangements, quite understandably, became less and less satisfactory to the Chinese, and their reaction took the form of a fantasy about the blameless and pure self being violently and grossly mistreated by all outsiders." (p. 74)

If anyone is fantasizing here, it is most assuredly Professor Pye. Has he, who grew up in China, never heard of the unequal treaties, and is he unaware of the origin of the treaty port agreements in wars deliberately provoked by the Western powers, and does he not know that the purpose of these treaties was not to "bottle up" the foreigners, but precisely the opposite?

In another chapter he presents the thesis, which I can only call preposterous, that the Chinese were frustrated by their lack of a colonial administration as a model of modern government, and by the treaty-port administrations which "served only to show up the inability of the Chinese to manage their own affairs." (p. 65) The grain of truth in all this, i.e., that Western penetration was less easy to identify and struggle against in China than in directly colonized countries, is lost in the nonsense that by moving to the treaty ports "thousands of Chinese demonstrated that foreign rule was preferable to their own government." The treaty ports provided certain advantages for certain groups of Chinese, but they also played a significant role in perpetuating the disorder which made the rest of China a hell of famine and warfare. Mao Tse-tung understood this, and thus demonstrated a greater theoretical sophistication than Lucian Pye. When Mao succeeded in establishing "law and order" throughout China, he did not take the treaty ports for a model, but rather required their elimination. (It might be added that the foreign denizens of the treaty ports, after decades of praying for "strong government" in China, were not happy when Mao finally established a strong government on the only plan which seemed feasible to him.)

In addition to these two fundamental sources of distortion: the misuse of psychological concepts to explain "irrational" political behavior which is assumed rather than proved, and the misuse of social science concepts which are at best tentative and at worst not adequate to the realities of even Western politics; this work suffers from a third major flaw. This is the accumulation of errors of fact and interpretation which can be attributed either to a deliberate and selective distortion of the available literature; or to a superficiality of knowledge and carelessness of research which is hardly more excusable. Some examples of this have already been given; three more should suffice:

1) Pye should read the 1946 book of his colleague, Harold Isaacs, No Peace for Asia, and then reassess his statement on page 240 that "At the end of World War II... the world environment was one of profound sympathy for any country committed to national development." The fact is that at the end of World War II, anti-colonialism was not yet even a fashionable pose and the Western powers were suppressing every nationalist movement they felt capable of defeating.

2) He cites C. K. Yang's book, The Chinese Family in the Communist Revolution but apparently does not understand the implications of China's family revolution for the nature of authority in China. Pye writes naively of the "innocent" "purifying ethic" propounded by young people which, "if understood by their parents, could only make the latter proud" (p. 109). The ethic carried by these young Chinese was innocent only by modern Western standards; by attacking the near-absolute power of the family head, it was in the profoundest sense subversive of the traditional Chinese ethics and social structure which were built upon this patriarchal power. The Chinese elders were not misinformed; they understood very well that the family revolution was not just a purification of traditional values.
3) The statement (on p. 58) that the Chinese feel no "need to change fundamentally and irrevocably their basic nature or identity" flies in the face of mountains of evidence to the contrary. Were I to write a "psychocultural study of the Chinese I would stress precisely their compulsive efforts to change their own natures in order to produce (hackneyed but indispensable phrase!) the "new socialist man." The most outstanding work on this theme is probably the early one by Robert Lifton, Thought Control and the Psychology of Totalism. Where Pye gets his idea that the Chinese feel no need to change themselves mystifies me.

I have raised some serious criticisms in this review; but objections to this criticism can still be offered: first, isn't such a "psychocultural" study, however wrong in its details, worth attempting? I would not deny that a discriminating use of psychology can enrich the other social sciences. The monographs by Yang and Lifton mentioned above are examples of what can properly be done. Such a grandiose scheme as attempted in The Spirit of Chinese Politics, however, is dangerous because those who are attracted by Pye's approach are likely to accept his framework and try to work within it, rather than testing the structure itself for viability. To outline the proper scope of psychological studies of this type is beyond the scope of this review, but sympathy with the subject and an exhaustive search for the rational bases of his (their) behavior is a prerequisite.

Another objection comes from well-informed scholars who find in the rich proliferation of observations and hypotheses, confirmation of some of their own pet theories about the Chinese. Does the work not earn a place in our bookshelves for that alone? they ask. Yes, if you are so well acquainted with China that you can screen out all the silly and insidiously wrong ideas, if you have the patience to sift through a mountain of chaff for a few wholesome grains (with so many ideas tossed out, he can't be wrong all the time), and above all, if you are properly skeptical of the grandiose pretensions to pathbreaking originality which the book claims for itself. Other reviews have already pointed out the The Spirit of Chinese Politics is in the tradition of Arthur Smith's Chinese Characteristics and other impressionistic reflections on the Chinese personality. But the general reader, the beginning student, and the eager social scientist seeking easy answers to the enigma of Chinese behavior should avoid it until they have served an apprenticeship with more careful and painstaking scholars, and until they have made a serious attempt on their own to appreciate Chinese motives. It should then be possible to make a psychologically oriented analysis that accepts the validity of goals which the Chinese set for themselves and which does not need to falsify the very real external threats which influence both their policies and their political culture.

Professor Pye, though affecting a paternalistically benevolent attitude, is no friend of the Chinese, for he has engaged in an implicit put-down of their actions when the rational explanations are often lying close at hand.
The Revolutionary Pacifism of A.J. Muste: On The Backgrounds of The Pacific War

Introductory Comment: The title and subtitle of this essay may seem unrelated; hence a word of explanation may be useful. The essay was written for a memorial number of Liberation which, as the editor expressed it, "gathered together a series of articles that deal with some of the problems with which A.J. struggled." I think that Muste's revolutionary pacifism was, and is, a profoundly important doctrine, both in the political analysis and moral conviction that it expresses. The circumstances of the anti-fascist war subjected it to the most severe of tests. Does it survive this test? When I began working on this article, I was not at all sure. I still feel quite ambivalent about the matter. There are several points that seem to me fairly clear, however. The American reaction to Japan's aggressiveness was, in a substantial measure, quite hypocritical. Worse still, there are very striking, quite distressing similarities between Japan's escapades and our own -- both in character and in rationalization -- with the fundamental difference that Japan's appeal to national interest, which was not totally without merit, becomes merely ludicrous when translated into a justification for American conquests in Asia.

This essay touches on all of these questions: on Muste's revolutionary pacifism and his interpretation of it in connection with the second World War; on the backgrounds of Japan's imperial ventures; on the Western reaction and responsibility; and, by implication, on the relevance of these matters to the problems of contemporary imperialism in Asia. No doubt the article would be more coherent were it limited to one or two of these themes. I am sure that it would be more clear if it advocated a particular "political line." After exploring these themes, I can suggest nothing more than the tentative remarks of the final paragraph.

In a crucial essay written 40 years ago,¹ A.J. Muste explained the concept of revolutionary nonviolence that was the guiding principle of an extraordinary life. "In a world built on violence, one must be a revolutionary before one can be a pacifist." "There is a certain indolence in us, a wish not to be disturbed, which tempts us to think that when things are quiet, all is well. Subconsciously, we tend to give the preference to 'social peace,' though it be only apparent, because our lives and possessions seem then secure. Actually, human beings acquiesce too easily in evil conditions; they rebel far too little and too seldom. There is nothing noble about acquiescence in a cramped life or mere submission to superior force." Muste was insistent that pacifists "get our thinking focussed." Their foremost task is to denounce the violence on which the present system is based, and all the evil -- material and spiritual -- this entails for the masses of men throughout the world.... So long as we are not dealing honestly and adequately with this ninety percent of our problem, there is something ludicrous, and perhaps hypocritical, about our concern over the
ten percent of violence employed by the rebels against oppression." Never in American history have these thoughts been so tragically appropriate as today.

The task of the revolutionary pacifist is spelled out more fully in the final paragraph of the essay.

Those who can bring themselves to renounce wealth, position and power accruing from a social system based on violence and putting a premium on acquisitiveness, and to identify themselves in some real fashion with the struggle of the masses toward the light, may help in a measure -- more, doubtless, by life than by words -- to devise a more excellent way, a technique of social progress less crude, brutal, costly and slow than mankind has yet evolved.

It is a remarkable tribute to A.J. Muste that his life's work can be measured by such standards as these. His essays are invariably thoughtful and provocative; his life, however, is an inspiration with hardly a parallel in twentieth century America. Muste believed, with Gandhi, that "unjust laws and practices survive because men obey them and conform to them. This they do out of fear. There are things they dread more than the continuance of the evil." He enriched half a century of American history with a personal commitment to these simple truths. His efforts began in a time when "men believed that a better human order, a classless and warless world, a socialist society, if you please, could be achieved," a time when the labor movement could be described as "that remarkable combination of mass power, prophetic idealism and utopian hope." They continued through the general disillusionment of war and depression and anti-radical hysteria, to the days when American sociologists could proclaim that "the realization that escapes no one is that the egalitarian and socially mobile society which the 'free-floating intellectuals' associated with the Marxist tradition have been calling for during the last hundred years has finally emerged in the form of our cumbersome, bureaucratic mass society, and has in turn engulfed the heretics."2 And finally, still not "engulfed," he persisted in his refusal to be one of the "obedient, docile men" who are the terror of our time, to the moment when our "egalitarian and socially mobile society" is facing a virtual rebellion from the lower depths, when young men are being faced every day with the questions posed at Nuremberg as their country devotes itself to enforcing the "stability" of the graveyard and the bulldozed village, and when the realization that escapes no one is that something is drastically wrong in American society.

In one of his last published essays, Muste describes himself as an "unrepentant unilateralist, on political as well as moral grounds."3 In part, he bases his position on an absolute moral commitment that one may accept or reject, but that cannot be profitably debated. In part, he defends it on grounds that seem to me not very persuasive, a psychological principle that "like produces like, kindness provokes kindness," hence an appeal to "the essential humanity of the enemy."4 It is very difficult to retain a faith in the "essential humanity" of the SS trooper or the Commissar or the racist blinded with hate and fear, or, for that matter, the insensate victim of a life of anti-communist indoctrination. When the enemy is a remote technician programming B-52 raids or "pacification," there is no possibility for a human confrontation and the psychological basis for nonviolent tactics, whatever it may be, simply evaporates. A society that is capable of producing concepts like "un-American" and "traitor" -- of turning "peace" into a dirty word -- has advanced a long way towards immunizing the individual against any human appeal. American society has reached the stage of near total immersion in ideology. The commitment has vanished from consciousness -- what else can a right-thinking person possibly believe? Americans are simply "pragmatic," and they must bring others to this happy state. Thus an AID official can write,
with no trace of irony, that our goal is to move nations "from doctrinaire reliance on state enterprise to a pragmatic support of private initiative" and a headline in the New York Times can refer to Indian capitulation to American demands concerning the conditions of foreign investment as India's "drift from socialism to pragmatism." With this narrowing of the range of the thinkable comes an inability to comprehend how the weak and dispossessed can resist our benevolent manipulation of their lives, an incapacity to react in human terms to the misery that we impose.

The only useful way to evaluate the program of unilateral revolutionary pacifism is to consider what it implies in concrete historical circumstances. As a prescription for the United States in the mid-sixties, it is much too easy to defend. There is no particular merit in being more reasonable than a lunatic; correspondingly, almost any policy is more rational than one that accepts repeated risk of nuclear war, hence a near guarantee of nuclear war in the long run -- a "long run" that is unlikely to be very long, given the risks that policy makers are willing to accept. Thus in the Cuban missile crisis, Kennedy was willing (according to Sorenson's memoirs) to accept a probability of 1/3 to 1/2 of nuclear war, in order to establish that the United States alone has the right to maintain missiles on the borders of a potential enemy.6 And who knows what "probabilities" the CIA is now providing to the Rostows and the Wheelers who are trying to save something from their Vietnam fiasco by bombing at the Chinese border? Furthermore, it does not require an unusual political intelligence to urge world-wide deescalation upon the great power that by any objective standard is the most aggressive in the world -- as measured by number of governments maintained by force or subverted by intrigue, by troops and bases on foreign soil, by willingness to use the most awesome "killing machine" in history to enforce its concept of world order.

It would be more enlightening to consider the program of revolutionary pacifism in the context of a decade ago, when international gangsterism was more widely distributed, with the British engaged in murderous repression in Kenya, the French fighting the last of their dirty colonial wars, and the Soviet Union consolidating its Eastern European empire with brutality and deceit. But it is the international situation of December, 1941, that provides the most severe test for Muste's doctrine. There is a great deal to be learned from a study of the events that led up to an armed attack, by a competing imperialism, on American possessions and the forces defending them, and, even more, from a consideration of the varying reactions to these events, and their aftermath. If Muste's revolutionary pacifism is defensible as a general political program, then it must be defensible in these extreme circumstances. By arguing that it was, Muste isolated himself not only from any mass base, but also from all but a marginal fringe of American intellectuals.

Writing in 1941, Muste saw the war as:

a conflict between two groups of powers for survival and domination. One set of powers, which includes Britain and the United States, and perhaps 'free' France, controls some 70% of the earth's resources and thirty million square miles of territory. The imperialistic status quo thus to their advantage was achieved by a series of wars including the last one. All they ask now is to be left at peace, and if so they are disposed to make their rule mild though firm... On the other hand stands a group of powers, such as Germany, Italy, Hungary, Japan, controlling about 15% of the earth's resources and one million square miles of territory, equally determined to alter the situation in their own favor, to impose their ideas of 'order', and armed to the teeth to do that, even if it means plunging the whole world into war.7

He foresaw that an allied victory would yield "a new American empire" incorpora-
ting a subservient Britain, "that we shall be the next nation to seek world domination -- in other words, to do what we condemn Hitler for trying to do."

In the disordered post-war world, we shall be told, he predicts, that "our only safety lies in making or keeping ourselves 'impregnable'. But that... means being able to decide by preponderance of military might any international issue that may arise -- which would put us in the position in which Hitler is trying to put Germany."

In a later essay, he quotes this remark: "The problem after a war is with the victor. He thinks he has just proved that war and violence pay. Who will now teach him a lesson?"

The prediction that the United States would emerge as the world-dominant power was political realism; to forecast that it would act accordingly, having achieved this status by force, was no less realistic. This tragedy might be averted, Muste urged, by a serious attempt at peaceful reconciliation with no attempt to fasten sole war-guilt on any nation, assurance to all peoples of equitable access to markets and essential materials, armament reduction, massive economic rehabilitation, and moves towards international federation. To the American ideologist of 1941 such a recommendation seemed as senseless as the proposal, today, that we support popular revolution. And at that moment, events and policy were taking a very different direction.

Since nothing of the sort was ever attempted, one can only speculate as to the possible outcome of such a course. The accuracy of Muste's forecast unfortunately requires little comment. Furthermore, a plausible case can be made for his analysis of the then-existing situation, a matter of more than academic interest, in view of developments in Asia since that time.

As I mentioned, the point of view that Muste expressed was a rather isolated one. To see how little the intellectual climate has changed, it is enough to consider the lengthy debate over the decision to drop the bomb. What has been at issue is the question whether this constituted the last act of World War II or the first phase of American post-war diplomacy; or whether it was justified as a means of bringing the war to a quick conclusion. Only rarely has the question been raised whether there was any justification for American victory in the Pacific war; and this issue, where faced at all, has been posed in the context of the cold war -- that is, was it wise to have removed a counter-weight to growing Chinese power, soon to become "Communist" power?

A fairly typical American view is probably that expressed by historian Louis Morton:

In the late summer and autumn of 1945 the American people had every reason to rejoice. Germany and Japan had been defeated, and American troops, victorious everywhere, would soon be returning home. Unprecedented evil had been overcome by the greatest display of force ever marshalled in the cause of human freedom...

It is remarkable that such an attitude should be so blandly expressed and easily accepted. Is it true that in August, 1945, the American people "had every reason to rejoice" -- at the sight of a Japanese countryside devastated by conventional bombing in which tens of thousands of civilians had been massacred, not to speak of the horrifying toll of two atom bombs (the second, so it appears, history's most abominable experiment); or at the news of a final gratuitous act of barbarism, trivial in the context of what had just taken place, a 1000 plane raid launched after the Japanese surrender had been announced but, technically, before it was officially received? To Secretary of War Stimson it seemed "appalling that there had been no protest over the air strikes we were conducting against Japan which led to such extraordinarily heavy losses of life"; he felt that "there was something wrong with a country where no one questioned that." What then are we to say of a country that still, 20 years later, is incapable of facing the question of war guilt?

It is not, of course, that the question of war guilt has gone out of
fashion. No trip to Germany is complete, even today, without a ritual sigh and wringing of hands over the failure of the German people to face up to the sins of the Nazi atrocities and the question of war guilt. This is a sure sign of the corruption of their nature. Just recently, a group of American liberal intellectuals gave their impressions of a tour of West Germany in the Atlantic Monthly (May, 1967). None failed to raise the question of war guilt. One comments that "however disparate our temperaments or our political emphases, we were plainly a group made coherent by our shared suspicions of Germany's capacity for political health...we had not forgotten, nor could we forget, that we were in the country which had been able to devise, and implement, Nazism." The same commentator is impressed with the "dignity and fortitude" with which young Germans "carry an emotional and moral burden unmatched in history: they have to live with the knowledge that their parent generation, and often their own parents, perpetrated the worst atrocities on the record of mankind." Another, a fervent apologist for the American war in Vietnam, asks "How does a human being 'come to terms' with the fact that his father was a soulless murderer, or an accomplice to soulless murder?" Several "were offended by the way the camp [Dachau] had been fixed up, prettified" (does the "prettification" of Hiroshima -- or, to take a closer analogue, the prettification of Los Alamos -- provoke the same response?). To their credit, a few refer to Vietnam; but not once is a question raised -- even to be dismissed -- as to American conduct in the Second World War, or the "emotional and moral burden" carried by those whose "parent generation" stood by while two atom bombs were used against a beaten and virtually defenseless enemy.

To free ourselves from the conformism and moral blindness that has become a national scandal, it is a good idea occasionally to read the measured reactions of conservative Asians to some of our own exploits. Consider, for example, the words of the Indian Justice Radhabinod Pal, the leading Asian voice at the Tokyo Tribunal that assessed the war guilt of the Japanese. In his carefully argued (and largely ignored) dissenting opinion to the decision of the tribunal, he has the following remarks to make:

The Kaiser Wilhelm II was credited with a letter to the Austrian Kaiser Franz Joseph in the early days of that war, wherein he stated as follows: "My soul is torn, but everything must be put to fire and sword; men, women and children and old men must be slaughtered and not a tree or house be left standing. With these methods of terrorism, which are alone capable of affecting a people as degenerate as the French, the war will be over in two months, whereas if I admit considerations of humanity it will be prolonged for years. In spite of my repugnance I have therefore been obliged to choose the former system.'

This showed his ruthless policy, and this policy of indiscriminate murder to shorten the war was considered to be a crime. In the Pacific war under our consideration, if there was anything approaching what is indicated in the above letter of the German Emperor, it is the decision coming from the allied powers to use the atom bomb. Further generations will judge this dire decision. History will say whether any outburst of popular sentiment against usage of such a weapon is irrational and only sentimental and whether it has become legitimate by such indiscriminate slaughter to win the victory by breaking the will of the whole nation to continue to fight. We need not stop here to consider whether or not 'the atom bomb comes to force a more fundamental searching of the nature of warfare and of the legitimate means for the pursuit of military objectives.' It would be sufficient for my present purpose to say that if any indiscriminate destruction
of civilian life and property is still illegitimate in warfare, then, in the Pacific war, this decision to use the atom bomb is the only near approach to the directives of the German Emperor during the first World War and of the Nazi leaders during the second World War.

Nothing like this could be traced to the credit of the present accused.11

When we lament over the German conscience, we are demanding of them a display of self-hatred -- a good thing, no doubt. But for us the matter is infinitely more serious. It is not a matter of self-hatred regarding the sins of the past. Like the German Kaiser, we believe that everything must be put to fire and sword, so that the war will be more quickly finished -- and we act on this belief. Unlike the German Kaiser, our soul is not torn. We manage a relative calm, as we continue, today, to write new chapters of history with the blood of the helpless and innocent.

Returning to Møstø's radical pacifism in the context of 1941, recall that the first of his proposals was that there be no attempt "to fasten sole war-guilt on any nation." The second was that measures be taken to assure to all peoples equitable access to markets and essential materials. The immediate cause of the attack on Pearl Harbor was the recognition, by the Japanese military, that it was "now or never." The Western powers controlled the raw materials on which their existence depended, and these supplies were being choked off in retaliation for expansion on the mainland and association with Germany and Italy in the tripartite pact. Japan faced an American diplomatic offensive aimed at changing it "from a hostile expansionist empire, with great pride in its destiny and ambitious plans for its future, to a peaceful, contented nation of merchants subcontracting with the United States to aid America's fight against Hitler"12 -- precisely what was achieved by the war, if we replace "Hitler" by "the international Communist conspiracy." To understand the Japanese predicament more fully, to evaluate the claim that Japan represented the forces of "unprecedented evil" arrayed against the American-led "cause of human freedom," and to appreciate the substance of Møstø's radical pacifist alternative, it is necessary to look with some care into the backgrounds of Japanese imperialism.

Japan had been opened to Western influence by a threat of force in the mid-19th century, and had then undertaken a remarkably successful effort at modernization. A new plutocracy replaced the old feudal structure, adopting the forms of parliamentary government. Mass participation in the developing political structure was minimal; it is doubtful that the living standards of the peasantry and urban workers rose during the period of transition from a medieval to a modern capitalist society. Japan joined the other imperialist powers in the exploitation of East Asia and took over Formosa, Korea and parts of Southern Manchuria. In short, by the late 1920's, Japan was what in modern political parlance is called a "democracy" and was attempting to play the normal role of a great power.

A portent of danger lay in the virtual independence of the armed forces from the civilian government. The "dual diplomacy" to which this gave rise was shortly to have disastrous consequences.

The great European War of 1914-18 gave Japan an opportunity to extend its "rights and interests" in China and provided new markets for expanding Japanese industry. The revival of European competition came as a severe blow, and post-war diplomacy attempted, vainly, to construct a new and stable international system that would integrate Japan with the other imperialist powers. In good faith, Japan accepted the subordinate role assigned it, and consented, throughout the 20's, to be a well-behaved member of the imperialist club. The Washington Conference of 1921-2 established the naval forces of America, England and Japan in the ratio of 5:5:3, accepting the American position of "equality of security" rather than the Japanese goal of "equality of armaments." As Schroeder comments,
"the American argument was that Japan, a state surrounded on all sides by historic enemies and powerful rivals, had a superior natural situation for defense, while the United States, in the midst of two oceans without a powerful enemy on two continents, had defensively an inferior natural endowment." 13

The Washington Conference arrangements were renegotiated in the London Naval Treaty of 1930 involving Japan, Great Britain, and the United States. The matter is discussed in detail in a study by James Crowley. 14 In the negotiations leading to this treaty, Secretary of State Stimson placed emphasis on "the unusual problems posed by the necessity of the United States to defend two coastlines and on the "great concessions" which the American government had made at the time of the Washington Conference." Crowley points out that "throughout the 1920's, Japan faithfully adhered to the terms of the Washington Conference treaties." At issue in the subsequent negotiations was the question whether Japan could maintain its primary objective: "supremacy over the American fleet in Japanese home waters." The London Treaty, in effect, required that Japan abandon this objective. The London Treaty "did not render England a second-class naval power, nor did it endanger the safety of the United States or its insular possessions in the Pacific," but it did compromise "the principle of Japanese naval hegemony in Japan's own waters."

The domestic opposition to the treaty in Japan was a very serious matter. It led to a strengthening of the role of the military, which felt, with reason, that the civilian leadership was seriously endangering Japanese security. The treaty also evoked the first of "the series of violent attacks on the legally appointed leaders of Japan which would characterize the political history of that country during the 1930's" when Premier Hamaguchi, who was responsible for the treaty, was shot by "a patriotic youth" in 1930. An immediate consequence of the treaty, was the adoption by the opposition party of a platform insisting on "the maintenance of Japan's privileged position in Manchuria, and a foreign policy which discounted the necessity of cooperation with the Anglo-American nations in defense of Japan's continental interests or in the cause of naval armament agreements." In summary, it seems clear that the refusal of the United States to grant to Japan hegemony in its waters (while of course insisting on maintaining its own hegemony in the Western Atlantic and Eastern Pacific) was a significant contributory cause to the crisis that was soon to erupt.

In later years, the Japanese came to feel, with much justice, that they had been hoodwinked more generally in the diplomatic arrangements of the early 1920's, which "embodied the idea that the Far East is essentially a place for the commercial and financial activities of the Western peoples and... emphasized the importance of placing the signatory powers on an equal footing, thus ignoring the desirability of providing special relations between particular countries, especially between Japan and China." 15 A typical Japanese view of the situation was expressed by a delegate to the 1925 conference of the Institute of Pacific Relations (IPR): "Just as [Japan] was getting really skillful at the game of the grab, the other Powers, most of whom had all they wanted anyway, suddenly had an excess of virtue and called the game off." 16 A decade later, a delegate to the 1936 IPR conference was to reiterate:

The Japanese feel that Western countries are unfair in imposing the status quo on Japan and calling it 'peace.' Their whole conception of diplomatic machinery and collective security is that it is simply a means to maintain that sort of peace, and to that degree the Japanese people are against it. This doesn't mean that Japan would not participate in collective security if some machinery can be devised which provides for 'peaceful change.' ...Japan has a legitimate desire to expand. What are the means by which a nation can legitimately expand? Imperialistic advances are
apparently out of date, but this is not understood by the Japanese people. The average reasoning of the Japanese people is that Great Britain and the other Western powers have done it, so why shouldn't we? The problem is not so much to determine the aggressor as to provide ample opportunities for the necessary expansion peacefully. 17

Through the mid-1920's the Japanese were, generally, the most sympathetic of the imperialist powers to the Kuomintang in its attempt to unify China. In 1927, Chiang Kai-shek stated that the Japanese policy differed from the "oppressive" attitude of Britain and the United States, and Eugene Ch'en, then a high Kuomintang official, contrasted Japan's nonparticipation in the imperialist bombardment of Nanking to the "cruelty inherent in the Western civilization"; this "indicated Japan's friendship for China." The goal of Japanese diplomacy was to strengthen the anti-Communist elements in the Kuomintang and, at the same time, to support the rule of the warlord Chang Tso-lin over an at least semi-independent Manchuria. At the time, this seemed not totally unreasonable, although the legal position of Japan was insecure, and this policy was sure to come into conflict with Chinese nationalism. According to one authority:

As of 1927 Manchuria was politically identifiable with China only insofar as its overlord, Chang Tso-lin, was also commander-in-chief of the anti-Kuomintang coalition controlling Peking. But Chang's economic and military base in the Three Eastern provinces was entirely distinct from China, and in the past he had occasionally proclaimed Manchuria's independence. 18

To the extent that this assessment is accurate, Japanese diplomacy was not unrealistic in aiming to prevent the growing nationalist movement in China from overwhelming Manchuria, and, at the same time, to curb the ambitions of the Manchurian warlord to take over all of China. This remained, in essence, the goal of the Japanese civilian governments even through the "Manchurian incident" of 1931-2.

By 1931, it was becoming fairly clear that the relatively conciliatory diplomacy of the 1920's was unlikely to secure the "rights and interests" regarded as essential for Japan's continued development. The effects of the great depression were immediate and severe (see below). The London Treaty had failed to provide Japan with military security vis à vis the other imperialist powers. Manchuria remained independent of the Kuomintang, but Chinese Nationalist pressures for unification were increasing. At the same time, the Soviet Union had significantly expanded its military power on the Manchurian border, a fact that could not fail to concern the Japanese military. Japan had a substantial investment in the South Manchurian Railway, and, rightly or wrongly, regarded Manchuria as an extremely important potential source of desperately needed raw materials. Large numbers of Japanese as well as thousands of Korean farmers encouraged by Japan had settled in Manchuria, inflaming Chinese nationalism and, simultaneously, deepening the commitment of the Kwangtung Army in Manchuria to "preserve order." The future of the South Manchurian Railway -- and with it, the associated investments as well as the welfare of the Japanese and Korean immigrants and residents -- was very much in doubt, as Chinese pressures mounted both inside Manchuria and in Nationalist China. "Technically, under a 1905 protocol, China was barred from building any railway lines parallel to the South Manchurian Railway or from constructing any lines which might endanger the commercial traffic along it," 20 but China was quite naturally disinclined to honor this provision, and Japanese attempts to conduct discussions on railway construction were frustrated, as the Kuomintang pursued its course of attempting to incorporate Manchuria within China and to eliminate Japanese influence, no doubt with the support of the majority of the Manchurian population. A number of fairly serious incidents of violence occurred involving Korean settlers and the Japanese military. A Japanese officer was murdered in the summer of 1931. In Shanghai, a boycott of Japanese goods was initiated.
Under these conditions, debate intensified within Japan as to whether its future lay in "the political leadership of an East Asia power bloc" guaranteed by military force, or in continuing to abide by "the new rules of diplomacy established by Occidental and satiated powers." The issue was resolved in September, 1931, when Kwantung Army officers provoked a clash with Chinese forces (the "Mukden incident") and proceeded to take full control of Manchuria. China, not unexpectedly, refused the Japanese offers to negotiate, insisting that "evacuation is a precondition of direct negotiation." Exercising the right of "self-defense" against Chinese "bandits," the Kwantung Army established control by force, and in August, 1932, the Japanese government, under strong military and popular pressure, recognized Manchuria as the new, "independent" state of Manchukuo, under the former Manchu Emperor, Pu Yi. As Walter Lippmann commented, the procedure of setting up "local Chinese governments which are dependent upon Japan" was "a familiar one," not unlike the American precedents "in Nicaragua, Haiti, and elsewhere."

The Manchurian events flowed over into China proper and Japan itself, and caused an international crisis. The boycott in Shanghai and a clash between Chinese troops and Japanese marines near the Japanese sector of the international settlement led to a retaliatory aerial bombardment by the Japanese. "This indiscriminate use of air power against a small contingent of Chinese soldiers dispersed among a congested civilian population generated a profound sense of shock and indignation in England and the United States." In Japan, the Shanghai Incident was seen rather differently. The Japanese Minister to China at the time, Mamoru Shigemitsu, writes in his memoirs that he was responsible for the request that the government dispatch troops to Shanghai "to save the Japanese residents from annihilation." In his view, the thirty thousand Japanese settlers and the Japanese property in Shanghai were at the mercy of the Chinese army, with its rather left-wing tendencies. Furthermore, "Chinese Communists" were starting strikes in Japanese-owned mills. For all of these reasons, Shigemitsu felt justified in requesting troops, which "succeeded in dislodging the Chinese forces from the Shanghai district and restoring law and order" -- a "familiar procedure", as Lippmann rightly observed, and not without present-day parallels.

As far as Japan itself is concerned, the events of 1931-2 were quite serious in their impact. According to the outstanding Japanese political scientist Masao Maruyama, "the energy of radical fascism stored up in the preparatory period now burst forth in full concentration under the combined pressure of domestic panic and international crises such as the Manchurian Incident, the Shanghai Incident, and Japan's withdrawal from the League of Nations." Furthermore, "the issue of the infringement of the supreme command," raised when the civilian leadership had overruled the military leaders and in effect capitulated to the West at the London Naval Conference, "was a great stimulus to the fascist movement." In 1932 a series of assassinations of important political figures (including Prime Minister Inukai) contributed further to the decline of civilian power and the strengthening of the hand of the military.

The international reaction to these events was ambiguous. The League of Nations sent a commission of inquiry, the Lytton Commission, to investigate the Manchurian situation. Its report rejected the Japanese position that Manchukuo should be established as an independent state, and insisted on a loose form of Chinese sovereignty, at which point Japan withdrew from the League of Nations. The United States also found itself somewhat isolated diplomatically, in that the harsh anti-Japanese position taken by Secretary of State Stimson received little support from the other Western Powers.

In a careful review of the point of view of the Lytton Commission, the Inukai government, and the central army authorities, Sadako Ogata demonstrates a considerable area of agreement:

...the central army authorities... insisted upon the creation of a new local regime with authority to negotiate settlement of
Manchurian problems, but under the formal sovereignty of the Chinese National Government, a traditional arrangement. This was the arrangement that the world at large was willing to accept. The Lytton Commission proposed the constitution of a special regime for the administration of Manchuria possessed of a large measure of autonomy but under Chinese jurisdiction. Finally, when the State of Manchukuo declared its independence, the Government of Japan withheld formal recognition and thereby attempted to avoid a head-on collision with the powers, which by then had lined up behind the doctrine of non-recognition of changes caused by Japanese military action in Manchuria. The complete political reconstruction of Manchuria was achieved, then, at the hands of the Kwantung Army in defiance of the opposition of government and central military leaders.29

The Lytton Commission report took cognizance of some of the complexities in the situation. The report drew the following conclusion:

This is not a case in which one country has declared war on another country without previously exhausting the opportunities for conciliation provided in the Covenant of the League of Nations. Neither is it a simple case of the violation of the frontier of one country by the armed forces of a neighboring country, because in Manchuria there are many features without an exact parallel in other parts of the world.

The report went on to point out that the dispute arose in a territory in which both China and Japan "claim to have rights and interests, only some of which are clearly defined by international law; a territory which, although legally an integral part of China, had a sufficiently autonomous character to carry out direct negotiations with Japan on the matters which lay at the roots of this conflict."30

It is an open question whether a more conciliatory American diplomacy that took into account some of the real problems faced by Japan might have helped the civilian government (backed by the central army authorities) to prevail over the independent initiative of the Kwantung Army, which ultimately succeeded in bringing the Japanese Government to recognize the fait accompli of a Manchukuo that was more a puppet of the Kwantung Army than of Japan proper.

In any event, the success of the Kwantung Army in enforcing its conception of the status of Manchuria set Japan and the United States on a collision course. Japan turned to an "independent diplomacy" and reliance on force to achieve its objectives. The Japanese position of the mid-thirties is described as follows by Rōyama: Japan's aim is not to conquer China, or to take any territory from her, but instead to create jointly with China and Manchukuo a new order comprising the three independent states. In accordance with this programme, East Asia is to become a vast self-sustaining region where Japan will acquire economic security and immunity from such trade boycotts as she has been experiencing at the hands of the Western powers.31

This policy was in conflict with Chinese nationalism and with the long-term insistence of the United States on the open door policy in China.

From 1928 there had been an increasing divergence between the policies of the civilian Japanese governments, which attempted to play the game of international politics in accordance with the rules set by the dominant imperialist powers, and the Kwantung Army which regarded these rules as unfair to Japan and was also dissatisfied with the injustice of domestic Japanese society. The independent initiative of the Kwantung Army was largely that of the young officers of petty bourgeois origin who felt that they represented as well the interests of the soldiers, predominantly of peasant stock. "The Manchurian affair constitutes an external expression of the radical reform
movement that was originally inspired by Kita and Okawa,32 who had developed the view that Japan represented an "international proletariat," with an emancipating mission for the Asian masses, and who opposed the obvious inequities of modern capitalism. The fundamental law proposed for Manchukuo, in 1932, protected the people from "usury, excessive profit, and all other unjust economic pressure." As Ogata notes,33 the fundamental law "showed the attempt to forestall the modern forms of economic injustice caused by capitalism." In Japan itself, this program appealed to the Social Democrats, who blamed "Chinese warlords and selfish Japanese capitalists for the difficulties in [Manchuria]" and who demanded "the creation of a socialistic system in Manchuria, one that would benefit 'both Chinese and Japanese living in Manchuria'."34

Ogata cites a great deal of evidence to support the conclusion that the Army never expected to establish Japanese supremacy, but rather proposed to leave "wide discretion to the local self-governing Chinese bodies, and intended neither the disruption of the daily lives of the Manchurian people nor their assimilation into Japanese culture."35 The program for autonomy was apparently influenced by, and attempted to incorporate certain indigenous Chinese moves towards autonomy. "In the period immediately preceding the Manchurian Affair, a group of Chinese under the leadership of Chang Ku also attempted to create an autonomous Manchuria based on cooperation of its six largest ethnic groups (Japanese, Chinese, Russians, Mongolians, Koreans, and Manchurians) in order to protect the area from Japanese, Chinese and Soviet encroachment."36 The governing bodies set up by the Kwantung Army were led by prominent Chinese with Japanese support. Reorganization of local administrative organs was undertaken by utilizing the traditional self-governing bodies.... Yu Chung-han, a prominent elder statesman of the Mukden Government, was...installed as chief of the Self-Government Guiding Board on November 10. Yu had been the leader of the civilian group in Manchuria which, in contrast to the war lords, had held to the principle of absolute hokyo anmin (secure boundary and peaceful life). According to him, the protection and prosperity of the Northeastern Provinces assumed priority over all, including the relationship with China proper. Through tax reform, improvement of the wage system of government officials, and abolition of a costly army, the people in Manchuria were to enjoy the benefits of peaceful labor, while defense was to be entrusted to their most powerful neighbor, Japan.37

In general, the Kwantung Army regarded the 30 million people of Manchuria--half of whom had immigrated since the initiation of Japanese development efforts a quarter of a century earlier--as "suffering masses who had been sacrificed to the misrule of warlords and the avarice of wicked officials, masses deriving no benefits of civilization despite the natural abundance of the region."38 Furthermore, the Army regarded Manchuria as "the fortress against Russian southern advancement, which became increasingly threatening as Soviet influence over the Chinese revolution became more and more apparent."39 With many Japanese civilians, it felt that "under the leadership of Chiang Kai-shek and with the support of the Western democratic powers which wanted to keep China in a semi-colonial state safe from the continental advance of the Japanese, China was rapidly becoming a military-fascist country,"40 and had no right to dominate Manchuria. To use the kind of terminology favored by Secretary Rusk, it was unwilling to sacrifice the Manchurian people to their more powerful or better organized neighbors, and it engaged in serious efforts to win the hearts and minds of the people and to encourage the responsible Chinese leadership that had itself been working for Manchurian independence.41

In fact, a case can be made that "had it not been for Western intervention, which strengthened China, the Tibetans and Mongols would have simply resumed their own national sovereignty after the fall of the Manchu empire" in 1911, as would the Manchurians. With considerable Western prodding, the Nationalist government had abandoned the original demand for union with equality of Chinese, Manchus, Mongols, Moslems and Tibetans and taken the position that China should rule the outer dominions. The West assumed that China would be under Western guidance and influence; "by confirming the maximum area for China it increased the sphere of future Western investment and exploitation"42 (a fact which adds a touch of irony to current Western complaints about "Chinese expansionism"). From this point of view, the independence of Manchukuo could easily be rationalized as a step towards the emancipation of the peoples of East Asia from
Western dominance.

To be sure, the establishment of Japanese hegemony over Manchuria—and later, North China as well—was motivated by the desire to secure Japanese rights and interests. A liberal professor of American history, Yasaka Takagi, observed that the general support for the Japanese military in 1931 was similar to the Manifest Destiny psychology underlying American expansion into Florida, Texas, California, Cuba, and Hawaii. He described the bandit-infested, warlord-controlled Manchurian region, then subject to the clash of expansionist Chinese nationalism and Japanese imperialism, as similar to the Caribbean when the United States justified its Caribbean policy. He asks why there should be a Monroe Doctrine in America and an Open Door principle in Asia, and suggests an international conference to resolve the outstanding problems of the area, noting, however, that few Americans would "entertain even for a moment the idea of letting an international conference define the Monroe Doctrine and review Mexican relations." He points out, quite correctly, that "the peace machinery of the world is in itself primarily the creation of the dominant races of the earth, of those who are the greatest beneficiaries from the maintenance of the status quo."

Nevertheless, it appears that few Japanese were willing to justify the Manchurian Incident and subsequent events on the "pragmatic" grounds of self-interest. Rather, they emphasized the high moral character of the intervention, the benefits it would bring to the suffering masses (once the terrorism had been suppressed), and the intention of establishing an "earthly paradise" in the independent state of Manchukuo (later, in China as well), defended from Communist attack by the power of Japan. Maruyama observes that "what our wartime leaders accomplished by their moralizing was not simply to deceive the people of Japan or of the world; more than anyone else they deceived themselves." To illustrate, he quotes the observations of American Ambassador Joseph Grew on the "self-deception and lack of realism" in the upper strata of Japanese society:

...I doubt if one Japanese in a hundred really believes that they have actually broken the Kellogg Pact, the Nine-Power Treaty, and the Covenant of the League. A comparatively few thinking men are capable of frankly facing the facts, and one Japanese said to me: 'Yes, we've broken every one of these instruments; we've waged open war; the arguments of "self-defense" and "self-determination for Manchuria" are rot; but we needed Manchuria, and that's that.' But such men are in the minority. The great majority of Japanese are astonishingly capable of really fooling themselves....It isn't that the Japanese necessarily has his tongue in his cheek when he signs the obligation. It merely means that when the obligation runs counter to his own interests, as he conceives them, he will interpret the obligation to suit himself and, according to his own lights and mentality, he will very likely be perfectly honest in so doing....Such a mentality is a great deal harder to deal with than a mentality which, however brazen, knows that it is in the wrong.

In this respect, the analogy to current American behavior in Asia fails; more than one American in a hundred understands that we have actually violated our commitments, not only at Geneva, but, more importantly, to the UN charter. However, the general observation remains quite valid in the changed circumstances of today. It is very difficult to deal with the mentality that reinterprets obligations to suit self-interest, and may very well be perfectly honest—in some curious sense of the word—in so doing.

Alongside of those who justified the Manchurian intervention on the pragmatic grounds of self-interest, those who spoke of a new Monroe Doctrine "to maintain the peace of East Asia," and those who fantasized about an "earthly paradise," there were also dissident voices that questioned Japanese policy in a more fundamental way. As the military extended its power, dissidents were attacked—both verbally and physically—for their betrayal of Japan. In 1936, for example, the printing presses of the leading Tokyo newspapers were bombed and Captain Nonaka, who was in command, posted a Manifesto of the Righteous Army of Restoration "which identified those groups most responsible for the betrayal of the national polity—the senior statesmen, financial magnates, court officials, and certain factions in the army—proclaiming:

They have trespassed on the prerogatives of the Emperor's rights of supreme command—among other times, in the conclusion of the London Naval Treaty and in the removal of the Inspector General
of Military Education. Moreover, they secretly conspired to steal the supreme command in the March Incident; and they united with disloyal professors in rebellious places. These are but a few of the most notable instances of their villainies....

It is difficult to imagine such a development in the United States today. Difficult, but not impossible. Consider, for example, the column by William H. Stringer on the editorial page of the Christian Science Monitor on February 7, 1968, calling for an end to "that violent, discouraged, and anarchic thinking which disrupts government and adds to Washington's already grievous burdens." The final paragraph explains why the "carping and caterwauling from the pseudointellectual establishment" must cease:

Certainly this time of crucial decisions is a time to uphold the government--President and Congress--with our prayers. Yes, to see that no mist of false doctrine or sleazy upbringing can upset the constitutional order which gives thrust and purpose to our country. And to remind ourselves and affirm that our leaders have the utilization of ever-present intelligence and wisdom from on high, that they indeed can perceive and follow the "path which no fowl knoweth." (Job 28) [Italics mine]

One would have to search with some diligence in the literature of totalitarianism to find such a statement. An obscure Japanese military officer condemns the disloyal professors and other betrayers who have trespassed on the Imperial prerogatives; a writer for one of our most distinguished and "responsible" newspapers denounces the pseudointellectuals of false doctrine and sleazy upbringing who refuse to recognize that our leaders are divinely inspired. There are, to be sure, important differences between the two situations; thus Captain Nonaka bombed the printing presses, whereas his contemporary equivalent is featured by the responsible American press.

As Toynbee had noted earlier, Japan's race-conscious English-speaking peoples of the Pacific closing in upon her--had suddenly become precarious again.

These special interests had repeatedly been recognized by the United States. Both China and Japan regarded the Root-Takahira Agreement of 1908 as indicating "American acquiescence in the latter's position in Manchuria." Secretary of State Bryan, in 1915, stated that "the United States frankly recognized that territorial contiguity creates special relations between Japan and these districts" (Shantung, South Manchuria and East Mongolia); and the Lansing-Ishii Notes of 1917 stated that "territorial propinquity creates special relations between countries and, consequently, the Government of the United States recognizes that Japan has special interests in China, particularly in the part to which her possessions are contiguous." In fact, the United States for several years regarded the Kuomintang as in revolt against the legitimate government of China, and even after Chiang's anti-Communist coup showed little pro-Nationalist sympathy. As late as 1930, the American minister to China saw no difference between the Kuomintang and the warlord rebels in Peking, and wrote that he could not "see any hope in any of the self-appointed leaders that are drifting over the land at the head of odd bands of troops." At the same time, the United States insisted on preserving its special rights, including the right of extraterritoriality, which exempted American citizens from Chinese law. In 1928, there were more than 5200 American marines in China protecting these rights (the Japanese army in Manchuria at the time was about 10,000 troops). The other imperialist powers were even more insistent on protecting their rights, and persisted in their anti-Nationalist attitudes right through the Manchurian Incident.

In later years, when the Japanese had begun to use force to guarantee their position in China, they still retained the support of the American business community (as long as it did not itself feel threatened by these actions). In 1928, American consuls supported the dispatch of Japanese troops; one reported that their arrival "has brought a feeling of relief... even among Chinese, especially those of the substantial class." The business community remained relatively pro-Japanese even after Japanese actions in Manchuria and Shanghai in 1931-2; "...in general, it
was felt that the Japanese were fighting the battle of all foreigners against the Chinese who wished to destroy foreign rights and privileges....that if the organizing abilities of the Japanese were turned loose in China, it might be a good thing for everybody."53 Ambassador Grew, on November 20, 1937, entered in his diary a note that the MacMurray Memorandum, just circulated by one of the main American spokesmen on Far Eastern affairs, "would serve to relieve many of our fellow countrymen of the generally accepted theory that Japan has been a big bully and China the downtrodden victim."54 Commonly the American attitude remained that expressed by Ambassador Nelson Johnson, who argued that the American interest dictated that we be neither pro-Chinese nor pro-Japanese but rather "must have a single eye to the...effect of developments in the East...upon the future interests of America," namely, "the fact that the great population of Asia offers a valuable outlet for the products of our industries and that as our industries develop we will be more and more interested in cultivating an outlet for them."55 Also typical is his explanation of the attitude we should adopt "toward these oriental peoples for whose future we became responsible." What we make of them will be "peculiarly the product of American idealism"; in their future "we shall continue to be interested as a father must be interested in the career of his son long after the son has left the fami ly nest."56 He was concerned, in fact, that native American altruism would be too predominant in our treatment of our Asian wards, and hoped rather that the "new period of American international relations" would be "characterized by the acquisitive, practical side of American life rather than its idealistic and altruistic side."

As late as 1939 Ambassador Grew, speaking in Tokyo, described the American objection to the New Order as based on the fact that it included "depriving Americans of their long-established rights in China" and imposing "a system of closed economy." Critics noted that nothing was said about the independence of China, and that it might well appear, from his remarks, that "if the Japanese stopped taking actions that infringed on American rights the United States would not object to their continued occupation of China."57 In the fall of 1939, Secretary of State Hull refused to negotiate a new commercial treaty with Japan or arrive at a modus vivendi "unless Japan completely changed her attitude and practice towards our rights and interests in China."58 Were this condition met, so it appears, the situation would have been quite different.

The depression of 1929 marked the final collapse of the attempt of Japanese civilians to live by the rules established by the Western powers. Just as the depression struck, the new Hamaguchi cabinet adopted the gold standard in an attempt to link the Japanese economy more closely with the West, foregoing the previous attempts at unilateral Sino-Japanese "coprosperity." An immediate consequence was a drastic decline in Japanese exports. In 1931, Japan was replaced by the United States as the major exporter to China. Japanese exports to the United States also declined severely, in part, as a result of the Smoot-Hawley tariff of June, 1930, in part because of the dramatic fall in the price of silk.59 For an industrialized country such as Japan, with almost no domestic supplies of raw materials, the decline in world trade was an unmitigated disaster. The Japanese diplomat Mamoru Shigemitsu describes the crisis succinctly:

The Japanese were completely shut out from the European colonies. In the Philippines, Indo-China, Borneo, Indonesia, Malaya, Burma, not only were Japanese activities forbidden, but even entry.60 Ordinary trade was hampered by unnatural discriminatory treatment.... In a sense the Manchurian outbreak was the result of the international closed economies that followed on the First World War. There was a feeling at the back of it that it provided the only escape from economic strangu­lation.61

The infamous Yosuke Matsuoka stated in 1931 that "we feel suffocated as we observe internal and external situations. What we are seeking is that which is minimal for living beings. In other words, we are seeking to live. We are seeking room that will let us breathe."62 Ten years later he was to describe Japan as "in the grip of a need to work out means of self-supply and self-sufficiency in Greater East Asia." He asks: "Is it for the United States, which rules over the Western Hemi­sphere and is expanding over the Atlantic and the Pacific, to say that these ideals, these ambitions of Japan are wrong?"63

Western economic policies of the 1930's made an intolerable situation still worse, as was reported regularly in the conferences of the Institute of Pacific Relations (IPR). The report of the Banff conference of August,
1933, noted that "the Indian Government, in an attempt to foster its own cotton industry, imposed an almost prohibitive tariff on imported cotton goods, the effects of which were of course felt chiefly by Japanese traders, whose markets in India had been growing rapidly."64 "Japan, which is a rapidly growing industrial nation, has a special need for ...[mineral resources]... and is faced with a serious shortage of iron, steel, oil, and a number of important industrial minerals under her domestic control, while, on the other hand, the greater part of the supplies of tin and rubber, not only of the Pacific area but for the whole world, are, by historical accident, largely under the control of Great Britain and the Netherlands."65 The same was true of iron and oil, of course. In 1932, Japanese exports of cotton-piece goods for the first time exceeded those of Great Britain. The Indian tariff, mentioned above, was 75 per cent on Japanese cotton goods and 25 per cent on British goods. The Ottawa conference of 1932 effectively blocked Japanese trade with the Commonwealth, including India. As the IPR conference report noted, "Ottawa had dealt a blow to Japanese liberalism."

The Ottawa Commonwealth arrangements aimed at constructing an essentially closed, autarchic system; the contemporary American policy of self-sufficiency proceeded in a similar direction. The only recourse available to Japan was to try to mimic this behavior in Manchuria. Liberalism was all very well when Britania ruled the waves, but not when Lancashire industry was grinding to a halt, unable to meet Japanese competition. The "Open Door" policy was appropriate to an expanding capitalist economy, but must not be allowed to block American economic recovery. Thus in October 1935, Japan was forced to accept an agreement limiting shipments of cotton textiles from Japan to the Philippines for two years, while American imports remained duty-free. Similarly, revised commercial arrangements with Cuba in 1934 were designed to eliminate Japanese competition in textiles, copper wire, electric bulbs and cellophane.66

The 1936 IPR conference continues the story. Writing on "Trade and trade rivalry between the United States and Japan," William W. Lockwood observes that American preponderance in Philippine trade "is attributable in large degree to the Closed Door policy of the United States, which has established American products in a preferential position. Were Japanese businessmen able to compete on equal terms, there is no doubt that Japan's share of the trade would advance rapidly."67 At the same time, American tariffs on many Japanese items exceeded 100 per cent.

Japan did not have the resiliency to absorb such a serious shock to its economy. The textile industry, which was hit most severely by the discriminatory policies of the major imperialist powers, produced nearly half of the total value of manufactured goods and about 2/3 the value of Japanese exports, and employed about half of the factory workers. Though industrialized by Asian standards, Japan had only about 1/7 the energy capacity per capita of Germany; from 1927-32, its pig iron production was 44 per cent that of Luxembourg and its steel production about 95 per cent.68 It was in no position to tolerate a situation in which India, Malaya, Indo-China and the Philippines erected tariff barriers favoring the mother country, and could not survive the deterioration in its very substantial trade with the United States and the sharp decline in the China trade. It was, in fact, being suffocated by the American and British and other Western imperial systems, which quickly abandoned their lofty liberal rhetoric as soon as the shoe began to pinch.

The situation as of 1936 is summarized as follows by Neumann:

When an effort to set a quota on imports of bleached and colored cotton cloths failed, President Roosevelt finally took direct action. In May of 1936 he invoked the flexible provision of the tariff law and ordered an average increase of 42 per cent in the duty on these categories of imports. By this date Japan's cotton goods had begun to suffer from restrictive measures taken by more than half of their other markets. Japanese xenophobia was further stimulated as tariff barriers [rose] against Japanese goods, like earlier barriers against Japanese immigrants, and presented a convincing picture of western encirclement. The most secure markets were those which Japan could control politically; an argument for further political expansion...against an iron ring of tariffs.69

It is hardly very astonishing, then, that in 1937 Japan began to expand at the expense of
China. From the Japanese point of view, the "new government of North China established in 1937 represented the intention of the Japanese to keep North China independent of Nanking and the interest of the Chinese opposed to colonization of the North by the dictatorial Kuomintang." On December 22, 1938, Prince Konoye made the following statement:

Japan demands that China, in accordance with the principle of equality between the two countries, should recognize the freedom of residence and trade on the part of Japanese subjects in the interior of China, with a view to promoting the economic interests of both peoples; and that, in the light of the historical and economic relations between the two nations, China should extend to Japan facilities for the development of China's natural resources, especially in the regions of North China and Inner Mongolia.

There were to be no annexations, no indemnities. Thus a new order was to be established, which would defend China and Japan against Western imperialism, unequal treaties, and extraterritoriality. Its goal was not enrichment of Japan, but rather cooperation (on Japanese terms, of course). Japan would provide capital and technical assistance; at the same time, it would succeed in freeing itself from dependence on the West for strategic raw materials.

Japanese leaders repeatedly made clear that they intended no territorial aggrandizement. To use the contemporary idiom, they emphasized that their actions were "not intended as a threat to China" and that "China knows that Japan does not want a wider war," although, of course, they would "do everything they can to protect the men they have there." They were quite willing to negotiate with the recalcitrant Chinese authorities, and even sought third power intervention. Such Japanese leaders as Tojo and Matsuoka emphasized that no one, surely, could accuse Japan of seeking mere economic gain. In fact, she was spending more on the war in China than she could possibly gain in return. Japan was "paying the price that leadership of Asia demands," they said, attempting "to prevent Asia from becoming another Africa and to preserve China from Communism." The latter was a particularly critical matter. "The Japanese felt that the United Front and the Sino-Soviet pact of 1937 were steps toward the destruction of Nationalist China and the Bolshevization of East Asia." The Japanese were, furthermore, quite willing to withdraw their troops once the "illegal acts" by Communists and other lawless elements were terminated, and the safety and rights of Japanese and Korean residents in China guaranteed.

Such terminology was drawn directly from the lexicon of Western diplomacy. For example, Secretary of State Kellogg had stated U.S. Government policy as: "to require China to perform the obligations of a sovereign state in the protection of foreign citizens and their property" (Sept. 2, 1925). The Washington Treaty Powers were "prepared to consider the Chinese government's proposal for the modification of existing treaties in measure as the Chinese authorities demonstrated their willingness and ability to fulfill their obligations and to assume the protection of foreign rights and interests now safeguarded by the exceptional provisions of those treaties," and admonished China of "the necessity of giving concrete evidence of its ability and willingness to enforce respect for the safety of foreign lives and property and to suppress disorders and anti-foreign agitations" as a precondition for the carrying on of negotiations over the unequal treaties (notes of Sept. 4, 1925). Because of this "inability and unwillingness," "none of the Treaty of Washington signatories gave effect to the treaty with respect to extra-territorial rights, intervening in internal Chinese affairs, tariffs, courts, etc., on grounds that their interests were prejudiced by lawlessness and the ineffectiveness of the government of China."

In 1940, Japan established a puppet government in Nanking under the leadership of Wang Ching-wei, who had been the leading disciple of Sun Yat-sen and, through the 1930's, was a major figure in the Kuomintang. Its attempt to establish order in China was vain, however, as the United Front continued to resist—in the Japanese view, solely because of outside assistance from the Western imperialist powers. Japan was bogged down in an unwinnable war on the Asian mainland. The policy of "crushing blow—generous peace" was failing, because of the foreign support for the "local authority" of Chiang Kai-shek, while Japan's real enemy, the Soviet Union, was expanding its economic and military power. How familiar it all sounds.
that characterizes much of American scholarship, which often seems mired in the rhetoric of a Fourth of July address. For example, Willard Thorp describes American policy in these terms: "...we do not believe in exploitation, piracy, imperialism or war-mongering. In fact, we have used our wealth to help other countries and our military strength to defend the independence of small nations" (in the manner indicated in note 67, for example). Many similar remarks might be cited, but it is depressing to continue.

A wave of revulsion swept through the world as the brutality of the Japanese attack on China became known. When notified of the intention of the Japanese Government to bomb Nanking, the United States responded as follows: "The Government is of the opinion that any bombardment of an extensive zone containing a sizeable population engaged in their peaceful pursuits is inadmissible and runs counter to the principles of law and humanity." Now that these principles have been repealed, it is difficult to recapture the feeling of horror at the events themselves and of contempt for those who had perpetrated them. For an American, today, to describe these events in the manner they deserve would be the ultimate hypocrisy. For this reason I will say very little about them.

In Manchuria, the Japanese conducted a fairly successful counterinsurgency operation, beginning in 1931. The record is instructive. In 1932, the insurgents who menaced the people and obstructed the attainment of wangtao [the perfect way of the ancient kings, or the kingly way] had at one point reached 300,000, but the earnest and brave efforts of various subjugating agencies headed by the Japanese army brought about great results. Thus the number of insurgents declined from 120,000 in 1933 to 50,000 in 1934; 40,000 in 1935; 30,000 in 1936; and 20,000 in 1937. As of September, 1938, the number of insurgents is estimated at 10,000. The success was achieved in part by contingents of Japanese troops, in part by the national army of Manchukuo, and in part by the police. "Because of the success of these activities [which led to the winning of the support of the masses], the insurgent groups are now in an extremely precarious condition and the attainment of peace seems to be in sight." The "native bandits" and "rebellious troops from the local armies" had been absorbed by the Chinese Communist Party, during this period, and were, by 1938, "under the Communist hegemony operating with the slogan of 'Oppose Manchukuo and Resist Japan,'" with political leadership supplied from China. The goal of the insurgents was "to destroy the government's pacification efforts" and to win public confidence and disturb public opinion "by opposing Manchukuo and Japan and espousing Communism. Their efforts lead the masses astray on various matters and significantly hamper the development of natural resources and the improvement of the people's livelihood." Through a combination of pacification and propaganda activities, their efforts are being countered, and, the Report continues, the "nation's economy and culture" preserved.

The report emphasizes the strong distaste of the authorities for forceful means:

The use of military force against the insurgents is the principal means of attaining peace and order, in that it will directly reduce the number of insurgents. But this method is to be used only as a last resort; it is not a method that is compatible with our nation's philosophy, which is the realization of the kingly way (wangtao). The most appropriate means suitable for a righteous government is that of liberating the masses from old notions implanted by a long period of exploitative rule by military cliques and feudalistic habits and of dispelling the illusions created by Communist ideology. Furthermore, the philosophy of the state calls for a proper understanding by the masses of the true nature of righteous government, the reasons behind the establishment of the state, and the current state of affairs. The insurgents should be given an opportunity to alter their misconceived notions and to become good citizens. This is why the operation for the inducement of surrender has such grave significance.

A continuing problem was the "nearly universal phenomenon in Manchuria that the insurgent groups return to their original state of
operation as soon as the subjugation period is terminated and troops are withdrawn. To counter this tendency, a number of methods were used, with considerable success. Communist groups were heavily infiltrated and alienation was created within the guerrilla groups. The formerly anti-Japanese Korean community was won over by "sociopolitical and accompanying psychological changes" ("revolutionary development," in modern phraseology), specifically, by offering them "the possibility of owning land and escaping from the control of their Chinese landlords. Among the Chinese, the situation was different, and more difficult.

Through propaganda and example, the guerrillas awakened the patriotism of the people and convinced them that the guerrillas were the only true defenders of their interests. When necessary, the guerrillas terrorized the reluctant elements as a warning to others. An intricate network of anti-Japanese societies, peasant societies, and the like provided the guerrillas both with the necessary supplies and with vital intelligence. Farmers who were located in regions too remote to be protected by the Manchukuo authorities and the Japanese were forced to comply with the guerrillas' demands, even if they had no desire to assist the insurgent cause.

The obvious answer to this problem was a system of "collective hamlets." By the end of 1937, the Police Affairs Headquarters reported that over 10,000 hamlets had been organized accommodating 5,500,000 people. The collective hamlets, Lee informs us, were set up with considerable ruthlessness. Families were ordered to move their farm homes with little or no notice, even if the collective hamlets were not ready. Some farmers were forced to move just before the sowing season, making it impossible for them to plant any seeds that year, while others were ordered to move just before harvest. Many farmhouses seem to have been destroyed by troops engaged in mop-up operations before preparations had been made for the farmers' relocation. The only concern of the military was to cut off the guerrillas' sources of food supply and their contacts with the farmers.

There is no point in supplying further details, which will be familiar to anyone who has been reading the American press since 1962.

The collective hamlet program was fairly successful, though it was necessary to prevent insurgents from "assaulting the weakly protected collective hamlets and plundering food and grain" and to prevent infiltration. According to a report in 1939, many of the residents of the hamlets continued to "sympathize with Communism and secretly plan to join the insurgents," and the Communists continued to exploit the farmers' grievances with skill. Vice-Governor Itagaki formulated the problem succinctly: "We are not afraid of Communist propaganda; but we are worried because the material for propaganda can be found in the farmers' lives. We are not afraid of the ignition of fire; rather we are afraid of the seeping oil."

The Japanese undertook a number of what are now called "population control methods," including registration of residents, issuance of resident certificates, unscheduled searches, and so on. They also made use of the method of reward and punishment recommended by more recent theorists of pacification. The Japanese understood that "it was totally unrealistic to expect reforms or innovations to be initiated by those who were already well off" and therefore replaced the former "local gentry" by "young and capable administrative personnel" who were trained to assist the local administrators through the Hsueh-ho-hui, the government-sponsored organization to recruit mass support for the Manchukuo regime. Many abuses at the village level were also eliminated, in an attempt to wean the villagers from their traditional belief that the government is merely an agency of exploitation. Extensive propaganda efforts were conducted to win the hearts and minds of the villagers. In comparison with American efforts at pacification, the Japanese appear to have achieved considerable success--if these documents can be believed--in part, apparently, because Japan was not committed to guaranteeing the persistence of the old semi-feudal order and was less solicitous of property rights. The reports
indicate that by 1940, the Communist guerrillas had been virtually exterminated in Manchuria.

A secret Report of the Office of Information of the Government of Manchukuo in April, 1939, reports the achievements of pacification in Tunghwa Province in glowing terms:

It must be said that the economic and spiritual impact of the reconstruction activities on the citizens of the province has been very uplifting. We have observed an increase in the areas under cultivation as a result of the recovery of abandoned lands; an increase in agricultural production owing to improvements in seeds; an increase of farmers' cash incomes as a result of improvement in market facilities; remarkable progress among merchants and industrialists assisted by government loans; and the winning of public support through medical treatment and the administration of medicine.

A secret Report of November, 1939, describes the situation in a province where "revolutionary development" was not yet quite so successful and insurgents still operated:

...most atrociously, these insurgents pillage goods, and kill and wound men and animals. They are also systematically conducting Communist indoctrination operations in various villages. As a result, many villagers are led astray by the insurgents' propaganda and begin to work for the insurgents, passively or politically. All this adds to the burden carried by the pacification forces.

Farmers were fleeing from "insurgent-infested areas in a continuous stream," though some continued to "sympathize with Communism." However, plans were being laid to "establish confidence" and destroy insurgent forces, to carry out "relief of afflicted people," and, in general, to extend the work of nation-building.

I have no knowledge of the reaction in Japan to whatever information was transmitted to the public about these matters. No doubt, many Japanese deplored the excesses of the pacification program, though the more reasonable presumably continued to discuss the situation in balanced and unemotional terms, taking note of the violence carried out on both sides. If there were vocal advocates of Japanese withdrawal from Manchuria, they could be shown reports of the sort just quoted, and warned of the atrocities that would be sure to follow were Japanese troops to be removed and the Communist guerrillas given a free hand. Obviously, regardless of cost, the Japanese must continue to use limited means to secure law and order and to permit the responsible elements of Manchurian society to build an independent nation free from externally directed terror.

No one hated the necessary violence of pacification more than the Japanese officers in charge. Vice-Governor Itagaki described the moral dilemma that they faced in moving words:

The construction of the defense hamlets must be enforced—with tears. We issue small subsidy funds and severe orders [to the farmers], telling them to move to a designated location by such and such a date and that this is the last order. But it is too miserable [to watch] the farmers destroying their accustomed houses, and [to see] little innocent babies wrapped in rags and smiling on carts that are carrying the household goods away. A few days ago, a girl of sixteen or seventeen made me weep by coming to my office at the prefectural government and kneeling down to beg me to spare her house. She said, "Do we really have to tear down our house, councilor?" She had walked a long way to town thinking, "If I asked the councilor, something could be done." Watching the bony back of the little girl who was quietly led out by the office boy, I closed my eyes and told myself, "You will go to hell." The hardship of the Japanese police officers at the forefront who have to guide the coercive operation directly is beyond imagination. I was told many times while I was on my inspection tours of the front, "I cannot go on with this kind of wretched work. I will quit and go home." These words, uttered [as we sat] around a lamp sipping kaoliang gin, sounded as though someone was spitting blood. In each case we had to console and keep
telling each other that this was the last hill that needed to be conquered. The program was forced through mercilessly, inhumanely, without emotion—as if driving a horse. As a result, more than 100 defense hamlets were constructed throughout the prefecture. These were built with blood, tears, and sweat.95

In Manchuria, the problem of the terrorists and Communist bandits seems to have been solved by 1940. In China itself, pacification continued throughout the Pacific war. Chalmers Johnson summarizes these efforts briefly in a recent study.96 In both north and central China "the Japanese suffered from guerrilla attacks and from their inability to distinguish a guerrilla from a villager." In the north the policy implemented was "the physical destruction of all life and property in an area where guerrillas were thought to exist...whereas in central China a policy of establishing so-called Model Peace Zones was pursued...[consisting] of expelling the Communists from certain very rich agricultural areas and then, following this military phase, of integrating the cleared area into the Japanese satellite economy." The latter policy was far more successful, and it was possible to place the Government in Chinese hands. There was also a "strategic hamlet" program, described in the following terms in a recent Japanese commentary:

...the Japanese Army tried its 'Chingshiang' (Clean Hamlet) operations in Soochow in Central China and its 'Aliutsun' (Railway Defense Village) program in Shangtung Province in North China...The concept of 'Chingshiang' lies in making the village or hamlet the basis for reforming government at the grass-root level; and, by concentrating all military, political, economic and ideological effort on a single village, in building it up into a peaceful, stabilized and secure area; then by using this village as a model district, in gradually extending security and stability to cover the whole 'hsien' (county), the whole province and eventually the whole country. 97

However, external interference made it impossible to carry through this program. With far greater power to reinforce their efforts and a much smaller and weaker enemy, American political scientists were not unreasonable in looking forward to greater success.

So events proceeded through the terrifying decade of the 1930's. Seeking desperately for allies, Japan joined with Germany and Italy in the Tripartite Pact at a moment when Germany appeared invincible. With the termination of the Japanese-American commercial treaty in January, 1940, Japan turned to "other commercial channels," that is, to plans for occupation of French Indochina and the Dutch East Indies, and for gaining "independence" for the Philippines. The expiration of the treaty was the turning point that led many moderates towards support for the Axis powers.98

In July, 1940, the United States placed an embargo on aviation fuel, which Japan could obtain from no other source, and in September, a total embargo on scrap iron. Meanwhile American aid to China was increasing. In September, the Tripartite Pact was signed, and Japanese troops entered northern Indo-China. The goals were basically two: to block the flow of supplies to Chiang Kai-shek, and to take steps towards acquisition of petroleum from the Dutch East Indies. On July 2, 1941, a decision was made to move troops to Southern Indo-China. The decision was known to the American Government, since the Japanese diplomatic code had been broken. On July 24, President Roosevelt informed the Japanese Ambassador that if Japan would refrain from this step, he would use his influence to achieve the neutralization of Indo-China. This message did not reach the Japanese Foreign Ministry until July 27. On July 26, Japan announced publicly its plans to move troops to Southern Indo-China and the United States Government ordered all Japanese assets in the United States to be frozen.100 On August 1, a total embargo of oil was announced by the United States. At this point, "Japan was denied access to all the vitally needed supplies outside her own control."101

What slender hope there now remained to avoid war lay in the Hull-Nomura talks, which had been underway since February.
The nature of these talks has been a matter of some dispute. Pal points out that the American position hardened noticeably in the course of the discussions, with respect to all major issues.\textsuperscript{102}

The United States insisted on making the Axis alliance a major issue, though Japan persistently de-emphasized it. Schroeder argues that the American motive was in part "selling the anticipated war with Japan to the American people," who might not "agree that an attack on non-American soil -- on Thailand, Malaya, Singapore, or the Netherlands East Indies -- constituted an attack on the United States."\textsuperscript{103} It may be that the underlying motive was to justify the forthcoming American involvement in the European war. In any event, the American terms, by November, were such that Japan would have had to abandon totally its attempt to secure "special interests" of the sort possessed by the United States and Britain in the areas under their domination, as well as its alliance with the Axis powers becoming a mere "subcontractor" in the emerging American world system. Japan chose war -- as we now know, with no expectation of victory over the United States but in the hope "that the Americans, confronted by a German victory in Europe and weary of war in the Pacific, would agree to a negotiated peace in which Japan would be recognized as the dominant power in Eastern Asia."\textsuperscript{104}

On November 7, 1941, Japan offered to accept "the principle of non-discrimination in commercial relations" in the Pacific, including China, if this principle "were adopted throughout the world." The qualification was, needless to say, quite unthinkable. Hull's final demand was that the principle be applied in the Japanese occupied areas, and that Japan withdraw all forces from China and Indochina. The Western powers could not be expected to respond in kind in their dominions. A few days later came "the day that will live in infamy."

This final exchange points clearly to what had been, for decades, the central problem. Japan had insisted that in its plans for "coprosperity" and then a "new order", it was simply following the precedent established by Great Britain and the United States; it was establishing its own Monroe Doctrine and realizing its Manifest Destiny. It is revealing to study the American response to this claim. Hull professed to be shocked. In his view of the matter, the Monroe Doctrine, "as we interpret and apply it uniformly since 1823 only contemplates steps for our physical safety," whereas Japan is bent on aggression.\textsuperscript{105} He deplored the "simplicity of mind that made it difficult for...[Japanese Generals]...to see why the United States, on the one hand, should assert leadership in the Western Hemisphere with the Monroe Doctrine and, on the other, want to interfere with Japan's assuming leadership in Asia," and he asked Nomura: "Why can't the Japanese Government educate the generals" to a more correct understanding of this fundamental distinction.\textsuperscript{106}

American scholars were equally offended by the analogy. W.W. Willoughby, in a detailed analysis, concludes that no comparison can be made between the Monroe Doctrine and Japan's plans.\textsuperscript{107} The United States, he asserts, has never resorted to the Monroe Doctrine to demand "that it be given special commercial or other economic privileges in the other American States." Rather, "it has exercised its powers of military intervention or of financial administration for the benefit of the peoples of the countries concerned or of those who have had just pecuniary claims against them." He cites with approval the discussion by G.H. Blakeslee in Foreign Affairs, which characterizes the main difference between the American and Japanese position in this way:

The United States is a vast territory with a great population vis-a-vis a dozen Caribbean republics, each with a relatively small area and population. Japan, on the other hand, is a country with a relatively small area and population vis-a-vis the vast territory and great population of China. An attitude which therefore appears natural for the United States to take toward the Caribbean States does not appear natural for Japan to take toward China.

This contribution to the history of imperialist apologia at least has the merit of originality. To my knowledge, no one had previously argued that attempts by one nation to dominate another are
proper just in case the victim is much smaller and weaker than the power that is bent on subjugating it. However, this argument is perhaps surpassed in acuity by Blakeslee's next explanation of the fundamental error in the Japanese analogy:

The United States does not need to use military force to induce the Caribbean republics to permit American capital to find profitable investment. The doors are voluntarily wide open.

American willingness to submit to the people's will in the Caribbean was, in fact, nicely illustrated in the fall of 1933, a few months after Blakeslee's article appeared, when Ramon Grau San Martin came into power in Cuba with a program that interrupted what Sumner Welles described as the attempt to secure "a practical monopoly of the Cuban market for American imports." As Welles noted, this government was "highly prejudicial to our interest... our own commercial and export interests cannot be revived under this government." Consequently, Roosevelt refused to recognize the Grau government, and Welles commenced his intrigues (which, he admitted, were "anomalous") with Batista, who was, in his judgment,"the only individual in Cuba today who represented authority...This...had rallied to his support the very great majority of the commercial and financial interests in Cuba who are looking for protection" (Welles to Hull, Oct. 4, 1933). The Grau government soon fell, with the result that "the pre-1930 social and economic class structure was retained, and the important place in the Cuban economy held by foreign enterprises was not fundamentally disturbed."108

But the basic inadequacy of the Japanese analogy, as Blakeslee points out, is the difference in aims. The United States

aims to help the backward Caribbean countries to establish and maintain conditions of stability and prosperity. The United States does not wish to seize territory, directly or indirectly, or to assume political or economic control. And when it has seemed necessary to intervene in some revolution-tossed land, it has effected the necessary reorganization and has then withdrawn.

It is this benevolence of intent that the Japanese do not share. Consequently, their appeal to the precedent of American practice is entirely without worth. The matter is simply put in a recent study of post-war American foreign policy, which is very critical of its recent directions: "...the American empire came into being by accident and has been maintained from a sense of benevolence." "We engaged in a kind of welfare imperialism, empire-building for noble ends rather than for such base motives as profit and influence." "We have not exploited our empire." "... have we not been generous with our clients and allies, sending them vast amounts of money and even sacrificing the lives of our own soldiers on their behalf? Of course we have."109

In comparison with this long-standing record of benevolence, Japanese aggression stands exposed as the kind of "unprecedented evil" that fully merited the atom bomb. This review obviously does not exhaust the issues. But it does serve, I think, to place in context the policy alternatives that were open to the United States in 1941 and in earlier years. The predominant American opinion remains that the only proper response was the one that was adopted. In contrast, "realists" of the Grew-Kennan variety take the position expressed by Schroeder, who argues against the mistake of basing policy on an "emphasis on meting out justice rather than doing good." The "moralistic" position of Hull, the "too hard and rigid policy with Japan," in Schroeder's view, was not based on "sinister design or warlike intent, but a sincere and uncompromising adherence to moral principles and liberal doctrines." The "realistic" approach of accommodation favored by Grew would not have been immoral, he argues. "It would have constituted only a recognition that the American government was not then in a position to enforce its principles, reserving for America full freedom of action at some later, more favorable time."110 Schroeder does not question that we were, in fact, "meting out justice," but argues only that we were wrong, overly moralistic, to do so; he does not question the principles to which the United States adhered, but only our insistence on abiding by these principles at an inappropriate time.
In contrast to the alternatives of "realism" and "moralism," so defined, the revolutionary pacifism of Muste seems to me both eminently realistic and highly moral. Furthermore, even if we were to grant the claim that the United States simply acted in legitimate self-defense, subsequent events in Asia have amply, hideously, confirmed Muste's basic premise that "the means one uses inevitably incorporates themselves into his ends and, if evil, will defeat him." Whether Muste's was, in fact, the most realistic and moral position at the time may be debated, but there is, I think, no doubt that its remoteness from the American consciousness was a great tragedy. The lack of a radical critique of the sort that Muste, and a few others, sought to develop was one of the factors that contributed to the atrocity of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, as the weakness and ineffectiveness of such radical critiques today will doubtless lead to new and unimaginable horrors.

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Footnotes


2. Daniel Bell, in Commentary, October, 1964, p.72.


4. "Pacifism and class war."

5. Congressional Record, May 9, 1967.

6. The probabilities are meaningless with respect to the objective situation, but not with respect to the mentalities of those who use them as a guide to action. If anything can be more frightening than the behavior of the self-styled "pragmatic" and "tough-minded" policy makers of the Kennedy administration in this crisis, it is the attitude that remains long after the crisis has cooled, that this was Kennedy's "finest hour", in which he demonstrated his skill at the game of "nuclear chicken" (cf. historian Thomas Bailey, New York Times Magazine, Nov. 6, 1965).


9. "The Cold War and American Scholarship," in F.L. Loewenheim, ed., The Historian and the Diplomat, Harper and Row, 1967. He goes on to develop the conventional view that the Soviet Union is solely to blame for the dimming of "the bright hopes for the future", by "the subtle challenge of political subversion and economic penetration" (unthinkable to the West, of course) and by support of revolution, as in Greece, "in violation of allied wartime agreements that had placed Greece in the western sphere of interest." As to the latter, he does not discuss the considerable evidence that indicates, rather, that Stalin was opposed to the Greek rebellion and adhered to the Churchill-Stalin settlement that divided Europe into spheres of influence. He also makes no mention of Truman's statement, immediately after Nagasaki, that Bulgaria and Rumania, the two countries assigned predominantly to the Russian sphere in the Churchill-Stalin agreement, "are not to be spheres of influence of any one power." Nor is there any reference to the American role except as one of "containment." In a review in the Political Science Quarterly, vol. 82, December, 1967, Arthur Schlesinger describes Morton's essay as "an always intelligent account of the role of history and historians in the era of the cold war," which "will disappoint those looking for a Studies on the Left expose of the corruptions allegedly wrought in the writing of American history by the decision to oppose Communist aggression after 1945."

10. See Wesley F. Craven and James L. Cate, eds., The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 5, University of Chicago Press, pp.732-3: Arnold wanted as big a finale as possible, hoping that USASTAF could hit the Tokyo area in a 1,000-plane mission: the Twentieth Air Force had put up 853 B-29's and 79 fighters on 1 August, and Arnold
thought the number could be rounded out by calling on Doolittle's Eighth Air Force. Spaatz still wanted to drop the third atom bomb on Tokyo but thought that battered city a poor target for conventional bombing; instead, he proposed to divide his forces between seven targets. Arnold was apologetic about the unfortunate mixup on the 11th and, accepting Spaatz' amendment, assured him that his orders had been "coordinated with my superiors all the way to the top." The teleconference ended with a fervid "Thank God" from Spaatz.

From the Marianas, 449 B-29's went out for a daylight strike on the 14th, and that night, with top officers standing by at Washington and Guam for a last-minute cancellation, 372 more were airborne. Seven planes dispatched on special bombing missions by the 509th Group brought the number of B-29's to 828, and with 186 fighter escorts dispatched, USASTAf passed Arnold's goal with a total of 1,014 aircraft. There were no losses, and before the last B-29 returned President Truman announced the unconditional surrender of Japan.


In the afternoon of August 14, 1945, thousands of people died during a protracted and intensive aerial bombardment of an arsenal in Osaka. I was a witness to the tragedy. I saw dozens of corpses--loyal subjects literally consumed by service to a government which had already decided to accept the Potsdam Declaration's demand for unconditional surrender. The only reason these people died was because they happened to have been in the arsenal or environs at the time of the air raid. After what seemed an eternity of terror and anguish, we who were fortunate enough to survive emerged from our shelters. We found the corpses--and the leaflets which American bombers had dropped over the destruction. The leaflets proclaimed in Japanese, 'Your Government has surrendered. The war is over!'


13. Ibid., p.7.


15. Masamichi Rôyama, Foreign Policy of Japan: 1914-39, Tokyo, 1941, p.8. He goes on to argue that it was Japanese inexperience that led to passivity and acceptance of the American attempt, with British backing, to attain hegemony in the Pacific--an obvious consequence of "equality" among unequals.


20. Crowley, op. cit., p. 103.

21. Ibid., p. 110.

22. Ibid., p.140.

23. Quoted in ibid., p.154.

24. Ibid., p.160. The progress of civilization is indicated by the reaction to the American destruction of cities of the Mekong Delta in early February, 1968, for example, the destruction of Ben Tre with thousands of civilian casualties to protect 20 American soldiers (20 had been killed, in a garrison of 40), after the city had been taken over, virtually without a fight, by the NLF forces.

From his viewpoint, "Manchuria was an outlying district belonging to and colonized by China," a "sparsely populated, backward country on the borders of China." By 1930, the "revolutionary diplomacy" of China was attempting to reverse and overthrow the unequal treaties, including long-standing Japanese interests. At a time when the only solution to world problems was free trade, Europe was reverting to a close autarchic economy and blocking trade between Japan and the colonial possessions of the European powers, and the League of Nations was following the policy of keeping the world static, in the interests of established imperialism. The Kwantung Army acted unilaterally, to protect what they took to be the legitimate interests of Japan in Manchuria. Later steps to defend Manchukuo were determined in part by the threat of ultimate Communist encirclement (by Communist Chinese and the Soviet Union), and in part as an attempt to "counter the world movement to closed economies," which required that the Japanese must attempt "to attain self-sufficiency." This view of the situation, to which I return below, was not unrealistic.

26. Shigemitsu, however, did not escape the Shanghai incident quite so lightly as did, say, American Ambassador to the Dominican Republic W. Tapley Bennett or Presidential envoy John Bartlow Martin 23 years later, in not dissimilar circumstances. Shigemitsu was severely wounded by a terrorist (an advocate of Korean independence) and had a leg amputated.

27. Thought and Behavior in Modern Japanese Politics, Oxford, 1963, p.30. He adds that "while there is no doubt that the Manchurian Incident acted as a definite stimulus to Japanese fascism, it must be emphasized that the fascist movement was not something that suddenly arose after 1931."

28. Ibid., p.81.


31. Op.cit., pp.11-12. Royama is described by Maruyama (op. cit.) as "one of Japan's foremost political scientists and a leading pre-war liberal."

32. Ogata, op.cit., p.132.

33. Ibid., p.124. Cf. also p.185.

34. Crowley, op.cit., p.138. It should be added that among the complex roots of fascism in Japan was a great concern for the suffering of the poor farmers, particularly after the great depression struck. See Maruyama, op.cit., pp.44-45 for some relevant quotations and comments.

35. Ogata, op.cit., p.182.

36. Ibid., p.40.

37. Ibid., pp.118-119.

38. Ibid., p.45, paraphrasing a Kwantung Army research report.

39. Ibid., p. 42.

40. Royama, op.cit., p.11.

41. Comparisons are difficult, but it seems that the Japanese were considerably more successful in establishing a functioning puppet government in Manchuria than the United States has ever been in Vietnam, just as the Germans were more successful in converting French nationalist forces to their ends in occupied and Vichy France than the United States has been in Vietnam. On the insurgency that developed in Manchuria, and the Japanese attempts to suppress it, see below.


45. In addition, there were those who opposed any compromise or concession on the grounds that it would then be impossible "to face the myriad spirits of the war dead" (General Matsui, 1941, cited by Maruyama, op.cit., p.113). It is painful to contemplate the question of how many have died, throughout history, so that others shall not have died in vain. Another crucial factor, according to Maruyama (p.124), was "the counsel of the Senior Retainers close to the Emperor, who had chosen
war abroad in preference to class struggle at home, and who were then less afraid of losing that war than of risking revolution"--also a familiar pattern. See, for example, the discussion of the Spanish Civil War, in Noam Chomsky, American Power and the New Mandarins.

46. Crowley, op.cit., p.245.

47. Survey of International Affairs, 1926, p.386; cited in Takagi, op.cit.


49. Both citations from William Johnstone, The United States and Japan's New Order, Oxford, 1941. The Lansing-Ishii notes, however, contained a secret protocol which in effect cancelled this concession.

50. Quoted in Iriye, op.cit., p.271.

51. This is as large a force as the United States maintained in Vietnam in 1962. In late 1937, the Japanese had 160,000 troops in China. One tends to forget, these days, what was the scale of fascist aggression a generation ago.

52. Iriye, op.cit., p.218.


54. Cited in Dorothy Borg, The United States and the Far Eastern Crisis, p.590.

55. Cited in ibid., p.42.

56. Officers of the Japanese Army in China expressed the same solicitude. General Matsui, departing to take up his post as Commander-in-Chief of the Japanese Expeditionary force in Shanghai in 1937, stated: "I am going to the front not to fight an enemy but in the state of mind of one who sets out to pacify his brother." At the Tokyo Tribunal he defined his task in the following words: "The struggle between Japan and China was always a fight between brothers within the 'Asian family'....It has been my belief all these years that we must regard this struggle as a method of making the Chinese undergo self-reflection. We do not do this because we hate them, but on the contrary because we love them too much. It is just the same as in a family when an elder brother has taken all that he can stand from his ill-behaved younger brother and has to chastise him in order to make him behave properly." Quoted in Maruyama, op.cit., p.95.


60. The racist American immigration law of 1924 had been a particularly bitter blow to the Japanese. In addition there were immigration barriers in Canada, Latin America, Australia and New Zealand. It is worthy of mention that the Japanese effort to insert a racial equality paragraph into the League of Nations resolutions endorsing the "principle of equality of Nations" and "just treatment of their nationals" had been blocked by Britain. Woodrow Wilson, then in the chair, ruled that it should not be instituted "in view of the serious objections of some of us" (Pal, op.cit., pp.317f.). Only Britain and the United States failed to vote for this resolution. See Neumann, op.cit., pp.153-4.


62. Quoted in Ogata, op.cit., p.35.

63. Quoted in Shigemitsu, op.cit., p.221.

64. Problems of the Pacific, 1933, B. Lasker and W.L. Holland (eds.), Chicago, 1934, p.5.

65. Ibid., p.10.


67. Problems of the Pacific, 1936, Holland and Mitchell (eds.), Chicago, 1936. Parenthetically, we may remark that American post-war Philippine policy served to perpetuate what U.N. representative Salvador Lopez calls the pre-war "system rooted in injustice and greed" which "required the riveting of the
Philippine economy to the American economy through free trade arrangements between the two countries," and which, in "tacit allegiance with the Filipino economic elite" led to a "colonial economy of the classical type." (In F.H. Golay, ed., The United States and the Philippines, Prentice-Hall, 1966). Furthermore, this "short-sighted policy of pressing for immediate commercial advantage" interrupted the Philippine revolution that was underway at the time of the American conquest. This "interruption" continued, for example, with the policies of Magsaysay, who "cleared away the ambivalence which had arisen in the persistent experimentation with public corporations of various kinds by a firm avowal that public policy would reflect faith in and dependence on private enterprise" (Golay, in Golay, ibid.). One effect of this "improvement" in "the political and economic aspects of the investment climate" was that from 1957-63 "earnings accruing to American foreign investors were in excess of twice the amount of direct foreign investment in the Philippines", an interesting case of foreign aid. In fact, the preferential trade relations forced on the Philippines in 1946 virtually guaranteed American domination of the economy. Two Filipino economists, writing in the same volume, point out that "acceptance of the Trade Act by the Philippines was the price for war damage payments. In view of the prevailing economic circumstances, Filipinos had no alternative but to accept, after considerable controversy and with obvious reluctance." But the "compensating" rehabilitation act was itself something of a fraud, since "the millions of dollars of war damage payments...in effect went back to the United States in the form of payments for imports, to the benefit of American industry and labor."

70. Rōyama, op.cit., p.120. He adds that the new government was "provisional, and willing even to accept members of the Kuomintang if they would join."

71. Cf. Lyndon B. Johnson, Aug. 18, 1967. In noting the all-too-obvious parallels between Japanese fascism and contemporary American imperialism in Southeast Asia, we should also not overlook the fundamental differences, in particular, the fact that Japan really was fighting for its survival as a great power, in the face of great power "encirclement" that was no paranoid delusion.

72. "Despite the vigor of the Japanese government's efforts to convey the idea that they wanted American aid in achieving a quick settlement [in 1937], United States officials again failed to understand the situation" (Borg, op.cit., p.466). Unfortunately for the Japanese apologists, they were unable to use some of the devices available to their current American counterparts to explain the failure of the Chinese to accept their honorable offers. For example, the director of Harvard's East Asian Research Center, John King Fairbank, thoughtfully explains that "when we offer to negotiate we are making an honorable offer which, in our view, is a civilized and normal thing to do," but the Asian mind does not share our belief "in the supremacy of law and the rights of the individual protected by law through due process" and is thus unable to perceive our honorable intent and obvious sincerity (Boston Globe, Aug. 19, 1967). It is only those rather superficial critics, who do not understand the Asian mind, who insist on taking the North Vietnamese literally when they state that negotiations can follow a cessation of the bombing of North Vietnam, or who point out the moral absurdity of the plea that both the victim and his assailant "cease their violence."


77. Ibid., p.213. The United States was the least offender in this regard, abandoning its control over Chinese tariffs in 1928. Germany and the Soviet Union had relinquished extraterritoriality in the 1920's (the United States did so in 1942). Japan relinquished these rights in the puppet state of Manchukuo.

78. Cf. Shigemitsu, op.cit., p.190. Also Lu, op.cit., p.34.

79. In Thorp, op.cit., p.7. He deplores the fact that this is not well understood by Asians. Thorp, formerly Assistant Secretary of State and member of the U.N. delegation, and at the time Professor of Economics at Amherst, also draws the remarkable conclusion, in 1956, that
one of the major international problems is the demonstrated willingness of the Soviet Union to support aggression in Indochina. The conference whose proceedings he was editing concluded finally with the hope that "the Chinese people will one day regain their liberties and again be free" (p.225), but did not specify when the people of China had previously possessed their liberties and lived in freedom.


81. See Chong-Sik Lee, Counterinsurgency in Manchuria: the Japanese Experience, RAND Corporation memorandum RM-5012-ARPA, January, 1967, unlimited distribution. I am indebted to Herbert Bix for bringing this study to my attention. As is very often the case with RAND Corporation studies, it is difficult to determine whether it was written seriously or with tongue-in-cheek. There is no reason to question the scholarship, however. The original documents translated in the memorandum are particularly interesting.


84. Lee, ibid., p.23.

85. Ibid., p.25.

86. Ibid., pp.26f.

87. Ibid., pp.33f.

88. For an updating of such methods, see William Nighswonger, Rural Pacification in Vietnam, Praeger, 1966.


90. Ibid., p.46.

91. Ibid., cf. pp.55f.

92. Ibid., p.305.

93. Such reports illustrate a phenomenon noted by Maruyama, in his analysis of the "theory and psychology of ultranationalism": "Acts of benevolence could coexist with atrocities, and the perpetrators were not aware of any contradiction. Here is revealed the phenomenon in which morality is subtly blended with power" (op.cit., p.11). Again, the reader will have no difficulty in supplying contemporary examples.


97. Shizuo Maruyama, "The other war in Vietnam: the Revolutionary Development Program," Japan Quarterly, July-September, 1967. The author, a Southeast Asia specialist and editorial writer for Asahi Shimbun, notes the similarity to earlier Japanese efforts, but feels that the prospects for the American program are dim, for a number of reasons, among them, the following: "...the wounds inflicted on Nature, so ruthlessly destroyed for this, are too brutal to see. Beautiful grasslands, the verdant forests and the rich crops have all been burned by flame throwers, napalm bombs and chemical defoliants. The great earth has been gouged and dug over. The ugly land, no longer green, has lost its power to attract people and to stir deep in the hearts of people a love for their birthplace and their motherland." There is, he feels, little chance that revolutionary development will succeed "when Nature has been turned into a scorched earth and the system and the traditions born of a race of people have been destroyed."

98. Lu, op.cit., p.67.


100. The timing of these events is given in this order in Lu, op.cit., p.188. According to Ike, op.cit., p.108, the order to freeze assets was given on the evening of the 25th, the announcement that troops would be moved south at noon on the 26th. The reasons for the delay in transmission of Roosevelt's offer to the Japanese Foreign Ministry are obscure. It
appears that there was still some room for diplomatic manoeuvre, at this time.

101. Schroeder, op. cit., p.53. He quotes General Miles as saying that the United States "today is in a position to wreck completely the economic structure of the Japanese empire," and Admiral Stark as predicting that this move (the freezing of assets) would probably lead directly to war.


104. Ike, op. cit., introduction.


109. Ronald Steel, Pax Americana, Viking, 1967. Perhaps the introductory chapters of this book, from which these remarks are selected almost at random, are meant as parody, in which case they serve as witness, rather than evidence, for the pervasive self-delusion of our highly conformist and ideologically committed society. In American scholarship dealing with the international role of the United States it is often difficult to determine what is irony and what is sentimentality.

Reflections on Chomsky and Revisionist Views of Pre-War Japan

Noam Chomsky's article on Japan will evoke, as is customary with his writings, angry reaction from some quarters and silent patronizing disdain from others--namely, the specialists. Some will accuse him of ignoring the Chinese case; others, of failing to explain clearly what the pacifist alternative was. Yet, it would be tragic if the scholars in our field ignored the profoundly moral and complex interpretive problems raised by this essay about the responsibility for war. With the perspective of time, and of failure, we have gradually reached more rational interpretations of the origins of the First World War, and of the Cold War. It is obviously time we did the same for the Second World War. In this connection, I wish to add comments both on Japan and on U.S. foreign policy, which, while differing in emphasis from Professor Chomsky's article, are not meant as criticisms of it.

First, as a Canadian I am often exasperated by the excessive concern of American radical scholars with U.S. foreign policy. This exclusive emphasis sometimes seems to result in what is known as "pervasive" or "reverse" America as the center of world order. (What's that you say: it differs from the "Chinese World Order"?) Any attempt to change the interpretive framework of our field will not succeed merely through the proliferation of exposes of U.S. imperialism--no matter how important they may be. What we need is, first, a wider and more realistic geo-political outlook. Why aren't more people in this country writing about Sino-European relations? Also, comparatively few Americans address themselves to Canadian-Chinese relations, yet this would seem an ideal subject for studying the effects of U.S. imperialism, not on the third world, but on a "firm ally."

While present Canadian China policy may not offer many startling contrasts, at least we have a significant wheat trade with China. Every year, however, there is a hue and cry in Canada over the fact that flour companies, which normally do business in such international wheat sales, cannot participate in the China trade because they are owned by Americans, though managed by Canadians. This kind of "extraterritorial" law is one justification for calling America "imperial."

Secondly, in relation to Japan, attempts to re-assess the origins of the Pacific War will have to focus not only on external pressure ("Western Imperialism") but also on the problems of internal development. Until recently, in American historiography of pre-war Japan, two tendencies have prevailed, which are in harmony with "consensus" scholarship. One is a positive interpretation of modernization based on excessive emphasis on economic growth at the expense of the negative effects of institutional change accompanying that growth. The second consists of several attitudes which, though differing in their assessment of democracy in the 20's, derive from the same mechanistic assumptions about democracy. Robert Scalapino laments the "failure" of democracy, but blames the established parties and the left for a lack of commitment to Western-style parliamentarianism. Another attitude is that the established parties had achieved success by the late 20's and that except for the foreign crises of the 30's, Japanese democracy would have continued to develop in a stable manner. Both these attitudes ignore the social problems accompanying party rule, the effects of the depression, and the fact that it was only in the 20's that capital became sufficiently concentrated in the main zaibatsu to alter radically the market structure. These interpretations also tend to dismiss the critiques of established powers by the left and right as examples of "extremism."

Recently, however, younger scholars have been challenging the prevailing consensus scholarship. They have pointed out that while the parties were to some extent aligned with popular democratic movements in the early 1910's, by the 20's they had become the objects of popular criticism.
Consistent with this view is the attempt to show that the thought of radical leftists and rightists had an internally rational quality, and that they shared a common antipathy to the established parties and the zaibatsu.2

Our study of the 30's has been complicated by the fact that postwar Japanese historians have been disinclined toward revisionist interpretation, partly because so many of them had refused to "give in" before the war. Nevertheless, probably as many "leftists" supported the military and eventually the war as opposed them. Instead of dismissing these people as sellouts, it is time we re-assessed the moral dilemma in which they found themselves.3 Hoping to overthrow capitalism, these leftists sought alignments with "reform" elements in the army and the bureaucracy, who shared their disdain for the parties of the "center."4 What followed was a gradual convergence of many elements of the "left" and "right." What was the significance, for example, of the fact that Asanuma Inejirō, postwar Socialist leader, and Kishi Nobusuke, postwar conservative Prime Minister, had remarkably similar views on nationalism and war in 1940, although they clashed bitterly over U.S. imperialism and the Security Treaty in the late 50's? Was Asanuma merely an opportunist or did he act with internally consistent reasons? In the same general camp as these "leftists" and "reform bureaucrats" were intellectuals, such as those who served in the Shōwa Research Association, Prime Minister Konoe's brain trust. This association contained liberals of varying shades ranging from the beleaguered former president of today's glorious Todai, Ōkōchi Kazuo to Ozaki Hotsumi, assistant to Richard Sorge, the master spy and agent of Communist Russia. Among their other deeds, these intellectuals contributed to the theoretical formulation of Japan's New Order. Needless to say, all were deeply opposed to Western imperialism in Asia. It is perhaps easy to dismiss many of them as the equivalent of the contemporary American mandarins--"technocracy's own Maoists" in the words of James C. Thomson.5 Yet, while it is difficult to condone the apparently opportunistic use of "means" on the part of many liberals and leftists, we should exercise more caution in evaluating their position, particularly in the light of what, in part, motivated them--opposition to the zaibatsu, the established parties, and Western imperialism. Shades of corporate liberalism, mechanistic party politics, and American imperialism? The analogy, though terribly inexact because of the different historical contexts, is legitimate at least in respect to style--in both countries the established powers in the economic and political realm professed to be upholding traditional values, in the one case, social harmony, in the other, individual freedom, while actually flagrantly abusing them. It seems clear that if we wish to inject a moral concern into the historiography of international relations, we cannot ignore the moral dilemmas which intellectuals faced in countries like Japan during periods of crisis.


3. See my forthcoming article, "Asō Hisashi and the Search For Renovation in the 1930's" in Papers on Japan, (Harvard University, East Asian Research Center).


5. Most scholars have criticized these prewar leftists for embracing an order which was worse than the one they originally opposed. But it is too easy to make such judgments on hindsight.

Some Long-term Effects of U.S. Control of the Philippines

To review some of the long term effects of American colonialism in the Philippines—the only Asian country that we ever directly subordinated to a formal colonial status—will enable us to gain a more vivid, personal appreciation of the record that we have made in another Southeast Asian country during this century.

In 1898 President McKinley ordered troops into the Philippines to establish American sovereignty over the islands. There ensued an incredibly bitter war of conquest in which, according to one American general, one-sixth of the inhabitants of the most populous Philippine island died (about 600,000 people). But by 1907 the U.S. had succeeded in establishing a colonial rule that came to be acclaimed by many Filipino and American authorities for its moderate, even permissive, nature. American students of Philippine affairs usually call this colonial relationship "successful" and explain its success in terms of the ambivalent American motivation behind the initial seizure of the Philippines, the paucity of American commercial interests in the islands before 1898, and the relative insignificance of American investments there afterwards. But these facts do not of themselves explain what it was in the structure of American colonial rule that the Filipino leadership itself found so accommodating. Nor do they explain what factors existed in the Philippine situation that could enable American rule to become moderate so soon after having been so harsh. Least of all do they have a bearing on the reality behind the "success" of American colonialism in the Philippines.

A partial answer to these questions may be found by first examining the conservative-radical cleavage in late nineteenth-century Philippine nationalism. As early as 1893 a split along ideological and class lines appeared in the ranks of the Philippine nationalists. On the one hand, the propertied elite, including the liberal intelligentsia, sought to win the support of the Spanish government to the cause of political reform from above, even hoping to make the Philippines a province of Spain. Opposing them were the members of the Katipunan, a lower class plebeian group whose founder and "spiritual leader" was a self-educated laborer, Andres Bonifacio. It was the radical Katipunan advocating overthrow of the status quo, agrarian reform, and economic democracy that initiated and led the revolt against Spain in 1896. Only later, when the revolution had "expanded into a national struggle for liberation, when the masses had already shown that they could dethrone the ruler and beat his army in the field...the middle class, caught between two fires, moved in and sided with the rebels." Thereafter the leadership of the Philippine Revolution passed to both a Katipunero, Aguinaldo, and to the propertied classes. On Aguinaldo's orders Bonifacio was executed and the original Katipunan was disbanded.

Thus, at the moment when the Revolution was taking on a more conservative coloration, the United States came upon the scene. Confronted with a new but essentially familiar situation, the Filipino landowning and money-lending classes had little difficulty in allowing their "nationalism" to be coopted into the structure of American colonial rule. As it turned out, the total defeat of the Philippine Revolution by the American intervention in the early years of this century ultimately determined the role and composition of the ruling class in Philippine national life for most of the remainder of the century.

Between 1900 and 1905, while American military forces pacified the "natives," the more conservative members of the patrician elite, organized in the Federal Party, worked to extend American colonial rule throughout the islands. The Nationalists, who came into being in 1907, then extended and perfected the pattern of accommodation with the colonizers which the Federalists had established.
"A colonial regime," writes a Filipino historian, "naturally looks for a base or anchor of support in the dependent society. Its first alternative is to win over the existing leadership....It was unnecessary for the Americans to go beyond the first alternative in the Philippines, where the ilustrados readily responded to the policy of accommodation. The colonial regime strengthened its own position and that of its supporters by passing the appropriate laws on suffrage and elections." The spread of Western-style democratic institutions thus enabled the Nationalists and the landowning classes which they represented to consolidate their hold on the country.

From the inauguration of the landlord-dominated Philippine Assembly in 1907 until 1919, when the suffrage provisions of the Jones Law went into effect, the voting electorate of the country was limited to 3 per cent of the total national population--the same 3 per cent who in the waning days of Spanish colonialism had comprised the native aristocracy. Thereafter, although the franchise was extended, high property and literacy qualifications continued to deny suffrage to the vast majority of the Philippine population so that even by the 1947 election only 17 per cent, or approximately 3 million, were registered to vote. Through the device of suffrage restriction, the Nationalist Party, spokesman for a manipulative nationalism and its class constituents, ended up being the most direct beneficiary of, and the chief active participant in, the vaunted American training in democracy.

Ever since their triumph, the characteristic mark of Philippine politics has been the absence of ideological difference between political parties and factions. Yet even the servile politics of the Nationalist Party and its 1946 offshoot, the Liberals, was not without its underlying metaphysic. All political leaders espoused the principles of free enterprise, nepotism, and paternalism. Given a colony in the firm grip of a ruling elite as ideologically united, as economically homogeneous, and as accommodating as the Filipino elite--a colony in which the vast majority of natives were disenfranchised by poverty and ignorance--what colonizer would conceive of effecting anything but a moderate or permissive spirit of rule.

As the "tacit alliance" with the American colonial regime strengthened the landlord class, the alliance in turn strengthened the customary ally of the landlord class, the Catholic Church. Although the United States did formally disestablish the Catholic Church, it never enforced a complete separation of church and state. While the United States did assist in purchasing some 400,000 acres of friar lands, the terms by which these lands were resold to the peasants made the reform ephemeral, "since the rate of interest for the acquired homesteads, generally 8 per cent per annum for twenty-five years, proved to be more than the new owners could pay without adequate credit facilities. The result was that land gradually became absorbed by large landowners and partly again by the Church." Consequently, once the most serious threat to its hegemony had been crushed by the American suppression of the Revolution, the Catholic Church--an institution profoundly hostile to Philippine nationalism--proceeded to recover the religious and economic ground it had lost since the separation from Spain.

The Revolution had unleashed intense anticlerical feelings which were given organizational expression in 1902 when a Filipino priest broke with Rome and established the Aglipayan (Independent) Church. Because it enjoyed the support of the American Catholic hierarchy, the Roman Catholic Church in the Philippines was easily able to roll back the nationalist Aglipayan challenge to its spiritual authority. By decision of a pro-Roman Catholic Supreme Court in 1906, the Aglipayans were forced to relinquish all Church properties confiscated during the Revolution. This was a blow to their prestige from which they never recovered. In its preoccupation with safeguarding Roman Catholic interests in the islands the American colonizers had irrevocably weakened the only institution in Filipino life that was totally dedicated to representing the interests of the laboring poor.

The economic foundations of Catholic power also continued to grow with the new opportunities opened up for it by the American presence. When Japanese researchers conducted an inquiry into the state of Philippine politics and administration in 1943 they learned that the Catholic Church had shifted the locus of its economic wealth from landholding to the industrial and
financial fields. It had become "an industrial and financial institution" with investments in such soul saving activities as "breweries, the movies, and amusement establishments."8

Likewise, the Catholic Church gained tremendous political influence. Even today, at election time Catholic archbishops take out "full page political announcements in the Manila newspapers." So powerful is the Catholic hierarchy, writes Gunnar Myrdal, that "Acceptance by (it) can be an important avenue to office and non-acceptance the death knell of political ambition. Even the small beginnings of trade unions and peasant organizations are very much under the control of wealthy landowners and churchmen."9

The alliance of big landowners (the so-called "hacienda, comprador, and money lending families") and anti-nationalist churchmen was the chief legacy of over three centuries of Spanish colonialism. Under American colonial rule that legacy was enormously reinforced. The result was to foreclose the possibility of any meaningful economic transformation of Philippine society. In 1909 the Payne-Aldrich Tariff Act imposed on the colony uninhibited free trade with the United States. Deprived of tariff autonomy and forced into a closed-door, inherently unequal trade relationship, the Philippines soon experienced the rapid destruction of its cottage industry, and the overdevelopment of a narrow primary product export sector, largely in American hands. In 1899 only 7 per cent of Philippine total imports came from the U.S.; by 1932, 74 per cent of all Philippine foreign trade was with the U.S.10 In this time the colony had moved from a food exporting to a food importing condition. When the era of formal American colonialism drew to a close, the majority of Filipinos were worse off than they had been at the start, while the colony as a whole was more dependent on its Mother country than any other Western colony in Asia. In this situation of extreme economic dependency and war devastated helplessness, the U.S. imposed, under threat of refusal to pay for Philippine war damages, a new trade act which was even more damaging to their economic welfare than the Payne-Aldrich Act.

Also important in defining the postwar informal colonial status of the Philippine Republic was the Military Bases Agreement of March 14, 1947, and the Quirino-Foster Agreement of November 14, 1950. The first, giving the U.S. 23 military bases in the islands for 99 years, was followed by an agreement establishing the presence of a U.S. Military Advisory Group to support the national constabulary in suppressing a serious decolonization movement. The Quirino-Foster Agreement, in a similar way, enabled the U.S. to plant American civilian advisers at every level of Philippine government under the principle of "supervised assistance." Thus, ironically, in the first few years of her independence, the groundwork was being laid for the most active American military and economic intervention in the islands since the 1899-1909 decade of American imperialism.

The slowness of the Filipinos in perceiving the economic and other disabilities from their American colonial relationship is related to their problem of national identity, another legacy of colonialism. The Americans who destroyed their revolution also systematically downgraded their nationalism. In schools decorated with portraits of American presidents, young Filipinos were taught American songs and required to memorize the Gettysburg Address. In the American style colonial school system Filipino materials of instruction were conspicuously absent from the curriculum, the use of vernaculars was prohibited, and penalties were actually imposed on the pupils for speaking their native tongues.11 Until 1935 no Filipino was allowed to head the Department of Public Instruction.12 By that time a full generation of Americanized Filipinos had matriculated from the colonial system. Having absorbed Western political ideals through the neutralizing medium of an educational system that was originally conceived as an instrument of colonial pacification, the small electorate and the ruling nationalist elite in particular proved to be, with few exceptions, as eager as Magsaysay and Carlos P. Romulo to perpetuate U.S. colonialism.
A different side to the educational legacy of American colonialism was recently revealed by Salvador P. Lopez, Permanent U.N. Representative of the Philippines. Reflecting upon the American imposition of English on the Filipinos, he wrote: "By enormously complicating the learning process, this policy has doomed the majority of Filipino students to be hardly literate in the national language based on Tagalog, as well as in his own vernacular, if other than Tagalog, virtually illiterate in English, and almost totally illiterate in Spanish."13

Consequently, most Filipinos are today both deracinated and sorely bewildered about their identity. For their outlook, values, and tastes have been shaped by affluent, industrialized America, but are totally at variance with their abject poverty. A Filipino writer recently asserted that his country has one million urban unemployed, a rural population of which one quarter is underemployed and an annual real per capita income of less than $100. Philippine tenantry, which grew rapidly throughout the period of American rule, continues to impose extremely high levels on nearly half the peasant population. Today tenant farmers pay as much as 50 to 70 per cent of their crops in rent to landlords.14 The ruling elite, of course, is not unaware of the peasants' plight. Twice, in 1955 and again in 1963, the landlord-dominated Philippine Congress enacted publicity-oriented land reform bills. The first, Magsaysay's land reform, was completely ineffectual. The second was characterized in 1966 by an Australian student of Philippine agricultural policy as "a mixture of publicity stunt and bureaucratic reform with rather long range social and distributive implications....Its important immediate result was an administrative reorganization among the agencies concerned with agricultural productivity--a reorganization beginning at the top and very slowly spreading among the grass roots. Only a dozen municipalities had fully realized by late 1965 the local reorganization required....the strictly reform part of the legislation was weak....Expropriation is provided for large tenant estates of grainland, but the lower limit of the size expropriable was raised by Congress from 59 to 184 acres, and no appropriations have yet been made to finance expropriations."15

A serious assault on the inequalities in the Philippine agrarian structure will probably have to await a fundamental shift in power in Philippine class relationships. In the meantime, whatever advantages or successes their long participation in the "free world" capitalist economy under American tutelage are thought to have brought for most Filipinos the enduring political, economic, military, and psychological legacy of American colonialism renders them meaningless.

The psychological legacy of American colonialism, often ambiguous and difficult to grasp, may well be the most long-lasting. One might point to the introduction of the color line in all-white military clubs, schools, and churches. "The Americans," in the words of one anthropologist, "did not mix freely with Filipinos, and imposed a strong taboo on intermarriage. This social code was an obvious reflection of the racial mores of the United States, and might be characterized as a kind of informal Jim-Crowism."16 In the 1950's the upper class Filipino reaction to this ranged from a deep identification with Japan, to the establishment of the "Club Filipino" in Manila for the purpose of practicing "counter-snobbery against Westerners."17 At the same time (and not so well known), by heightening the racial consciousness of the native elite, the Americans indirectly influenced their approach to the overseas Chinese, an economically powerful, but politically and socially vulnerable, group of colored foreigners in the colony. An American scholar, George H. Weightman, has recently written that, "Historically, the greatest antipathy and open conflict in Southeast Asia between the Chinese and a host group occurs in the Philippines." This Filipino anti-Sinicism, he continues, "is largely but not entirely the result of both Spanish and American colonial policies."18 One might add that in so far as the twenty-year long American crusade against Communism has fanned the flames of anti-Sinicism, it has seriously complicated the task of meliorating ethnic problems wherever they exist as legacies of a colonial past in Southeast Asia.

And yet, awareness of these specific American ways of relating to the peoples of Asia still does not help us evaluate the psychological legacy of colonial rule. In fact, we cannot understand the situation of the overwhelming majority of post-war Filipinos until we delve more deeply into
the psychological implications of their centuries-long subordination to Spain and America. In the course of adjustment to the values of two different conquerors, the Filipino male has been made to reject a certain part of his personality and culture. That is to say, success in sustaining his underlying Malayan-Polynesian cultural heritage has always been paid for by a certain self-denial, perhaps, as one scholar has suggested, the denial of a rational exercise of anger. By rearing children not to rebel in the face of provocation, to suppress anger and be at all times gentle, obedient, and hospitable, the Filipino family system has made the proper adjustment to colonial rule. "There is also strong medical evidence to suggest a very high rate of schizophrenia and paranoia, though even normal health services are so rudimentary in most provinces that this can be little more than conjecture." Finally, following Frantz Fanon and Albert Memmi, we must look again at the high rate of crime, mental disorder, and corruption, together with the prolonged over-identification with the U.S. that has characterized Philippine society ever since it was granted, on American Independence Day, a nominal political independence. These signs of social disintegration and cultural-psychological disorientation are related to the fact that an informal colonial situation continues to exist in the Philippines—a nation still ruled by a dominant traditional elite that is subservient to U.S. economic and strategic interests.

2. Theodoro Agoncillo, The Revolt of the Masses (Quezon City, 1956) 114. I am following Agoncillo's pioneering reinterpretation of the Philippine Revolution. Although the author uses the term "middle class", it seems somewhat inappropriate at this time and in this context.


4. Ibid., 99.


12. Renato Constantino, The Filipinos in the Philippines and Other Essays (Quezon City, 1966) 43.


14. Benigno S. Aquino, Jr., "What's Wrong With the Filipinos?", Foreign Affairs (July, 1968) 770-779. The following figures suggest the dimensions and nature of the Philippine tenancy problem: "In general terms about one-third of the farms are occupied by tenants, one sixth are part owned and part rented, and only half are in the hands of owner-occupiers. In size the holdings average slightly over 10 acres, but in fact over half are smaller than 5 acres, another third between 5 and 12 acres, and the remainder range from 12 to 5,000 acres and together cover over half the total area. These larger holdings belong variously to business corporations, religious bodies, and most numerous of all, the caciques [political bosses]; but the great majority are let out to tenants in lots of a few acres each." Charles A. Fisher, South East Asia: A Social, Economic and Political Geography (London: Methuen & Co., 1964) 797-798.


On The Possibility and Desirability of a Theory of Modernisation

The verb "modernize" has a valuable use for which it is not easy to find a substitute. The political leaders and intellectuals of most developing countries desire to transform their country. They wish to see transformations in their economy, usually in their political system and educational system; often, also, in family life and in religious and cultural matters. Usually, the model for their reforming efforts is some other country more economically developed than their own; not necessarily a single country, but possibly a number of countries, each of which offers certain features to be imitated. British leaders, for instance, have recently become aware of a need to modernize many aspects of British life. Most commonly the model is America, but sometimes Scandinavian or other European countries.

It is useful to speak of reforming efforts of this sort as attempts to "modernize." Clearly, wholesale and rapid "modernization" in this sense is a neat epitomisation of the policy aims of the Meiji leaders of Japan in the 1870's, or Kemal Ataturk in Turkey in the twenties, or of countless other political leaders since. This sense of "modernization" may be paraphrased as follows: "The transformation of the economic, political, legal, social or cultural life of a nation in accordance with models derived from other contemporary societies thought to be more 'advanced'." It is a use of the word which implies nothing specific about the content of this transformation, its goals or its methods. There are as many forms of modernization as there are modernizing leaders.

There is a second, different sense of the word which is particularly common in recent academic discussions. In this usage the deliberate transformations implied in the first sense are assimilated to the "unengineered" transformations of societies like England and the USA during their periods of industrialisation, all being seen as different examples of a single unitary historical process. This second sense may be paraphrased as: "A process of social change, including and contemporaneous with industrialisation, which has already been taking place for decades or centuries in the industrial societies and which is now starting to a greater or lesser degree in the developing societies." As a convenient label one might call the latter sense of the word the "intransitive" and the former the "transitive" usage. That is to say: one can talk in the first sense of societies "being modernized," not of societies "modernizing," and in the second sense, vice versa.

In its first usage the word "modernization" seems to me useful since there is no other comprehensive shorthand way of describing what modernizing leaders are about. In its second sense the word seems to me useful only for designating—in a very rough and ready way—a field of comparative study, in much the same way as the words "feudalism" or "low temperature physics" are useful. The danger implicit in this second usage, however, is that one is tempted to slip into such phrases as "Modernization is a process which..."—phrases which only make sense on the assumption that the concept is capable of precise definition. Thence arise attempts to arrive at such a precise definition by enumeration of the component elements of "modernization." Sometimes such a definition itself is graced with the title "a theory of modernization"; sometimes the matter is pushed further and a real theory is built up which postulates the causal interrelations which link the various component elements of the process.
All of which exercises seem to me a waste of academic resources. My reasons for thinking so are as follows.

A typical list of the components of the process of modernization in this second intransitive sense might include all or any such features as: an increase in the total or the per capita output of goods and services, a rising level of mass education, urbanisation, a trend towards a nuclear family structure, an increasing functional specificity in organisational structures, an increasing tendency to allocate social roles on the basis of achievement rather than ascription, greater social mobility, bureaucratisation, in something like the Weberian sense, of both economic and political structures, greater equality of incomes, wider participation in political decision-making, greater rationalisation of law in terms of universalistic principles, and so on. Whatever the list, such attempts to define modernization (intransitive) run into a serious problem.

That problem can be stated most clearly in its crudest form. For an American—and it is chiefly in America that the word "modernization" has recently been in vogue—it may be posed most sharply in the form: "What to do about Russia?" There are a number of possible ways of dealing with the fact that in terms of economic structure and performance, educational levels, degree of bureaucratisation, use of achievement criteria, legal rationalisation and so on, Russia and America exhibit great similarities, while in other respects—in the nature of their social and political systems as well as in the mechanisms of economic decision-making—they exhibit great differences. At least three distinct positions may be taken.

1. "Modernization" means fundamentally a process which is an inevitable concomitant of industrialisation. Or more accurately "modern economic growth," the latter being defined as a continuous growth of the per capita output of goods and services achieved by investment of which a substantial part involves technological innovation rather than mere replacement or duplication of capital facilities. It is possible for a country to sustain this process for a long time and remain predominantly agricultural (e.g. New Zealand) but the case is rare enough for "industrialisation" to stand as a convenient shorthand for what is meant.

2. It is possible to include such features of Western democratic polities as a competing party system and freedom of speech and assembly within a definition of "modernization" and at the same time retain the theoretical assumption that is "a process," a unitary phenomenon whose elements are linked by chains of causal inevitability. This can be done by considering Russia and America to represent different degrees of modernization or different types of partial modernization. Thus it might be asserted that Russia is less modernized than America and that inevitably, as time goes on, there will be an increase in political freedom, a greater scope for free market systems and hence a greater resemblance to the United States. Alternatively it may be argued that the convergence will come from both sides, and that as Russia gives greater scope for individual choice, the United States will see a gradually increasing bureaucratisation of, and state control over, economic life. In either case, modernization is a single process which, in the long run (allowing for the adjustment of lags in specific sectors), makes industrial societies alike in quite specific terms.

3. A third resolution of the problem is to abandon any assumption of inevitability and to import explicit value judgments into the definition of modernization. Thus there can be a variety of forms of social change accompanying industrialization. Some are good and desirable; others are bad and undesirable. On this basis one can choose either to call the American model "modernization" and the Russian "partial modernization," "failed modernization," a "perversion of modernization," etc. Or, of course, vice versa.
All three of these solutions have difficulties. Let us deal with the second first. Its defect lies in the fact that it contains postulates—that democracy or a free market or a high degree of bureaucratization are inevitable end-products of the industrialization process—which are certainly not empirically justified by the history of the world up to the present, nor theoretically justifiable in terms of discernible trends in modern societies.

The third solution escapes this difficulty. It poses others, however. If the end-product (or interim goal) of modernization is defined concretely in terms of the American model as the desirable one of a number of possible alternatives, the theory of modernization which results is of interest only to those who accept the value assumptions which it implies. And it is a fact of modern history that not all leaders of developing countries share these values. Some are more attracted by the Russian model than by the American. Others wish to adopt certain features of American society such as its high industrial productivity, while evolving political and social forms from their own traditions.

It is possible to accept with equanimity the fact that one's theory of modernization is of interest to only a limited number of the world's modernizers, and this is a perfectly viable position. It has other limitations, however. America may well provide an "end-state model"—a concrete embodiment of the desirable society. It cannot provide a "process model"—an example of how to reach this desirable state. It is obvious enough that conditions do not permit the history of the United States over the last century or two to be repeated elsewhere. The difficulty of finding "process models" is a topic I return to later.

This third position is, in any case, one which most American scholars are understandably reluctant to adopt. To start with, there is an unhealthy smack of ethnocentrism about any theory which postulates either that the rest of the world does, or that it ought to, wish to model itself on America. And it is one mark of the liberalism of the American academic world, which distinguishes it from that of Russia or of China, that most (though unfortunately not all) American students of social development consider such ethnocentrism to be at least in bad taste.

The resort to the first position—the one which allows such a wide flexibility in the definition of modernization that both Russia and America may be called modernized—is, therefore, a sign of grace in an American scholar, a mark of liberal tolerance. And it is a position which has considerable attractions. The attempt to define the common features of all the industrial countries, including Russia and Czechoslovakia, leads to academic discussions of great interest. Unfortunately, these interesting discussions of "modernization" (intransitive) are unlikely to be helpful to the leaders of developing countries trying to "modernize" (the transitive sense) their countries. The reason is that the discussion has to be carried on at such an abstract level that all the important details are left out.

This is nowhere a more fatal limitation than in the political field. As long as political modernization is conceived in such liberally flexible terms it serves more to obscure the fundamental political choices which politicians must make than to clarify them. It drains politics of its life and vitality. It removes from the purview of political science all the issues that political science ought to be about.

For example, a list of the changes which constitute a part of the process of political modernization might include the following:

An expanding degree of popular participation in politics: the development of the concept of citizenship; an increasing allocation of roles by achievement rather than by ascription; universalism in the law. All of which may be roughly summarised as increasing equality.

A greater magnitude and scope of government business; the rationalization and secularisation of the political process; a greater degree of effectiveness in the implementing of governmental decisions—roughly summarised as an increased capacity of government.

An increase in the number and variety of political structures, in their functional specificity, in their complexity, and in the degree of their integration—for short, greater differentiation.

It is hard, in the framework of such concepts, even to pose the fundamental value questions, let alone the practical policy questions, which are the very stuff of politics in the developed as well as in the
developing world. Granted that there is likely to be an increase in equality as industrialisation proceeds, how much individual freedom has to be sacrificed to achieve it? Does the replacement of ascriptive by achievement norms, for instance, require that individuals should lose the freedom to will their property to family heirs? Is the sense of citizenship, resting on the institutionalization of political equality, compatible with the existence of great economic inequalities? And if not, what degree of inequality is tolerable? And if the sense of citizenship, and hence the legitimacy and hence the capacity of government, requires that economic inequalities should be kept within certain limits, how much should individuals' freedom to make profits, or to spend the profits they earn, be limited to that end?

And if one can ask how much freedom has to be sacrificed in the interests of equality, one can ask equally how much individual freedom has to be sacrificed in the interests of order. In the United States, for instance, unlike almost every other country in the world, it is not thought necessary in the interests of public order to deprive people of the freedom to buy lethal weapons without license at any corner store, though it is thought necessary to deprive people of the freedom to belong to a communist party. In Russia, on the other hand, it is thought necessary to deprive people of the freedom to join any other party except the communist. And so on; it would be an endless catalogue which listed the ways in which the freedom of action of individuals has been limited in order to maintain the stability of a system of power.

Similarly, one may ask, how much freedom has to be, or ought to be, sacrificed for economic development? How much does state planning require the restriction of freedom of economic activity; the use of political power to mobilise labour in ways which restrict individuals' free use of their leisure; the restriction of the freedom to choose one's type of education in the interests of a planned direction of human resources? And so on.

This is the kind of problem that politics is really about. It is the kind of problem that tends to slip through the too-broad mesh of a theory of modernization which adopts the first highest-common-factor approach.

The final conclusion which emerges from this process of elimination is, therefore, that for the leaders of countries in Asia or elsewhere who are trying to modernize, a theory of "modernization" (intransitive) is unlikely to be very helpful, whichever of the three possible approaches is taken. I think it would be better for the social sciences in general, and for political science in particular, if the concept of "modernization" in this intransitive sense as a process in nature susceptible to analytical theorizing were dropped from their vocabularies except as a broad label (like, say, "low temperature physics") which defines a field of study--"the social etc. changes accompanying industrialisation." Henceforth in this paper I shall use the word only in the transitive sense with which I began.

If a theory of modernization is unhelpful, what then should be the approach of those scholars who are interested in the problems of the developing countries and are subject to the nagging feeling that scholarship ought to be useful? My own answer would be a piecemeal empiricism which (a) takes the goals of a process of modernization from the goals actually held by modernizing leaders, (b) defines the problems in terms of adapting actual existing situations to those goals, and (c) seeks to elucidate these problems by building up a body of specific theoretical generalisations by means of ad hoc comparison of similar situations in history. These generalisations would be of the form: "If such and such happens in circumstances defined as such and such, so and so is the likely result."

Certain ground has to be cleared. "Take the goals actually held by modernizing leaders. In practice one must make a choice. In some developing countries the goals of political leaders do not extend beyond maintaining their own power. Those who thus treat political power as a private possession may easily be eliminated from sympathy. Even those who exercise power with a sense of responsibility, however, may set a variety of objectives for the modernizing transformation of their country. Some aim only to acquire certain prestige-carrying symbols; a glittering airport, a steel mill, a seat on the Security Council. Some think in military terms of enhancing national power by acquiring a powerful army--and so on. Some scholars would select for sympathetic consideration only those sets of goals which gave a prominent place to the
prevention of communism. My own predilection would be to take as a serious topic of study only the problems of those governments whose modernization plans revolve around the achievement of a level of economic growth which permits a continuous and general rise in levels of living. Economic growth is, after all, a precondition for many of the other changes commonly desired--the enrichment of cultural life, the development of education, even the expansion of government services which permits the specialisation of governmental functions--and at the same time some of these changes, such as the development of education, are also preconditions for economic growth.

To narrow the problems of modernization to this particular focus does not mean that they thereby become technically economic. I am suggesting, in fact, that this is a focus eminently suitable for the inquiries of sociologists, psychologists, political scientists and all other workers in the social sciences. Take, for example, the question: "in a world where technology does not have to be newly invented but can be systematically imported, is economic growth best achieved by giving free play to the individual profit-seeking enterprise of individuals in a market economy, or by the state taking command of the available investment resources and using them in accordance with a centrally directed plan; or in what sectors is the one appropriate and in what sectors the other?"

This is a question which involves sociological considerations of such matters as the conditions determining the actual structure of motivations in individual entrepreneurs or bureaucrats, and political considerations of the forces influencing decisions in the planning process and of the structural forms best adapted to various social and cultural conditions for carrying out planning decisions. The list of study topics of this kind can be extended indefinitely. In so far as the state is likely anyway to play an important role in economic development, at the very least in creating the infrastructure of communications and educational services, how can it acquire the authority necessary to mobilise investment resources and enforce its plans? How far ought, or can, opposition be simply repressed. As a factual question, at what point does repression destroy the possibility of achieving government by consent, by willing or grudging cooperation? As a value question, how much individual economic or political freedom is worth sacrificing in order to hasten the speed of economic growth? What is the role of ideology in maintaining the legitimacy of consent? How far can traditional local authority structures be utilised to mobilise consent for policies of economic modernization, and how far must they be destroyed and replaced by new organisations--political parties or bureaucratic structures? What is the relation between levels of literacy on the one hand, and the minimum degree of mass political participation required to maintain consensus on the other?

The scholar's job is to help get closer to answers to these questions by comparative study. It is here that "process models" as opposed to "end-state models" are important. In the nature of things, the countries seeking to modernize are more likely to learn something about the mechanisms of modernization from countries that have "been modernized" (been transformed largely through the efforts of modernizing leaders) than from those whose economic and social development owed little to central political direction. Japan and Russia are obvious candidates as such process models already in a very advanced stage. No one country, however, is likely to offer a very satisfactory process model, and certainly not countries whose reforming efforts began many decades ago. The Japanese recipe for development, for instance, is not likely to be repeatable. Modern developing countries are not as ideologically isolated, they face a faster rate of population growth, they have available a much more advanced industrial technology than nineteenth century Japan. They cannot maintain the legitimacy of the government and its modernization policies by a nationalism which is fed by a series of successful expansionist wars. They do not have the elements in the pre-modern social structure and cultural tradition which facilitated Japan's later development--and so on. That is why countries like India and China are more likely to be taken as process models for actual imitation. Although time has not shown conclusively the relative efficacy of their different recipes in terms of results, at least they are recipes worked out with reference to contemporary conditions.
More fruitful, however, than the study or imitation of single "process models" as a whole is the comparative study of particular problems in a variety of societies. For example, many countries are seeking to raise productivity in their traditional agricultural sector. In Asia, especially, the villages are often dominated by landlords. Would a land reform, redistributing ownership to the tenants, facilitate the process of economic development?

One might well begin by looking at the example of Japan. In the nineteenth century it seems that landlords often played a positive role in the diffusion of agricultural improvements. A land reform in, say, 1880, which destroyed those landlords' authority, might have slowed this process. Before generalising this into a general prescription to keep landlords in the early stages of agricultural development, one naturally looks at other societies. Something similar might be said of landlords in central Italy in the nineteenth century, but not in southern Italy. It could hardly be said of, for example, Indian landlords in the 1950's, of most Philippine landlords of the 1960's, and so on. As one compares a number of examples, one begins to isolate the relevant factors which determine the role of landlords in such situations: their cultural orientations; the size of their holdings and relations to their tenants; the level of literacy of tenants; the type of agricultural improvements which are ecologically feasible; the difference between living in a world where (as in 1880) "land reform" was unknown as a political slogan, and in a world (as in 1965) where it is a universal one, and the difference that this makes to the viability of traditional village hierarchies and the moral authority of landlords—and so on. When these factors are enumerated and some idea is gained of their relative importance it becomes easier to give a plausible assessment of what, in any particular situation, the effects of a land reform might be.

To be fair, a good many of the social scientists concerned with problems of modernization do in practice tackle concrete problems such as these in a manner similar to this. The two major points which I wish to make in this paper are: Firstly, that the attempt to create, or to force discussion into the framework of, a general theory of (intransitive) modernization only muddies the waters of discussion; secondly, that explicitly to select for consideration the goal of economic development from among those actually held by modernizing leaders, and for sociologists and political scientists as well as economists to frame their questions with reference to it, serves both to clarify the issues at stake and, in the economy of academic resources, to make scholarship of use (if it can be of use) primarily to those people who—by my values at least—most deserve consideration.

Comment

In addition to his many valuable contributions to our knowledge about Japan, American scholars and social scientists have long appreciated Professor Dore for his periodic attempts to point out our missteps, warn us of our cul-de-sacs ahead, and share with us some of the impressions of our work which are widespread abroad. One reason why these attempts have been appreciated is certainly that Professor Dore in turn seems to possess an understanding of, and some appreciation for, the aims and methods of American scholarly research. This understanding and appreciation is clearly evident even when Professor Dore questions "the possibility and desirability of a theory of modernization"—a topic which has occupied more American academic pages in the 1960's than almost any other—and it seems to me quite likely that many or even most American social scientists will find themselves in agreement with Professor Dore's critique of our work. And not only with the critique; surely Dore's positive argument will evoke a favorable response from most American social scientists.
The purpose of these brief comments is to show, nevertheless, that Professor Dore's exposition of the ways modernization has been, can be, and should be thought about and studied is flawed. Having attempted to show this, I will say briefly what is my referred way of thinking about historical change.

Professor Dore begins by observing that the verb "modernize" has two quite distinct usages: "Ataturk modernized Turkey," and England modernized during the eighteenth century"; he calls these the transitive and intransitive usages of the verb. He then argues that the intransitive usage (inevitably?) leads one into one of three uncomfortable situations: his knowledge about modernization is so general as to be useless for practical men-of-affairs and political leaders, or his notion of modernization includes implicit value-judgments which in turn force him to use more and more "epicycles" in order to distinguish things he likes from those he dislikes when they are otherwise alike, or he makes explicit value judgments. (This last style of thinking is then branded as ethnocentric, or some reason; at any rate, it is important to note that making one's own value judgments when conceptualizing modernization is clearly a Bad Thing.) Ignoring the second of these possible implications of using "modernization" intransitively, it appears that Dore is describing three types of theory which one may have about the world. These are:

1. Theory which is useful to political leaders, in that it gives specific, concrete answers when they ask "What should be done in order to achieve our goals?" In order to obtain such knowledge, research should aim at understanding the leaders' goals, understanding the actual, existing situations in which these goals will have to be worked for, and then building up an applied science containing generalizations of the form: if you do X in situation Y, then the result will likely be Z.

2. Theory which is universally true, i.e., true of all historical instances. While such a theory might appear, at first blush, to be the sort of knowledge to which all science and philosophy have always aspired, Professor Dore points out that with regard to modernization, such a theory necessarily does not include information about the idiosyncratic features of each modernizing society.

3. Theory containing concepts which incorporate one's own values.

Professor Dore concludes that it is only theory of the first sort which is worth obtaining, as far as he is concerned, about modernization.

The oddity of this conclusion for me, consists in the fact that these three types of theory are not distinct, except insofar as #1 explicitly mentions the use to which knowledge should be (able to be) put. It is tautological to observe that any true theory is universally true (i.e. true of all historical instances), and it is well-known that there is no difference in the truth-value of concepts whether or not they "import explicit value judgments" into their definitions. Hence it seems fair to assert (and I think Professor Dore would agree) that the only criterion upon which Dore bases his argument is: for whom is knowledge useful? Professor Dore's examples make this point doubly clear. #2-type theory is "unlikely to be helpful to the leaders of developing countries..." And #3-type theory is problematic insofar as it posits some "end-state" as desirable or inevitable, since "not all leaders of developing countries share" the values of any single model, and since an "end-state" does not show "how to reach" itself. (It will be evident that there are unwarranted jumps from the definition in #3 to the assertion that this involves positing some "end-state" to the assertion that the "end-state" is desired by the theorist to the assertion that nothing about how to reach the "end-state" can be included in such a theory.

With apologies for the laboriousness of the demonstration, it seems to me that the above considerations are sufficient to show that (1) Professor Dore has said nothing about "the possibility of a theory of modernization," and (2) Professor Dore has argued that a certain sort of theory of modernization is desirable because and only because it is helpful, useful, to those political leaders who desire to modernize their countries. Actually, Professor Dore is even more explicit than this; he allows that he would "take as a serious topic of study only the problems of those governments whose modernization plans revolve around...a continuous and general rise in levels of living." Simply, he would have us help such governments, and forget the rest.
The mind boggles. Not only is there no justification for this tunnel vision (presumably, Professor Dore believes that since one man's values are as good as another's there is no need to argue further?) But there is no consideration of this sort of question: how can one apply a "fact" about modernization-in-general to an instance of modernization-for-Dore's-purpose when we are not allowed to engage in research or theorizing which would tell us about the various types of modernization, and the crucial similarities and differences between the sort of modernization Dore wants to help and others? Surely one is not to take this argument seriously. Out of respect for Professor Dore, I conclude that he has over-stated his position; essentially, he only wants to tell us what to do, not why we should do it and should not do other things.

I began by pointing out that Professor Dore often seems to share American scholars' concerns and habits of thought even when he is being critical, and by predicting that this particular critique would be appealing to American ears. The reason why I expect Professor Dore's plea for useful knowledge about economic growth to be met receptively is that in making it he puts himself in company with some venerable sacred cows in the American social scientist's ideology. Ceteris paribus (of course) useful knowledge is better than useless knowledge: that is (to adapt an archaic but equivalent version of Dore's razor), will the King want to listen to you? You must separate facts from values in your study; scientific knowledge can be used by anyone for any purpose (and it should be?). Questions about "why" are nonscientific; science focuses on the "how." Economic goals are more important than other goals (And so on).

Very briefly, here is a different position. "Modernization" should be understood as (in Dore's words) "a process which is an inevitable concomitant of industrialization," even though this would make theory about modernization fall into #2 above. Further, "development" should be understood as an explicitly evaluative concept (and hence close to #3 above); for example, it was thought for a long time that political development means the process of achieving more political good, such as more meaningful participation in a more loving public. (This same distinction is accepted by people with very different values from mine, such as S. Huntington, who conceives of political development as the building of stronger institutions). Research should be aimed at discovering whether and how such development is possible.