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BCAS/Critical Asian Studies  
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CCAS Statement of Purpose

Critical Asian Studies continues to be inspired by the statement of purpose formulated in 1969 by its parent organization, the Committee of Concerned Asian Scholars (CCAS). CCAS ceased to exist as an organization in 1979, but the BCAS board decided in 1993 that the CCAS Statement of Purpose should be published in our journal at least once a year.

We first came together in opposition to the brutal aggression of the United States in Vietnam and to the complicity or silence of our profession with regard to that policy. Those in the field of Asian studies bear responsibility for the consequences of their research and the political posture of their profession. We are concerned about the present unwillingness of specialists to speak out against the implications of an Asian policy committed to ensuring American domination of much of Asia. We reject the legitimacy of this aim, and attempt to change this policy. We recognize that the present structure of the profession has often perverted scholarship and alienated many people in the field.

The Committee of Concerned Asian Scholars seeks to develop a humane and knowledgeable understanding of Asian societies and their efforts to maintain cultural integrity and to confront such problems as poverty, oppression, and imperialism. We realize that to be students of other peoples, we must first understand our relations to them.

CCAS wishes to create alternatives to the prevailing trends in scholarship on Asia, which too often spring from a parochial cultural perspective and serve selfish interests and expansionism. Our organization is designed to function as a catalyst, a communications network for both Asian and Western scholars, a provider of central resources for local chapters, and a community for the development of anti-imperialist research.

Passed, 28–30 March 1969
Boston, Massachusetts
Committee of Concerned Asian Scholars

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[Passed March 28-30, 1969, Boston]

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- Andrea Faste (address above), West
- Steve Graham, 5122 Waterman, St. Louis, Mo, 63108, Midwest
- Judy Perroëlle, 116 E. Manning, Providence, R.I. 02906, East

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The Myth of the Bloodbath: North Vietnam’s Land Reform Reconsidered

by D. Gareth Porter

Note: This essay has been slightly edited and substantially condensed since its publication in 1972 as Interim Report No. 2 of Cornell University’s International Relations of East Asia Project. Reprinted in this form courtesy of IREA. The full text may be ordered from IREA, 140 Social Sciences Building, Cornell University, Ithaca, N.Y. 14850, for $2.00.

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INTRODUCTION

American intervention in Vietnam has been justified increasingly in recent years by portraying the North Vietnamese leaders as ideological fanatics who would carry out a massive “bloodbath” against former foes if they were to gain power in South Vietnam. In particular, this argument, which has been promoted in a series of Presidential speeches, draws on allegations concerning the North Vietnamese land reform program which was carried out from 1953 to 1956. The essence of these allegations is that the land reform was a deliberate reign of terror aimed at eliminating whole economic classes and that tens or even hundreds of thousands of innocent people were killed.

This view of land reform has been broadly accepted by both American scholars and the public as an established fact. Yet there has never been a careful study of the land reform which makes use of all the available documentation. It is hoped that this essay may serve not only to unravel a central myth about the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, but also to reveal some of the “scratches on our minds” which underlie American policy in Vietnam.

I. THE LITERATURE OF THE LAND REFORM

The literature on North Vietnam’s land reform is, first of all, a reflection of the low level of American scholarship on Vietnam in general and North Vietnam in particular. For many years, the late Bernard Fall was virtually the only academic specialist on Vietnam who was independent of the U.S. government, and he commanded correspondingly great attention and respect for his views. Yet there has never been a careful study of the land reform which makes use of all the available documentation. It is hoped that this essay may serve not only to unravel a central myth about the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, but also to reveal some of the “scratches on our minds” which underlie American policy in Vietnam.

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his book, The New Class in North Vietnam, in which he first presented his account of the North Vietnamese land reform. In 1960, Hoang Van Chi received a grant from the Congress for Cultural Freedom to spend a year in Paris writing a book which would reach American and European audiences with his attack on the DRV land reform. For many years, the Central Intelligence Agency channeled funds to the Congress for Cultural Freedom as part of its global program of supporting anti-communist intellectual groups. USIA subsidized the publication in 1964 of From Colonialism to Communism, a fact admitted by the USIA Director Leonard Marks in September 1966. Hoang Van Chi then came to the US to work for the USIA, and he now lectures at AID's Washington Training Center. As a participant in the training program for US personnel going to Vietnam, he boasted of having "served the government of President Diem with special attention to the psychological vulnerabilities of the Communist forces." Moreover, Chi claimed credit for one of the Diem government's major political warfare moves: the invention of the term Viet Cong to refer to anyone who supported the communist movement in Vietnam. Although other authors have contributed to the making of the "bloodbath" myth by abusing important documentary evidence, it is Hoang Van Chi who has committed the most serious and most numerous offenses in this regard. His account is based on a series of falsehoods, non-existent documents and slanted translations which leave no doubt that his purpose was propaganda rather than accurate history. Much of the analysis which follows will therefore deal with Chi's assertions and the documentation used to support them.

II. WHY LAND REFORM?

The land reform in North Vietnam is commonly portrayed as an essentially political campaign carried out to fulfill abstract ideological requirements which conflicted with the real needs of Vietnamese society. Colonial Tonkin and Northern Annam, which together constitute the present territory of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, have been treated by the literature on the land reform as regions of small farmers owning the land they tilled, with little tenancy or inequality of landownership. This view seriously misrepresents the well-documented realities of the land tenure system in the North during the colonial period. The Red River area had an extraordinarily high ratio of population to land, and while most peasants did own some land, they owned so little that they were forced to work on additional land belonging to someone else.

According to French geographer Pierre Gourou, about 62% of the farming families owned less than one acre, while 20% owned less than one-half acre. As Gourou pointed out in 1936, the owners of such minute plots "cannot live on their property and must hire themselves out, or else rent farms." And by the same token the farmer with even a few hectares of land inevitably became a landlord, renting it out to a number of small tenants. "In Tonking," Gourou said, "the description 'large property' must be given to farmlands of truly unimpressive size (from 3.6 hectares!)." According to Yves Henry, there were some 21,000 landowners with between 3.6 and 18 hectares, while 1,000 more owned more than 18 hectares. But these figures certainly underestimated the number of large and middle landowners. Many of them, especially government officials, successfully hid their wealth by various devices, including the dispersal of plots among several villages and false land title registration under the names of their tenants. Gourou estimated that 90% of the landowners (not taking into account the families without any land at all) owned only 36.6% of the total cultivated land area in Tonkin, while 10% of the landowners controlled 43.2% of it. And data collected by the DRV on all of the 3653 villages which went through land reform confirm Gourou's estimates. As of 1945, according to these figures, 89% of the rural population, comprising landless laborers, poor peasants and middle peasants, owned only 40% of the cultivated land. The poor peasants and landless laborers, who represented 60% of the population, owned only 10% of the land. At the same time, the 2.5% of the rural families who lived by renting out land, owned 24.5% of the land outright and controlled much more indirectly. Although in theory the needs of the landless and landpoor were supposed to be assuaged by a share of communal lands, which constituted an estimated 20 to 25% of the total cultivated farm land in the North, the reality was that these lands were usually monopolized by local notables, who exploited them for their own profit.

The revolution of August 1945 and the war of resistance against the French which followed did not fundamentally alter the land tenure system of North Vietnam, despite the fact that many large landowners who worked for the French had their land confiscated and redistributed. By 1953, according to a DRV survey of 93 villages and 31 hamlets in 16 provinces, landlords still controlled 17% of the cultivated land while the poor peasants controlled only 18% of the land. Although the DRV introduced limited reforms aimed at reducing rents by 25% from the former 50 to 70% of the crop and reducing the interest on loans to poor peasants, compliance by the landlords was limited, even in areas which had long been liberated.

The reasons for the failure of these partial reforms were both political and economic. With the emphasis during the

Fig. 27. (D) Someuses. Đìn hở dạng gian nọ.
referred not to the percentage of farming units tilled by the source from which he took the figure warned that 98.7% of the total farm land area owned by owners (much less the "total farm area" tilled by their owners) made Tonkin’s landholding system almost ideal. But the worked by tenant farmers. 17 If true, it would indeed have reform, Fall asserted that 98.7% of the "total farm land area" in Tonkin was "tilled by owners"—a statement which would in Tonkin was “tilled by owners”—a statement which would lead one to believe that only 1.3% of the farm land was worked by tenant farmers. 19 If true, it would indeed have made Tonkin’s landholding system almost ideal. But the source from which he took the figure warned that 98.7% referred not to the percentage of farming units tilled by the owner (much less the “total farm area” tilled by their owners) but to the percentage of landowners who did not rent out all their land. 18 In other words 1.3% of all those who owned land were landlords whose only income was from renting it to others. Fall’s statement completely misrepresented the real situation, which was that the majority of the peasants either owned no land or so little that they had to rent additional land from a landlord to survive. Fall should have been aware of the very high proportion of the landowners who did not own enough land to support their families, for he mentioned in the same study the fact that 61% of the landowners held less than one acre—an amount which his own calculations showed to be too small to support an average-sized peasant family of five. 19 Yet, as late as 1963, he was still asserting that in Tonkin, more than 98% of the tilled land was owned by small-holders and concluding that, “To speak of ‘land reform’ is farcical.” 20 Similarly, in dismissing the need for radical land redistribution, Hoang Van Chi cites figures from Henry showing that 91% of the landowners held less than 5 hectares in pre-revolutionary Tonkin. 21 His purpose is obviously to portray North Vietnam as a region of small-landowners. But this figure also misleads the reader, since it does not say anything about the landless and landpoor peasants who made up the majority of the population. In this manner, statistical data has been misused to make the distribution of land in the North appear more equitable. The CIA’s George Carver in a 1966 essay in Foreign Affairs wrote: “Though there were inequities in land ownership in North Vietnam, the Red River delta had the most extensive pattern of private ownership to be found anywhere in Asia.” 22 This misleading statement was only the prelude to his conclusion that the rationale for the land reform was “rooted in the dogmatic fanaticism of the Vietnamese Communist leadership.” The same authors who have attempted to portray the land tenure system in North Vietnam in such a way as to deny the need for land reform have also attempted to minimize the actual economic benefits which the poor peasants derived from the reform. Here again, it was Fall who took the greatest pains to prove the point with statistical evidence, and again that evidence was seriously abused. Scorning the results of the land reform as “economically absurd,” Fall argued that the resulting parcels of land were hopelessly inadequate. According to official DRV statistics which he used in The Two Viet-Nams, the average share of land distributed to agricultural workers, poor peasants and some middle peasants was about one acre, which increased the total holding of the average poor peasant family of five to 1.75 acres and that of the average agricultural laborer’s family to 1.80 acres. 23 Fall asserts that at least one hectare (2.47 acres) was required by an average family for subsistence farming, without explaining how he reached this conclusion. 24 It appears that his 2.47-acre minimum derives from the figure of 800 grams of rice per day per person, which he had cited elsewhere as the minimum necessary for adequate nutrition. 25 But an investigation of the data on rice consumption in Vietnam reveals that this standard was quite extravagant: the average rice consumption per person per day in the much wealthier Mekong Delta region of South Vietnam, according to an official survey in 1959, was only about 470 grams per day. 26 Another survey of six different South Vietnamese provinces and Saigon carried out at about the same time discovered that the province with the highest average daily consumption of rice per person was Phong Dien, with 472 grams, while the poorest provinces had an average of less than 400 grams. 27 These figures compel us to look more closely at the alleged inadequacy of the plots distributed under the land reform program in the North. As of 1960, just over half of the cultivated rice land in North Vietnam produced two crops annually. However, even those parcels which grew only one crop per year appear to have been capable of producing enough rice to feed each
family member as well as the average Mekong Delta peasant—even using an extremely conservative estimate of paddy production per acre.

The average per-acre rice production in 1956, 1957 and 1958, according to official DRV statistics, was 752, 729, and 828 kilos respectively. 28 But even if we take a figure as low as 600 kilos of paddy as the annual production of one acre, we find that 1.75 acres would produce 1050 kilos of paddy per year, or 2875 grams per day. If we assume that one kilo of paddy provides 650 kilograms of rice for consumption, the 1.75 acres would provide roughly 2000 grams per day, or 400 grams for each member of an average peasant family of five.

The real meaning of this statistic can best be understood by comparing it not with Fall's arbitrary requirement of 800 grams of rice per day but with the 264 grams which Yves Henry's more detailed study reported as the average daily consumption of rice per person in Tonkin in 1932. 29 Since there had been no increase in the productivity of rice land in the two decades which preceded land reform, it is likely that this figure represented the approximate level of consumption for the majority of peasants when the land reform program began. In dismissing the land reform program as "economically absurd," Fall simply ignored the evidence of a fundamental improvement in the nutrition of the average poor peasant family.

III. LAND REFORM POLICIES: MYTHICAL AND REAL

Secondary sources which have portrayed the North Vietnamese land reform as an ideologically-inspired campaign of mass murder have based their case almost entirely on Hoang Van Chi's supposedly authoritative account, which can be briefly summarized in three basic assertions: 1) the Vietnamese Communist leaders, following the lead of their Communist Chinese mentors, used land reform as a means for physical "liquidation of the defenseless landowning class." 30 2) in order to insure the completeness of the liquidation, they established arbitrary quotas of landlords to be discovered and executed in each village; 3) the murder and terror required to accomplish the task went so far as to engulf party members, resistance veterans and innocent people, with the result that tens or even hundreds of thousands of people were killed in a massive "bloodbath."

In support of the first charge, Chi quotes what he calls the "famous slogan" of the Lao Dong Party regarding rural classes: "Depend completely on the poor and landless peasants, unite with the middle level peasants, seek an understanding with the rich peasants, and liquidate the landlords." 31 The slogan in question was indeed "famous" (since it represented the general policy of the party which every cadre was expected to understand thoroughly). But it was actually said, "abolish the feudal regime of land ownership in a manner that is discriminating, methodical and under sound leadership." 32 There was, in fact, no slogan calling on the people to liquidate landlords.

Although Hoang Van Chi's account puts great emphasis on the public denunciation and trial of landlords, it falsely portrays their actual function in the context of the DRV's basic policy toward the landlords. Contrary to his allegations, only those landlords who had committed serious crimes were to be publicly denounced by local peasants and put on trial.

At the very beginning of the land reform process, in 1953, Nhan Dan emphasized the need to avoid any indiscriminate attack on landowners. "The object of the struggle is not all the landowners but only those who refuse to abide by the policy, who refuse to reduce rents and debts," it stated. Those who essentially abided by the law, it added, "even though they have a few shortcomings," would be "pardoned." 33

The August 1953 resolution of the Lao Dong Party Political Bureau, which set forth the political line to be followed during the land reform program, also stated: "We must pay attention to distinctions in our actions regarding landowners, fundamentally dividing the landowning class and patronizing in the correct manner those who have participated in the resistance, because the fewer enemies we have, the better." 34 The leading spokesman on the land reform declared in April 1955, "The government has a policy to lead the peasants to distinguish different kinds of landowners."

The treatment of landlords was to be based on a three-fold distinction, depending on both the past political attitudes and behavior of the landlord and whether or not he resisted the land reform program. Those who had actively participated in the struggle against the French were to be considered "resistance landowners" and were to receive special consideration and compensation in the redistribution of their excess land. Those who were not active in the Viet Minh but who did not resist the DRV's laws and had committed no serious offenses against peasants were to be classified as "ordinary landowners." They were to retain a piece of land to till themselves and could change their class status after three to five years of honest labor.

A final category was to include those who had committed more serious crimes. As a pamphlet issued in 1954 by the National Peasants' Association explained: "A severe punishment is reserved for traitors, criminals, notorious citizens hated by local people, and reactionary elements who try to destroy our resistance and land reform movements."

Those who received hard labor sentences of more than five years, it said, would not receive any land, but their families were entitled to enough land for subsistence provided they were not accomplices in the landowner's crimes.

The sentences which could be meted out to landowners who violated various laws in connection with the rent reduction and land reform campaigns were fixed by Decree 151 of April 12, 1953. Lesser offenses, such as demanding illegal rent or attempting to disperse land to evade the new law, were liable to punishments ranging from a warning to
imprisonment up to one year. The destruction by a landowner of his own property “for the purpose of injuring the peasants or sabotaging production” was considered more serious and was punishable by imprisonment for a term from one to five years. Those actions aiming at disrupting the land reform through bribery, threats, rumors or other means were punishable by prison terms of three to ten years. And the most serious crimes, punishable by prison terms ranging from ten years to life or by death sentence, included “organizing armed bands and directing them in agreement with the imperialists and puppet administration in order to commit acts of violence; attempts upon the lives of peasants and experienced workers; arson and destruction of dwellings, warehouses, foodstuffs, crops, or irrigation works; instigation or direction of disorders.”

After the restoration of peace in 1954, in conformity with the Geneva Agreement’s provision forbidding reprisals, the slogan “Overthrow traitors, reactionaries, and dishonest and wicked notables” was replaced by the slogan “Overthrow dishonest and wicked notables.” The procedures in the mass mobilization campaign were also changed to forbid any general accusations of political crimes and to allow only civil and criminal charges to be brought against landlords.

Far from assuming all landlords to be guilty of some crime, the party’s expectation clearly was that the vast majority of them would be classified as “ordinary” landowners and would therefore be able to redeem themselves through labor on their own land. As the same government pamphlet explained, “The reason we give land to landlords is to open the way for them to work for a living and to reform. This is the humane policy of our government.”

One of the standard allegations about the land reform, found in a number of sources, is that the DRV’s leaders established in advance a “quota” of landlords to be denounced and executed in each village, which put pressure on cadres to “discover” landlords to be punished even where none in fact existed. The story first appeared in a July 1957 Time magazine article which clearly reflected the work of official propagandists in Saigon. Dramatically entitled, “Land of the Mourning Widows,” it described how the land reform had turned into a “bloodbath” because the “prestige of each Communist cadre was made dependent on the number of landlords sent to the gallows.”

It seems to be more than coincidence that at about the same time as the Time article appeared, Hoang Van Chi was working on a book, published in January 1958, in which he claimed that the Lao Dong Party Central Committee had established a quota of five death sentences in every hamlet in North Vietnam. He further asserted that Chinese advisers not only had “ taught the peasants how to classify the population” but also had controlled the whole land reform “point by point.”

Even before Chi’s book was published in the US, a certain William Kaye, identified only as a “specialist in Asian and Communist agrarian problems”—the usual words used to conceal the identity of US intelligence analysts—wrote: “A predetermined number of landlords had to be found in each village, even if they did not, in fact, exist.” The CIA’s George Carver similarly charged that “each land reform team had a pre-assigned quota of death sentences and hard labor imprisonments to mete out and these quotas were seldom underfulfilled.”

A more important voice in swaying American public opinion was that of Bernard Fall. Apparently drawing upon Hoang Van Chi’s account, he wrote, in The Two Viet-Nams, “Local party officials began to deliver veritable quotas of landlords and rich peasants, even in areas where the difference between the largest and smallest village plots was a quarter of an acre.” Far from having demanded a “quota” of “dishonest and wicked notables” to be executed in each village, the party leadership acted at the beginning of the campaign to limit the number of landlords which could be brought before the public for denunciation and trial in any one village. The reason for this action was that during the preliminary phase of the rent reduction campaign, carried out in a few selected villages in 1953, the peasants were denouncing on the average from 10 to 15 landlords for crimes in each village. As the party official responsible for directing land reform operations said in April 1955, “Because of their hatred for the landowners, at first the peasants usually wanted to confiscate everything and try all landowners.”

Fearing that the denunciation of this many landlords in the villages would complicate and lengthen the land reform campaign and arouse unnecessary opposition among potential allies in the landlord class, the Political Bureau decided in August 1953 to “narrow the attack.” Specifically, each village was permitted to bring no more than three landlords before such denunciation sessions. The other landlords accused of crimes were to be allowed to undergo self-criticism before the Province Administrative Committee and then to admit their mistakes before the village Congress of Peasants’ Representatives, which would then demand that the landlords make restitution for any wrongs done to peasants.

As a result of this procedure, according to this DRV account, each village in which the rent reduction campaign was carried out had an average of 2.1 landowners publicly denounced and tried. An average of 3.8 others were brought before the Congress of Peasants’ Representatives on lesser charges. In 1875 villages the number of landowners tried for serious crimes was 3938 or 8.8% of the total number of those classified as landowners.
But, as we have already seen, only those crimes involving conspiring with the "imperialists and puppet administration," attempts on the lives of peasants or cadres, or destruction of public or peasants' property were punishable by prison terms longer than ten years. And the figures released by the DRV after the completion of the 1953-54 phase of the land reform in August 1954 show that death sentences represented under 10% of the total number of sentences handed down by the land reform courts. The statistics for 836 villages which had gone through the process of mass mobilization for land reform showed that a total of about 1350 landowners had been denounced for their crimes of whom 135 had been given death sentences, while about 1,200 were given prison terms.21

Hoang Van Chi's effort to portray the "quotas" as a result of Chinese Communist direction of the program must be seen in the context of the propaganda campaign carried out by the Diem government's psychological warfare organs during this period. As early as August 1954, the newly-created Diem regime was already broadcasting a wholly fabricated story of 50,000 Communist Chinese troops in North Vietnam, along with Chinese advisers who, in the words of the anonymous scriptwriter, "demanded grand receptions with beautiful girls to entertain them, rice and meat of quality, and so forth."22 The same broadcast linked the supposed Chinese menace to North Vietnam with the land reform program, citing reports of 5,000 Chinese administrative cadre preparing to go to Vietnam to train Viet Minh land reform teams.

Saigon's propaganda began claiming that the Chinese advisers were actually running the North Vietnamese government. In August 1956 Diem's embassy in Washington carried an article in its weekly bulletin, News from Viet-Nam, which included reports by refugees from the North of great resentment on the part of North Vietnamese people toward the "bellicose, arrogant attitude of Red Chinese cadres who are entering North Vietnam in great numbers to take up important government and army positions."23 Thus Hoang Van Chi's first published account of the land reform, written in 1957, put the Chinese advisers in charge of the program from the beginning and controlling it "point by point," and not merely training Viet Minh cadres.24

Hoang Van Chi's account of Chinese supervision over the land reform was promoted enthusiastically by certain American and British authors interested in portraying the DRV as being under Chinese influence. The mysterious William Kaye, for example, wrote that the landlords were tried "under the watchful eye of Chinese advisers."25 P. J. Honey, the British specialist on Vietnam who had introduced Hoang Van Chi's book to American readers, asserted that "each of the agrarian reform teams was advised and supervised by Chinese instructors."26 George Carver of the CIA repeated the argument, although with some qualification, stating that "some" of the land reform teams "almost certainly had Chinese advisers."27 But even Carter apparently felt that Hoang Van Chi's allegation of the Chinese "point by point" control of the land reform program went too far.

Another class said to have been included in the DRV's plan for liquidation is the rich peasant class. According to Hoang Van Chi, this was accomplished simply by classifying all rich peasants and even "strong middle level peasants" as "landlords."28 Bernard Fall made the same charge, writing that rich peasants, to whom he referred as "kulaks," were disposed of in the usual way through land reform tribunals.29

In fact, during the resistance against the French, the rich peasants, like elements of the landlord class, were viewed by the party leadership as basically "anti-imperialist" and were thus allies of the party within the "National United Front."30 And the rich peasant class was, in Marxist-Leninist terms, essentially "capitalist" rather than "feudal" in character, since they exploited other peasants primarily by hiring their labor rather than renting land to them.31 For both of these reasons, therefore, the rich peasants were not a target of the land reform campaign.

On the contrary, the policy during the land reform was summarized by the slogan "ally with the rich peasant." Even though some rich peasants had collaborated with the French, and like landlords, had abused poor peasants in the past, the Party Central Committee ordered that no rich peasants be brought before the public to be denounced. Again the purpose was to "narrow the struggle" and to concentrate exclusively on the "dishonest and wicked notables" of the landlord class.32 No land belonging to rich peasants was to be confiscated unless it was rented out to poor peasants, while the hiring of labor was to be allowed to continue. Moreover, rich peasants were then to be allowed to vote and to be elected to village people's councils.33

Hoang Van Chi's final charge about the land reform program is that it was accompanied by a "deliberate excess of terror" which would "annihilate" any adverse reaction.34 As evidence of this intention, Chi alleges that the land reform campaign used the slogan "Better kill ten innocent people than let one enemy escape."35 This alleged slogan, which bears no resemblance to any public statement by the DRV or the Lao Dong Party, was first published in 1957, not in Hanoi, but in the official newspaper of Ngo Dinh Diem's National Revolutionary Movement, Cach Mang Quoc Gia.36 It was said to have been quoted in a speech delivered in Hanoi on October 31, 1957, by Professor Nguyen Manh Tuong of the Faculty of Pedagogy of the University of Hanoi.

But although Professor Tuong did make a speech at that time, the document which Hoang Van Chi published in 1958 and cited later does not represent Tuong's own unadulterated words. For the evidence indicates that it was fabricated by the Saigon regime for psychological warfare purposes. The chief of the psychological warfare department of the Vietnamese Army at the time, Col. Nguyen Van Chau, has confirmed that the text quoted by Chi "is nothing but a false document," which

**Fig. 31.** - (D.) Écoute à 4 cordes, nue par des femmes. Hai nguoi tai nau ve ghe duong.
Chi’s own testimony further undermines the document’s claim to authenticity. In publishing the text of the alleged speech in *The New Class in North Vietnam*, Hoang Van Chi explained that it “fell into the hands of a Vietnamese correspondent in Rangoon who sent it to Saigon where it was published in full in many papers.” 38 In response to questioning about this story, however, Chi admitted that he received his own original copy of the document from an official of the psychological warfare office of the Ministry of Information several months before it was published in the Saigon press. 39

In fact, the document appears to have been used with great effectiveness by Diem’s psychological warfare specialists in persuading *Time* magazine that the land reform was carried out with a “deliberate excess of terror.” *Time* used the “better kill ten innocent” slogan and attributed it to Secretary-General of the Party Truong Chinh, apparently without checking on the quotation’s origin. 40 Finally it found its way into official US propaganda: the CIA’s George Carver cited this alleged document as the one which guided the land reform program. 41

The allegations which form the core of the myth of the “bloodbath” turn out upon investigation to be based on misquotation in a crucial document emanating from the Diem government rather than from Hanoi. None of these allegations is supported by a single authentic document. On the contrary, the documents which are available tell a completely different story. The land reform policy which emerges from the evidence is one characterized by caution, practicality and the desire to prevent unjust and needless loss of life or liberty.

**IV. ERRORS: MYTHICAL AND REAL**

Hoang Van Chi has put great emphasis on the supposed public admissions by DRV leaders and press of massive and indiscriminate executions during the land reform as irresistible evidence that there was indeed a “bloodbath” in the North. He quotes from what he claims are DRV documents which appear to make such admission, and Bernard Fall and J. Price Gittings have cited other such documents in characterizing the land reform. Chi and other authors have capitalized on the fact that, three months after the land reform was completed, the Lao Dong party leadership launched a major campaign for the “rectification of errors” committed during the land reform. That unprecedented campaign, which followed months of open criticism in *Nhan Dan* of the implementation of the land reform program in many areas, was begun with a series of statements by party and governmental leaders admitting that “serious mistakes” had been committed.

But it is important to examine carefully what the documents admitting these mistakes actually did say and what they did not say. Like his description of the party’s policies regarding land reform, Chi’s account of the admission of errors of the land reform systematically distorts key DRV documents.

Well before the land reform was completed at the end of July 1956, the process of correcting the mistakes of the land reform was already begun, though in an unsystematic fashion. 41 Three months after the end of the land reform campaign, however, the party Central Committee began the campaign for "rectification of errors" of the land reform, formally admitting the mistakes and placing primary responsibility for the mistakes on the officials assigned to supervise the whole process. As *Nhan Dan* editorialized, “The mistakes were due to shortcomings in leadership as a consequence of which a number of policies advocated either were not sufficiently concrete or were not carefully worked out.” Because of "shortcomings in the guidance of the application of policies," it continued, there was “insufficient understanding of many policies of the Central Committee,” and the land reform administration “formed a separate system with excessively broad powers.” 2

The Ministers of State for Agriculture and Interior were forced to resign. Truong Chinh, considered by the Central Committee to bear overall responsibility for the mistakes as Secretary General of the Party, submitted his resignation after undertaking self-criticism before his colleagues. 3 According to the party’s own account, the failure of leadership had left the way open for the least politically conscious and least reliable elements of the poor peasant class to control the conduct of the land reform program in many villages. The cause of this development is readily apparent: throughout the resistance war the tendency of party cadres had been to compromise with the wealthier rural strata, even at the expense of the poor peasants’ interests. When the rent reduction and land reform campaign began, therefore, land reform cadres were urged by the party to avoid this “right deviation.” 42 As a result, the cadres swung to the other extreme of “left deviation,” giving complete freedom to the poorest peasants to satisfy their immediate economic and political interests, often at the expense not only of landowners but of rich and middle peasants, including resistance fighters and party members. 5 In the words of a later DRV account, the cadres were guilty of “following the masses” rather than “standing solidly on the position of the party.” 6

Often this meant that the land reform teams sent to the villages did not rely on local party cadres who had been trained during the resistance—even those from the poor peasant class—but turned instead to poor peasant elements who had previously been relatively inactive in the revolution. 7 These peasants, given a significant political role in their villages for the first time, apparently abused it in a variety of ways. Guideline put out by the Central Committee for dealing with landowners, rich peasants and middle peasants were systematically violated; proper distinctions were not made among landowners on the basis of their political attitudes; rich peasants were treated as landowners, and middle peasants were discriminated against; crop areas and land yields were overestimated and peasants often classified in a higher social stratum than was justified. Poor peasants not only denounced landowners who had committed crimes against them but also unjustly classified landowners as “dishonest and wicked notables” in order to make more land available for distribution. 8

Similar political tendencies created serious problems for a parallel effort to reorganize local party branches by taking in large numbers of poor peasants. Many of the older, better trained party cadres were attacked by newcomers as reactionaries, forced out of the party and even jailed, with the result that some of the oldest party cells were left in disarray and some even dissolved completely. 9
violations of party policy respecting freedom of worship may also have further strained already tense relations between the DRV and Catholics. But International Control Commission reports on the district suggest that, although there was widespread resentment among Catholics at having been prevented from emigrating to the South, there was no pattern of political reprisals against Catholics during the period of land reform.

The Party leadership clearly viewed the implementation of the land reform as an administrative disaster which had caused a serious political setback in the short term. It had seriously damaged many local party branches as well as harmed the prestige of the party in general. But although the DRV government pledged to make full restitution in cases of unjust imprisonment or execution, there is no documentary evidence that there had been the kind of indiscriminate execution of innocent people so often alleged. Hoang Van Chi and others have not, in fact, used the actual texts of documents relating to the errors of the land reform campaign but have used instead gross mistranslations and misrepresentations of these documents.

The most serious case of such misrepresentation is Hoang Van Chi’s translation of General Vo Nguyen Giap’s speech of October 19, 1956, in which he discussed the resolution of the Tenth Central Committee Congress. This document is especially significant, because it was the first major discussion by a high party official of the mistakes committed during the land reform program. As translated by Chi, the most important passages in the speech are those in which Giap appears to admit not only that the mistakes outlined above have been committed, but also that the use of terror as well as torture and murder of innocent people were normal practices which had simply been carried too far in the land reform.

According to Chi’s translation, Giap said: “We made too many deviations and executed too many honest people. We attacked on too large a front, and, seeing enemies everywhere, resorted to terror, which became far too widespread.” And in any case, his translation does not reflect the actual content of Giap’s speech but rather the misrepresentations of the DRV government.

GIAP’S SPEECH ON LAND REFORM ERRORS

Mistranslations of Key Passages

**VIETNAMESE TEXT**

"... khong chu trong de phong lech lac..."

"... khong nhan manh phai than trong, tranh..."

"... xu tri oan nhung nguoi ngay..."

(not in original)

"... dung nhung bien phap tran ap qua dang..."

"... mot cach pho bien."

"(h) ... tham chi dung phuong phap truy buc..."

"... de lam cong tac chinh don."

**ACCURATE TRANSLATION**

"(We) did not pay attention to precautions against deviation, and"

"... did not emphasize the necessity for caution and for avoiding..."

"... the unjust disciplining of innocent people..."

(not in original)

"... used excessive repressive measures..."

"... on a wide scale."

"... even coercive measures were used"

"... to carry out party reorganization."

**CHI’S TRANSLATION**

"We made too many deviations..."

(Omitted)

"... seeing enemies everywhere..."

"... resorted to terror..."

"... which became far too widespread."

"... worse still, torture..."

... came to be regarded as normal practice during party reorganization."
another passage, General Giap is quoted as saying: “Worse still, torture came to be regarded as a normal practice during party reorganization.”

But a careful study of the original text reveals Chi’s translation as a flagrant linguistic deception. An accurate translation of the first Giap statement cited above is: “We committed deviations in not emphasizing the necessity for caution and for avoiding the unjust disciplining” of innocent people. We attacked on too wide a front, and used excessive repressive measures on a wide scale.” The second passage should have been translated: “Even coercion was used in order to carry out party reorganization.” Thus Chi’s translation contains no less than eight significant mistranslations in three crucial sentences, which have the cumulative effect of substantially altering the meaning of Giap’s statement.

In his attempt to find party documents showing evidence of mass executions of innocent people, Hoang Van Chi also quotes a Nhan Dan article as saying:

Nghe An is the province in which party organizations existed as early as 1930. But it is in the same province that the most serious mistakes have been made, and the greatest number of party members have been executed during the land reform.

But the only article in Nhan Dan which refers to land reform in Nghe An says merely that “serious mistakes” had been committed in Interzone Four which had caused “heavy losses and pain” to the party branches in that region. The article continued:

There are party branches established in 1930 in Nghe An and Ha Tinh, challenged during the resistance in newly liberated villages in Quang Binh, or matured in the movement to serve the front lines in Thanh Hoa, which have been dissolved.

Nowhere in this discussion of the mistakes committed in Nghe An and other provinces of Interzone Four—or in any other article of the period—is there any sentence remotely resembling the one quoted by Hoang Van Chi, nor is there any reference to executions of party members.

Other American scholars misrepresented the documents dealing with the correction of errors because they could not translate the documents themselves and relied on translations provided in Saigon. It is now apparent that a number of articles in Nhan Dan from the 1956-57 period were seriously “doctored” in the process of translation and summarization by Vietnamese personnel.

Still another frequently-cited “fact” about the correction of errors campaign also turns out, on closer examination, to be without foundation. Hoang Van Chi claims that General Giap referred in his October 1956 speech to 12,000 party members wrongly imprisoned in the course of the land reform who would be released. Carver also calls forth this “fact” in his denunciation of the land reform, citing the same document. But a careful reading of the original text reveals that Giap made no mention of the number of party members or prisoners unjustly jailed and about to be freed. In December 1956, Truong Chinh did refer to the release of 12,000 persons, but this was in the context of the government’s three-phase review of all individuals imprisoned as a result of the land reform. In the first phase, those who had been wrongly arrested during the land reform and the party reorganization were released, along with all prisoners over sixty years of age; in the second phase those who had committed crimes not considered serious enough to warrant imprisonment were released; in the third phase, those who had committed serious crimes which could be commuted were released. So the 12,000 figure referred not to party members imprisoned but to all those who were released from prison, for whatever reason, after the land reform.

What the documents say, in fact, is quite different from the misleading impression conveyed in the literature on the land reform. The evidence simply does not support the charge that there was a DRV policy of systematic, massive executions of innocent people.

V. THE “ESTIMATES”: QUANTIFYING THE MYTH

By his systematic distortion of the basic facts of the land reform, Hoang Van Chi laid the basis for public acceptance of certain irresponsible figures on the number of deaths caused by the land reform. These figures, for which neither concrete evidence nor explanation has ever been offered, were based in each case on wholly subjective judgment, false information and assumptions.

The most frequently used figure has been the one given by Bernard Fall, who wrote: “The best-educated guesses on the subject are that probably close to 50,000 North Vietnamese were executed in connection with the land reform and that at least twice as many were arrested and sent to forced labor camps.” The figure of 100,000 was given by a French history teacher, Gérard Tongas, who remained in Hanoi after the Geneva Agreement. Tongas returned to Paris in 1959 to write a heavy-handed diatribe entitled, I Lived in the Communist Hell in North Vietnam and I Chose Freedom. His information on the land reform appears to have been acquired from the Francophile members of the Vietnamese bourgeoisie in Hanoi, who, according to Tongas, longed for the overthrow of the DRV so that they could send their children to French schools. His claim of 100,000 deaths thus represents the figure circulated by those who still hoped for a return to the status quo of the colonial period.
But it remained for Hoang Van Chi himself to provide American propaganda on the land reform with its most shocking "estimate." After asserting that "nobody has been able to assess accurately the exact number of deaths" from the land reform, he casually refers in a later chapter to "the massacre of about 5 percent of the total population." Based on a total estimated population of about 13.5 million in 1956, this would have represented a total of 675,000 people.

Chi offers no justification for this allegation, but he suggests at one point that most of the deaths were those of children who starved "owing to the 'isolation policy.'" There was no such policy. As the official party organ, Nhan Dan, stated "... if the family is one of a dishonest and wicked notable, who has been sentenced to imprisonment, there should be no contact with the person imprisoned, but there can be visits with the other members of the family." The picture of hundreds of thousands of innocent children being systematically starved to death is so absurd, in fact, that no secondary source has dared to use it. Yet it is mainly on the basis of Chi's totally unreliable account that the President of the United States himself has told the American people that "a half a million, by conservative estimates ... were murdered or otherwise exterminated by the North Vietnamese ... ." 8

As against the subjective "guesses" cited above, the statistics which have been published by the DRV, though admittedly incomplete, provide a better basis for estimating the number of executions. We have already mentioned the directive of the Lao Dong Political Bureau of August 1953 which limited the number of landlords who could be publicly denounced and tried in each village to a maximum of three. The average number of landlords denounced and tried per village in the 1875 villages covered by the rent reduction campaign was 2.1, according to the DRV study, for a total of 3,938. It has also been pointed out that a radio broadcast at the time reported that 135 of the first 1,350 landowners denounced and tried, or about 10 percent, received the death sentence. If this proportion were generally applied in all 1,875 villages covered by the rent reduction campaign, the total number of death sentences would have been about 400.

In 1,778 other villages, the land reform was carried out without the intervening phase of mass mobilization for rent reduction. No data is available from DRV sources on the number of landlords sentenced in these villages or the proportion of those sentenced to death. The DRV's account of the land reform suggests that the most numerous mistakes of classification and of accusation were committed after June 1955 as the party's supervision of land reform teams began to lag behind the pace of implementation in newly liberated areas. It is worth noting, however, that even if the number of death sentences in these 1,778 villages was three times more than the number of the first 1,875, the total for the entire land reform would still have been less than 2,500. The available official documentation thus suggests that from 800 to 2,500 executions during the land reform would be a realistic estimate.

Further support for this estimate comes from a surprising source—an official document issued by the Diem government in July 1959. In its formal attack on the DRV with regard to the Geneva Agreement, the Republic of Vietnam published figures which it claimed were the total number of sentences to death and hard labor for life in several provinces during North Vietnam's land reform. The figures were as follows: 10

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Death Sentences</th>
<th>Hard Labor for Life</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Phu Tho</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bac Giang</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thai Nguyen</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thanh Hoa</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>134</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The totals for all of these four provinces, including Thanh Hoa, the most populous province in the North, were thus 265 death sentences and 275 sentences of hard labor for life, or an average of 66 death sentences and 69 life sentences in each province. If these figures were indicative of the situation in the other eighteen provinces affected by the land reform, the totals would have been in the neighborhood of 1,500 executions and 1,500 life sentences, totals which would be entirely consistent with the statistics released by Hanoi.

It is not possible to judge the authenticity of the figures released by the South Vietnamese government, since no source was cited. But it is striking that the Information Ministry of a government so obviously hostile to Hanoi as the Diem government would give figures which are so low, so consistent with the DRV's figures, and so inconsistent with the myth of the "bloodbath."

CONCLUSION

Evidence shows that, although the land reform program was marred by administrative failures, its aims were to liberate the poor peasants from the threat of famine and from their total subordination to the landlords. The benefits of the land reform to the poor peasants, who made up the majority of the rural population, were a substantial increase in rice consumption and an improved social and political status in the villages. Hitherto powerless elements were encouraged for the first time to assert themselves, and although the short-term consequences were widespread abuses and conflict, even within the Lao Dong Party itself, the experiences of other nations suggest that bringing the poor peasants into the political process would be a positive development over the long run.

A determined propaganda attack against the land reform program launched by the South Vietnamese government, with...
American support, succeeded in portraying it as an excuse for ideologically-inspired mass murder. Where no evidence existed to support the "bloodbath" myth, it was created. As the U.S. government became more deeply involved in the attempt to control events in Vietnam, the myth of the "bloodbath" became increasingly useful and finally almost necessary. By the late 1960s, having been repeated by so many different sources, the myth of the "bloodbath" in North Vietnam had gained nearly universal acceptance. The President was then able to use it as a major rationale for maintaining the U.S. military presence in Vietnam.

Apart from the self-interest of officials and the incapacity of academics to do the necessary original research, however, it seems evident that the myth of the "bloodbath" in North Vietnam fits deeply-held prejudices common to most Americans. Two generations of American have been led to believe that revolutionaries guided by Marxist-Leninist concepts must be fanatical and cruel. Many Americans tended to accept that stereotype in total ignorance of the real nature of the Vietnamese revolution. Consequently this paved the way for the myth of the "bloodbath" to gain popular credence and helped stifle the search for truth. That same stereotype which belittled the intelligence, the patriotism and the humanity of the Vietnamese communist movement also made it easier for Americans to assume that it was no match for American economic and military power. It should now be clear that the U.S. can delay but cannot ultimately avoid using it as a major rationale for maintaining the U.S. military presence in Vietnam.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

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NOTES

I.


3. Carver, p. 355. Carver's attempt to promote Hoang Van Chi's account of the land reform is especially significant in that Carver tried to conceal his own affiliation with the U.S. government in writing the article. The fact that Carver was a CIA official was revealed only later by Senator J. William Fulbright.

4. See the interview with Hoang Van Chi published in the Agency for International Development's in-house newsletter, Front Lines, February 24, 1972.


6. Ibid.


8. Interview with Hoang Van Chi.


12. CORDS Training Book, p. 3.

II.

1. The land reform program is sometimes confused with the later phase of North Vietnamese agricultural policy in which cooperatives were established; hence the alleged "bloodbath" may be associated in some minds with the later "collectivization" program in the rural areas. But that phase did not begin until November 1958, nearly two and a half years after the end of the land reform process. The allegations of a "bloodbath," therefore, have nothing to do with the "collectivization" of agriculture. In contrast to the land reform, the campaign to establish cooperatives was gradual and noncoercive. This analysis concerns only the land reform program which began in 1953 and was completed in 1956.


4. Ibid.


6. See Pham Cao Doung, Thuc Tap Cong Chua Giai Nong Dan Viet Nam Duoi Thai Phap Thuc (The True Situation of the Vietnamese Peasants under French Colonialism), (Saigon: Nha Sach Khai Tri, 1965), pp. 104-105.

7. Ibid., p. 286.

9. See Henry, p. 112; Pham Cao Duong, pp. 74-83; Nguyen Huu Khang, La Commune Annamite (Paris: Librairie du Recueil Sirey, 1946), p. 54. For specific cases of such exploitation of communal lands by local notables under the French see the richly documented study by Truong Chinh and Vo Nguyen Giap, first published in 1937, Van De Dan Cay (The Peasant Problem), Hanoi: Nha Xuat Ban Su That, (1959), second printing, pp. 122-123.

10. Tran Phuong, loc. cit.


15. For a study which assumes the economic rationality of the land reform, however, see Christine Felter White, Land Reform in North Vietnam, Agency for International Development Spring Review, Country Paper, June 1970.


17. Ibid.

18. The Agriculture of French Indo-China, U.S. Department of Agriculture, August 1950 (mimeo), p. 11. Despite this caveat, the same source nevertheless ventures the opinion that Tonkin could be considered as a country of "small peasants who till their own land"—a misleading representation of the land tenure system.

19. Fall, loc. cit. Even this statistic was used by another writer hostile to the land reform to show that there were few landlords to be confiscated in the North. Joseph Buttiger writes that "more than 60 percent of all land was in the hands of peasants owning around one acre," a statement which was wrong on two counts: first the statistic cited by Fall does not refer to land area but to landowners, and secondly, it specifically states that 61% of them owned less than one acre, not "around" one acre. Buttiger seems to have been unaware of the economic significance of a plot of less than one acre. See Joseph Buttiger, Vietnam, A Dragon Embattled, Vol. II: (New York: Praeger, 1967), p. 912.


21. Chi, From Colonialism to Communism, p. 149.


Dividing the total numbers of landlords denounced by the number of
villages, we get averages of 2.4 per village in Thanh Hoa and 2.2 per
village in Nghe An and Ha Tinh. Nhan Dan, April 1-3, 1954, and August
1-3, 1954.

20. Ibid.
erg, “Communist Land Reform in North Vietnam.” p. 116. Nhan Dan,
August 13-18, 1954, reported figures of 1,215 landowners denounced
publicly in 826 villages.


27. Carver, loc. cit.
28. Chi, From Communism to Colonialism, p. 166.
30. A major party document dated 1948 described the party’s
policy toward rural classes during the resistance with the following
slogan: “Rely on the middle poor peasants, unite with the rich
peasants, isolate the landowners and oppose the French imperialists.”
See “Tinh Hinh va Nhiem Vu De Cuong Dua Ra Dai Hao Toan Quoc”
(Situation and Tasks to be Presented to the National Congress), in
Documents on Vietnamese Communism, Wason Film, 2584, Cornell
University Library.

31. Tran Phuong, ed., Cach Mang Ruong Dat, pp. 142-143; Tran
Phuong, “The Land Reform,” Pages of History, p. 183; Nhan Dan,
September 11-15, 1953, in Cuoc Khang Chien, p. 121.
33. Ibid., p. 144; Nhan Dan, June 1-5, 1953, in Cuoc Khang
Chien, p. 58.
34. Hoang Van Chi, From Colonialism to Communism, p. 211.
35. Ibid., p. 167 and 213.
37. Letter to the author, November 25, 1972, from Oliver,
France. For Chau’s revelations concerning documents forged by U.S.
and Diemist agencies during the period, see St. Louis Post-Dispatch,
September 24, 1972, p. 2.
38. Hoang Van Chi, loc. cit.

IV.

1. See for examples, Nhan Dan, June 29, 1956; August 20,
1956; August 24, 1956, September 6, 1956; September 8, 1956.
2. Nhan Dan, October 30, 1956, carried by Vietnam News

3. Ibid.
4. See for example, the article “Correct Mistakes of Rightist
Thinking” in Nhan Dan, January 13, 1956.
5. Tran Phuong, ed., Cach Mang Ruong Dat, p. 197.
6. Ibid.
7. Ibid., p. 189.
8. Ibid., pp. 190-191. Nhan Dan, August 24, 1956 and October
30, 1956.
9. Nhan Dan, July 2, 1956; October 7, 1956, November 22,
10. Tran Phuong, ed., Cach Mang Ruong Dat, p. 187. This
campaign to uncover subversives in the newly liberated areas,
even exaggerated and ultimately self-defeating, was based on real fears
of sabotage of the land reform campaign by agents of the Diem
government or the Americans. In March 1956, Nhan Dan reported
that in Ha Dong province someone was “spreading the rumor that U.S.-Diem
troops are about to come, and you’ll have to move again, so the
land reform is not final.” Nhan Dan, March 2, 1956.
11. Communiqué of the Central Committee, October 29, 1956,
12. Cach Mang Ruong Dat, p. 188.
13. For the official DRV version of the event, see Vietnam News
Agency, Radio Hanoi, November 16, 1956; for the Diem
government view, see News from Viet·Nam, December 1, 1956, p. 3. Saigon claimed
that “several hundred” people were killed by government troops during
the fighting, while Hanoi claimed “a few” persons were killed or
wounded. According to Vietnamese who escaped from Quynh Luu to
the South and were interviewed by American officials, “several hundred
persons were injured but only a few killed,” and troops brought in to
put down the uprising “fired their guns at the insurgents only a few
times and fought largely with rifle butts and bayonets.” UPI dispatch
from Saigon, Bangkok Post, November 29, 1956.
Paper, 509). London: Great Britain Parliamentary Sessional Papers,
15. See the statement by the DRV government before the 6th
Meeting of the National Assembly, Nhan Dan, January 4, 1957.
16. Hoang Van Chi, From Colonialism to Communism, pp.
209-210. Chi inaccurately refers to it as a speech read before the 10th
Congress of the Central Committee. In fact, it was read before a public
meeting of the citizens of Hanoi, according to the official text in Nhan
Dan, October 31, 1956.
17. Not only the authoritative dictionary published in Hanoi but
the pattern of actual usage of the term xu tri leave no room for doubt
that the word was used to mean “to discipline” or “to punish” and not
as a euphemism for “execute.” The dictionary defines it as synonymous
with “to discipline.” Van Tan, Tu Dien Tieng Viet (Dictionary of the
Vietnamese Language), (Hanoi: Nha Xuat Ban Khoa Hoc Xa Hoi,

Moreover, in the same speech by Giap, the following passage
illustrates its unambiguous meaning: “Cadres and people mistakenly
disciplined (bi xu tri) are all to be rectified: politically, they are to have
their rights, honor and responsibilities restored. Those who were
unjustly imprisoned are to be freed. Economically, they are to be
appropriately compensated and helped to make a living.” The story on
To Hieu village also describes the party secretary as having been
“disciplined (xu tri), arrested and jailed,” then freed. (Nhan Dan,
August 24, 1956.)
18. From Colonialism to Communism, p. 225.
19. Nhan Dan, November 22, 1956. There was no article even
uglemg vaguely resembling the one described by Hoang Van Chi in the
November 21 issue cited in his footnote.
20. Hoang Van Chi, From Colonialism to Communism, p. 214.

V.

1. Fall, The Two Viet-Nams, p. 159.
1960).
3. Ibid., p. 353. Not only his affinity for the French-speaking
bourgeoisie but his undisguised contempt for non-Francophile Vietnamese colored Tongas' attitude toward the DRV. Tongas once commented, "The cultural level of North Vietnam is undoubtedly one of the lowest imaginable." Tongas, "Indoclimination Replaces Education," in Honey, ed., *North Vietnam Today*, p. 93.

4. Hoang Van Chi, *From Colonialism to Communism*, p. 166.


7. Nhan Dan, August 6, 1956. This allegation is further contradicted by Chi's own admission, thirty pages later, that there were few landlord families who could not get money from friends or relatives who were tradesmen or officials. *From Colonialism to Communism*, p. 196.

8. President Nixon's Press Interview, April 16, 1971 (official White House text). President Nixon has escalated his own rhetoric on the "bloodbath" in North Vietnam by multiplying the number of deaths as the argument became increasingly crucial to the rationale for American policy in Vietnam. In 1969 he used Bernard Fall's figure of 50,000 deaths (President Nixon's Radio/TV address, November 3, 1969, official White House text). In 1971, he used the 500,000 figure cited above. But on July 27, 1972, the President reached a new level of rhetoric, declaring that more than one half million people were assassinated and another half a million died in "slave labor camps" in North Vietnam (*New York Times*, July 28, 1972). An inquiry to the National Security Council produced only a list of references of which Hoang Van Chi's "5 percent" figure was the only primary source. His own staff was thus unable to explain how he arrived at his new total of one million deaths from the North Vietnamese land reform.

9. See notes 19 and 20, Section III.


Zaibatsu Dissolution and the American Restoration of Japan

by Howard B. Schonberger

In virtually all of the nations of Asia, American activity in Japan after 1947 aroused deep fears and bitter opposition. Washington unilaterally announced policies designed to encourage the reemergence of Japan as the dominant economic power in the Pacific. This "reverse course," as it was commonly called, entailed the drastic curtailment of early Occupation reform measures in the business, labor, military, and reparations areas. The reorientation of American policy was publicly explained as a response to the acute economic crisis in Japan and the reluctance of Congress to underwrite the growing costs of the Occupation. Such explanations were met with skepticism by both critics and supporters of the new policies for Japan. They noted that the economic rehabilitation of Japan coincided with the rapid disintegration of the Chinese Nationalist regime, the breakdown in Soviet-American relations, and paralleled a similar change in policy in American-occupied Germany. The paramount motivation in America's Far Eastern policy, they believed, was the need to establish Japan as "a mighty bulwark against Moscow's domination of Asia."1

At the very center of the controversy over new American policies for Japan was the degree of restructuring needed for an economy that was dominated by ten major Zaibatsu families (about 56 persons). Through 67 holding companies and over 4,000 operating subsidiaries and affiliates, the Zaibatsu families at the end of the war asserted effective control of 75 percent of Japan’s financial, industrial, and commercial activities. Although the unexpectedly sudden surrender of the Japanese found the postwar planners in the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee (SWNCC) still sharply divided on the Zaibatsu question, the final directives by President Truman and the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) to General Douglas MacArthur, the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP), seemed reasonably clear. These instructions, which were similar to those for Occupied Germany in JCS 1067, called on SCAP to encourage a democratic and peaceful economy for Japan by policies which favored a "wide distribution of income and ownership of the means of production and trade." To that end SCAP was to institute a program for the "dissolution of the large industrial and banking combinations which ... exercise control of a great part of Japan's trade and industry" and to use the power of the purge to remove individuals from important economic positions in order to direct the Japanese economy along a peaceful course. The legislation and enforcement of the dissolution of the Zaibatsu, as with other Occupation reforms, was the responsibility of the Japanese Government.2

Throughout the fall of 1945 the Occupation functioned in an unremitting glare of publicity. Most press comments attacked the failure of General MacArthur to take action on the Zaibatsu issue, though a few left-wing journalists offered a more fundamental criticism. "It takes little reflection to realize," I. F. Stone commented prophetically in the Nation, "that we can hardly hope to break the power of Japan's ruling classes ... if we confine ourselves to operating through a government which remains their instrument. To do so is to leave in power the very elements we are pledged to eradicate."3 In any case, MacArthur felt compelled to act against the Zaibatsu even though he lacked knowledge of the intricacies of the Japanese corporate network and had only a small and newly organized staff of economic advisors. The General requested that the directors of each of the four largest Zaibatsu holding companies—Mitsui, Mitsubishi, Sumitomo, and Yasuda—volunteer dissolution plans of their own for approval by SCAP. The Yasuda Plan put forward by the Yasuda family following MacArthur's request was a limited deconcentration plan with numerous loopholes but it won the General's acceptance in October 1945 as the first step towards meeting the broad objectives of American policy; under SCAP prodding, other Zaibatsu executives concurred in its recommendations. For the moment, MacArthur succeeded in assuaging American public opinion, and world opinion as well, and placed the burden for further action on the Zaibatsu question in Washington.4
The secret and carefully detailed Zaibatsu dissolution program that finally emerged as official American policy in 1946 exploded into what became known publicly as the FEC-230 controversy (FEC-230 was the Far Eastern Commission directive to implement the dissolution program). A careful examination of the FEC-230 controversy of 1947 and 1948 provides important clues to the weight of economic and strategic components in Washington policy deliberations on Japan. It reveals even more dramatically the way in which internal problems in Japan became important in the context of Japan’s new international role in Asia. By bringing about the direct intervention of a powerful sector of the American business community, opening up public discussion of American policy, and generating the first careful scrutiny of the broad range of Japanese problems by Washington policy makers since the war, the FEC-230 debates of 1947 and 1948, perhaps more clearly than any other issue of that critical period, defined the reactionary contours implicit in the economic restoration of Japan.

CORWIN EDWARDS AND THE ORIGINS OF THE FEC-230

Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs William L. Clayton questioned the superficiality of the Yasuda Plan as the basis of American policy on the Zaibatsu. He requested the Justice Department in November 1945 to send a mission of anti-trust experts to Japan first make a study of the Zaibatsu system and then to arrive at specific policy recommendations. Appointed chairman of the mission was Corwin Edwards, an economist at Northwestern University and consultant for Clayton on international cartels policy. After more than two months of study and writing, Edwards early in 1946 submitted the recommendations of the Mission on Japanese Combines to SWNCC. With minor changes, these recommendations were adopted by SWNCC in October 1946 as official United States policy on the dissolution of the Zaibatsu. They were immediately forwarded to SCAP as an interim directive and later submitted to the Far Eastern Commission (the 11-nation body theoretically responsible for all Occupation policies) for its approval as FEC-230 on May 12, 1947.5

Edwards regarded the Yasuda Plan as “obviously insufficient to destroy the power of the great Japanese combines.” First, it made no reference to action on the combine subsidiaries or intercorporate and management ties below the level of the Zaibatsu holding companies at the very apex of the complex economic pyramid. Secondly, the Yasuda plan offered no provisions to insure the permanent and wide distribution of Zaibatsu assets or to prevent Zaibatsu family members retired from active positions in Japan’s business life from exerting their influence behind the scenes. “Selection of those who are to acquire control over Zaibatsu property is crucial,” Edwards wrote upon his return from Japan, “since it will determine, in large part, the character of future Japanese industrial organization.” Edwards saw four alternatives to Zaibatsu control of industry. First, and the most dangerous to the achievement of democracy in Japan, was government nationalization of industry either under a form of socialism or state capitalism; second, was control by labor unions along syndicalist lines; third was control by agricultural and consumer cooperatives in a cooperative commonwealth; and finally was the transfer of Zaibatsu property to “individuals and small business groups [to] lay the foundations for a Japanese middle class and a system of competitive capitalism.” In his own report Edwards opted for the last alternative though he recognized a grave weakness. “So much of industry has been controlled by the Zaibatsu that there is question whether competent individuals and business groups can always be found to take over Zaibatsu enterprises.” Edwards finessed the resolution of this problem by meekly suggesting that, “regardless of the ideology with which the question is approached, the transfers of authority will be ecletic and unsystematic.”6

Edwards’ recommendations for the dissolution of the Zaibatsu were far-reaching indeed. In its official form as FEC-230, the Edwards recommendations covered the dissolution of all “excessive concentrations of economic power” defined as any “private enterprise or combination operated for profit . . . if its asset value is very large; or if its working force . . . is very large . . . or if it produces, sells or distributes a large proportion of the total supply of the products of a major industry.” Creditors, stockholders, and managers of designated excessive concentrations were to be divested of all security holdings, liquid assets, and business properties; purged from all positions of business or governmental responsibility; and forbidden from purchasing securities or from acquiring positions of business or governmental responsibilities for ten years. One of the most controversial recommendations called for disposing of the securities of former business personnel as rapidly as possible, even if at a “fraction of their real value” with a decided purchase preference “furnished to such persons as small or medium entrepreneurs and investors, and to such groups as agricultural cooperatives and trade unions.” All possible technical and financial assistance was to be given these groups for the purchase of Zaibatsu properties and special care taken to screen sales “to exclude cloaks for Zaibatsu and for other groups” falling under the purge directive.7

That Edwards’ proposals were adopted as official United States policy caused wonderment to contemporaries and later to historians. It also gave rise to spurious charges that the document, at worst, was Communist-inspired, and at best, had been slipped by the attention of top policy-makers. Most of these charges originated, directly or indirectly, with the so-called “Japan Crowd” associated with Joseph Grew, former Ambassador to Japan and Acting Secretary of State in the critical months of Occupation planning prior to the Japanese surrender. Grew argued that American interests lay in maintaining a highly concentrated economy in Japan under an industrial elite who would participate in peaceful trade in cooperation with American economic aims. But others in the War and State Departments, especially the China experts, resisted this course and advocated fundamental changes in Japan’s business structure as part of a program to purge Japan of militarism and weaken its predominant role in Asia. Clearly FEC-230 represented the temporary triumph in 1946 of this faction of a divided and confused circle of policy-makers.8 The controlling assumption of the document, as Edwards put it, was that the Zaibatsu system, not simply the ten Zaibatsu family cliques, was linked with the Japanese program of aggression and war.

The responsibility of the Zaibatsu for the aggressive actions
of Japan is essentially in its structure... A few large Zaibatsu, controlling the industry and international trade of Japan, were supported by the Japanese government. Concentration of economic control enabled them to continue a semi-feudal relationship between themselves and their employees, to continue to suppress wages and to hinder the development of independent political ideologies. Thus the formation of the middle class, which was useful in opposing the militarist group in other democratic countries, was retarded.9

The main purpose of the dissolution program for Edwards and American policy-makers was to create a competitive capitalism based upon a middle class "capable of preventing the militarists" from again controlling the Japanese government.

On another level, FEC-230 was one component of the American attempt to reconstruct the world economy free of the exclusive trading blocs and price-fixing and output-restriction agreements of the prewar international cartels. At the time of his assignment to Japan, Edwards was a consultant on cartels to the International Business Practices Branch of the State Department and author of a highly regarded wartime study of the "Economic and Political Aspects of International Cartels." For Edwards, international cartels, which controlled 40 to 50 percent of world trade prior to the war, pointed towards restrictions of trade, unemployment, and an economic environment appropriate to totalitarian and aggressive political regimes. Moreover, domestic monopolistic concentration within the major capitalistic nations, Edwards argued, was a precondition for international cartels. The suppression of cartels therefore required an attack on domestic monopolies as well.10 "The destruction of the great combines in Japan," Edwards insisted, "must be part of an international attack upon arbitrary exercise of economic power by international cartels and combines." Only then would the Japanese "regard themselves as participants in a democratic world movement rather than as [objects] of discriminatory repression." 11 In his own fashion Edwards thus expressed the postwar consensus of Washington policy-makers that peace, and hence world prosperity, could be fostered only by open world trade.12

FIRST REACTIONS IN JAPAN TO FEC-230

For all of its thoroughness and detail, the Edwards Report failed to assign priorities to its numerous recommendations or indicate procedures for implementation. "The shape it's in now," commented one Occupation expert in April 1946, "MacArthur can use it as a basis for admirable anti-Zaibatsu legislation. But it can also serve as a basis for legislation that would mean nothing at all."13 Thus the Edwards recommendations left considerable initiative, authority, and responsibility to SCAP and brought to a head the conflicting personalities, bureaucracies, and ideologies within the Occupation.

From the outset, two key staff sections of the Occupation administration, Economic and Scientific Section (ESS) under Major General William F. Marquat and Civil Intelligence Section (also known as G-2) under Major General Charles A. Willoughby, opposed the basic thrust of the Edwards recommendations. To ESS they were utopian and required a staff beyond the budget restrictions imposed by Washington. They raised the basic question of "whether the purpose of the Occupation is to establish an ideal economy or whether it is to merely insure the disability of Japan to make future war." Giving nominal support to the broad principles of Edwards' recommendations, ESS warned Washington that many of its specific provisions would be "of great difficulty and impracticality of accomplishment."14 General Willoughby was even a stronger opponent of the liberal reforms and reformers of the early Occupation years. Constantly active in the surveillance of the Japanese Left and of suspected communists within SCAP, Willoughby's intelligence agencies were remarkably ineffective in dealing with business. Willoughby strongly attacked the purge of wartime business executives and often blocked orders from other staff sections when called upon to help in the enforcement of the Zaibatsu dissolution program.15 Underlying this opposition to economic reform was the view that a conservative Japan was a necessary ally in the "coming war with Russia." The chief of the Industrial and Financial Division of ESS explained early in 1946 that if you "destroy the Zaibatsu... you may have chaos for the next ten years... Let's not kid ourselves. We need a strong Japan. For one of these days we'll have to face Russia and we'll need an ally. Japan is it."16 The strategic dimension of the Cold War was close to the surface in Japan from the beginning of the Occupation and a brake on the entire reform program.

Leading the fight within SCAP to carry out the Edwards recommendations, especially after they were adopted as official American policy and forwarded to Tokyo in October 1946, was Brigadier General Courtney Whitney, chief of the powerful Government Section. A successful attorney in the Philippines before the war, Whitney remained one of the stalwarts of the "Bataan clique" surrounding MacArthur. Although all of his critics agreed that he himself was conservative, Whitney was certain that every phase of Japan's prewar society was feudalistic and that only by a thorough-going decentralization of governmental and business activity could a Western-style democracy be achieved. In expanding Government Section to take over its responsibilities for supervising the Emperor, the Cabinets, the Diet, the courts, and the civil service, Whitney selected a high-caliber staff of lawyers and economists. They were among the leading proponents of FEC-230 and no doubt helped Edwards in the preparation of his report. As genuine reformers with experience in Washington regulatory agencies they were often referred to disparagingly as the "New Dealers" in SCAP.17

Despite the crescendo of criticism from all quarters, General Douglas MacArthur consistently backed Government Section's ultimately futile effort to implement the Edwards recommendations into Japanese law and practice. MacArthur told Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal shortly before the end of the war that he regarded the Zaibatsu, though "subordinate and secondary to the military," as one of the main pillars of a Japanese feudalism that would have to be uprooted by the Occupation.18 Undoubtedly this conception...
of the Zaibatsu in an unholy alliance with the militarists contributed to MacArthur’s defense of the Zaibatsu dissolution program. In addition, MacArthur was attracted by the competitive capitalist economic model as the best guarantor against the growth of a revolutionary Left in Japan. His social views were so fundamentally conservative that he remained incredulous at charges that the FEC-230 program was socialistic and tended to view such criticisms as efforts to undermine his authority in Japan and thwart his presidential ambitions at home. Thus, the stronger and louder the complaints against FEC-230 became, the more MacArthur invested his own prestige in support of it. 19

The financial and industrial elite in Japan, who stood most to lose from implementation of the Zaibatsu dissolution program, were ever alert to these conflicts within SCAP and sensitive as well to shifting political currents in Washington. They recognized the dissolution of the top holding companies as inevitable, but sought to minimize its consequences. Once SCAP reached the more crucial phase of breaking up the ownership and management ties between the Zaibatsu operating companies or “subsidiaries,” Japanese business leaders offered strong resistance. It was SCAP’s attempt to extend the purge to the entire business structure in the winter of 1946 that triggered the first open controversy over the Zaibatsu dissolution program.

Though the basic Occupation directive of 1945 included an ambiguous section calling for the purge of “any persons who have held key positions of high responsibility since 1937, in industry, finance, commerce, or agriculture [who] have been active exponents of militant nationalism and aggression” the purges of 1946 covered only military and governmental personnel and did not affect the Zaibatsu combines at all. The delay in implementation of the “economic purge” developed from a dispute in Headquarters between Government Section, responsible for purge proceedings, and ESS and Willoughby’s G-2. From the outset it was argued that such a clean sweep of Japanese business would deprive the economy of its most experienced personnel and delay vital economic recovery. Government Section therefore agreed to wait until ESS had prepared a separate directive providing for more refined purge criteria in the business field than the broad measures of the original mandate. Two ESS drafts for an economic purge, however, were vetoed by Willoughby and other Section chiefs so that by the end of the summer of 1946 it appeared there might be no economic purge whatsoever. Stalemated in obtaining a separate economic purge directive General Whitney took the bold step of pressuring Japanese authorities to write an amendment to the original purge directive which covered the economic field or face listing of business organizations under the existing and more severe purge category of ultranationalist societies. 20

In interviews with Burton Crane, the conservative correspondent of the New York Times, anonymous Japanese executives condemned the purge as an attempt to discredit businessmen merely because they were successful. They warned that unless the key financial and industrial personnel were retained, the fate of Japan’s economy hung in the balance. 21 Appealing directly to General MacArthur to block the proposed purge, Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru (linked by marriage to the Mitsubishi Zaibatsu) warned that unless the Japanese government handled the purge in its own manner there was real danger for “the future of democratic and uncommunistic Japan.” 22 Supporting the opposition of these Japanese to the purge was General Marquat, who also protested to MacArthur that Government Section had trespassed into ESS jurisdiction over economic affairs. Meanwhile General Willoughby sought to prove to MacArthur from FBI reports that the agitation for the economic purge came from the communists within Government Section. 23

General MacArthur, of course, remained the key to the settlement of the economic purge issue. His correspondence with Prime Minister Yoshida in December 1946 indicated his intention to disregard the strong opposition and reflected, by all accounts, the influence of General Whitney. With MacArthur’s approval of the economic purge, most of the overt opposition melted away. Almost a year and a half after the surrender, the Japanese government on January 4, 1947, extended the purge into the business sector. 24

But as SCAP prepared the administrative machinery for inaugurating the economic purge, the Japanese business elite, blocked in its attempt to work through sympathetic government ministries and the SCAP bureaucracy, stepped up their appeals to potential allies in the United States. “The survivors among the bankers and industrialists,” explained one dismayed liberal reporter, “know that close association with American and British investors represents their best chance to retain their position. They are launching a campaign designed to gain friends in American circles by hopes of profits.” 25 During the crucial months of late 1947 and early 1948, Newsweek magazine, guided by foreign affairs editor Harry F. Kern and Tokyo correspondent Compton Pakenham, served as the principal vehicle for this strategy. In the first important conservative attack on MacArthur’s handling of the Occupation, Newsweek charged that up to 30,000 businessmen, the “brains of the entire Japanese economic structure” faced removal from their jobs under the recently passed “economic purge.” Not only were these businessmen the “most active, efficient, cultured, and cosmopolitan” group in Japan but they had “always been disposed toward cooperation with the United States.” The Cold War corollary followed naturally. The extreme Left in Japan would capitalize on the disruption created by the purge “to advantage of the ever watchful Russians, the advocates of severe purges.” 26

Avoiding a direct attack on General MacArthur, Newsweek struck at General Whitney and his Government

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Section as the chief culprits behind the economic purge. Described as a red-faced man, portly, and short-tempered, Whitney prevailed over his rivals in SCAP, Newsweek reported, because his friendship for MacArthur enabled him to skirt official channels. The purge program itself was drawn up, according to Pakenham, by Government Section officers who were "theoretical experts in limited phases but otherwise ... immature, untrained for local conditions, blindly unconscious of their tremendous power, and unconcerned over the practical consequences." Calling for a Congressional investigation of why American capitalist principles were being undermined by the Occupation, Newsweek concluded its broadside with the lament of one of Pakenham’s Japanese business informants. "We can’t understand why, when America could have all Japan working in its own interest, it is now engaged in wrecking the country so as to leave it as an eventual prize to the Russians."27

General MacArthur, who had fostered an image of untarnished success for his administration of Japan, was greatly ranked by the Newsweek article. He wrote his closest political confidant that the "Newsweek smear" was "apparently another link in the campaign which is being so assiduously pressed in the east to discredit me."28 The General prepared an immediate rebuttal in which he took full responsibility for the economic purge and denied any rivalries within SCAP. He charged that Newsweek had attacked the basic concept of the occupation which was the elimination of nationalism and aggression from all aspects of Japanese society, and added that it was "fantastic" that the purge would be interpreted as "theoretical experts in limited phases but otherwise ... immature, untrained for local conditions, blindly unconscious of their tremendous power, and unconcerned over the practical consequences." Calling for a Congressional investigation of why American capitalist principles were being undermined by the Occupation, Newsweek concluded its broadside with the lament of one of Pakenham’s Japanese business informants. "We can’t understand why, when America could have all Japan working in its own interest, it is now engaged in wrecking the country so as to leave it as an eventual prize to the Russians."27

ECONOMIC CRISIS AND THE COLD WAR

As SCAP pushed forward with the FEC-230 program, the continued inflationary spiral of the economy in 1947 undercut its essential aim of limiting excessive concentrations of economic power. "The main internal force for inflation," according to one former Occupation economist and Pentagon consultant, "came ... from big business (Zaibatsu) firms which had had war contracts with the Japanese Government. Without substantial inflation most of Japan’s war contracting companies and the banks which financed them would have failed like Confederate companies and banks after our own Civil War."29 If the Zaibatsu were the main force behind the inflation, the economic policies of successive ultra-conservative Japanese governments, all with close ties to the financial and industrial elite, encouraged the inflation from which members of the Zaibatsu were reaping profits and by which they were able to subvert the intent of the dissolution program.30

Certainly that was the view of the majority of Japanese who suffered enormously from the shortage of goods, black market prices, and plummeting real incomes. The Japanese people blamed the Yoshida government, CBS correspondent William Costello reported in February 1947, for "permitting the sale of vast quantities [of rice] at black market prices. They blame the government for not controlling the distribution of lumber, cement, steel, charcoal, fish and hundreds of other critical items."31 One American missionary wrote home that "If prices keep on rising everyone except the blackmarketeers will be bankrupt... Teacher’s salaries remain constant at practically the prewar level. Several have told me they couldn’t subsist if they didn’t sell their belongings one after the other."32

Workers responded to the deteriorating living standards with militant, and left-wing organized, trade union struggles. In one of the most dramatic episodes of the Occupation, railroad, post office, and other governmental employees, backed by the Social Democratic Party, called for a general strike, which could have involved up to four million unionists for February 1, 1947. Only General MacArthur’s last-minute order to the union leaders to cancel the strike rescued the Yoshida government from a direct confrontation with the Japanese working class.33 The incident also pointed up the paradoxical nature of MacArthur’s defense of the Zaibatsu dissolution program. He intervened on behalf of a government that attempted to undermine the program and failed to strengthen those forces upon which its success was predicated. Critical as he remained of Japanese monopoly capitalism, MacArthur feared a socialist alternative even more. The model of competitive capitalism envisioned in FEC-230, if somewhat quixotic to begin with, became increasingly irrelevant to the realities of Japan in 1947.

The social and economic instability in Japan also aggravated American hopes for making Japan self-supporting. A SCAP report on Japan’s trade position in the fall of 1947 showed that, during the period from September 1945 through September 1947 95.7 percent of Japan’s imports came from the United States yet only 38.2 percent of its exports went to the American market. By covering Japan’s food, fertilizer, petroleum, medical, and other basic requirements, Japan’s trade deficit to the United States for the period amounted to $563 million, financed largely by Congressional appropriations. These growing dollar “advances” had the effect of making Japan a hard currency area and resulted in a contraction of Japanese exports in the sterling bloc nations of Asia. As it became increasingly clear that Japan would not be

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able to regain its export markets in the United States and that Congress would be loath to bear the burden of indefinitely financing Japan’s trade deficits and other Occupation costs. Washington policy makers argued that the key to self-support for Japan lay in overcoming the profound obstacles to Japanese trade in Asia. But without an effective program of economic stabilization for controlling inflation, particularly in the vital export sector, the outlook for the future of Japan, internally and in Asia, appeared highly discouraging.

As a tentative first step toward solving these complex problems Secretary of Commerce Averill Harriman suggested in December 1946 that an “economic cabinet” of five prominent American businessmen be sent to Tokyo. He regarded their mission as urgent to world stability and, no doubt, was surprised when General MacArthur vetoed the whole project. Equally important, Assistant Secretary of War Howard C. Petersen emphasized the next month the need to make unilateral decisions on the Japanese economy. He feared that the fiscally conservative, Republican controlled 80th Congress would not permit the continuation of the growing costs of the Occupation and that unless a new program for Japan was developed quickly, there was a real danger of a precipitous American withdrawal from Japan.

Modification of Edwin Pauley’s reparations program became the first focus around which the War Department developed a new policy for Japan. Throughout 1946 General MacArthur and powerful American and Japanese business interests had called for a scaling down of the removals of surplus industrial capacity called for in the Pauley Report. Such heavy removals would add to the costs of the Occupation and were creating a climate of economic uncertainty harmful to economic recovery, they argued. In requesting a review of the whole reparations program in January 1947, Assistant Secretary Petersen noted, too, that the inability of the Japanese to recapture dollar markets in silks and other textiles had undercut an essential principle of the Pauley program, namely that Japan was expected to be self-supporting. Therefore, Petersen suggested, not only would the level of industry after removals have to be revised, but the selection of which plants to be removed would have to be changed too.

As the first report of the Special Committee on Japanese Reparations headed by Clifford Strike made clear in April 1947, what had been classified in the Pauley Report as “Japanese Industrial War Potential”—iron and steel, shipbuilding, oil refining, synthetic rubber and others—henceforth would be regarded as necessary for the reconstruction of the Japanese economy.

The decision to abandon the Pauley’s reparations program during the spring of 1947 also reflected, in a negative way, a new strategic view of Japan held by Washington policy makers. Pauley’s recommendations were premised on a Japan with sufficient industrial capacity to be self-supporting, but not enough to dominate the Asiatic economy. It was generally understood that such a program allowed the United States to mobilize Japanese resources to assist the Chinese Nationalists in their civil war against the Communists. But upon the return of General George C. Marshall in January 1947 from his futile mission to rescue Chiang Kai-shek in a coalition government, American officials began to shift the fulcrum of Far Eastern policy from China to a reconstructed Japan. “The deterioration of the situation in China,” recalled George F. Kennan of the State Department Policy Planning Staff, “heighten[ed] greatly the importance of what might now happen in Japan. Japan as we saw it was more important than China as a potential factor in world political developments. It was . . . the sole great potential military-industrial arsenal of the Far East.” Dean Acheson, Assistant Secretary of State, provided the enduring imagery for the long-range outlook that lay behind the review of the reparations question. In his famous speech of May 8, 1947, Acheson labelled Germany and Japan as the “workshops of Europe and Asia” and asserted that the United States was “prepared to take up the reconstruction of Japan and Germany independently without waiting for an agreement of the four Great Powers.”

For all of the manifest importance of reparations matters, the striking feature of American policy in Japan during 1947 was the failure to revise the original reform programs in light of the stated paramount objective of a reconstructed Japan as the dominant industrial power in Asia. Preoccupied with European affairs and reluctant to challenge General MacArthur’s nearly sovereign authority over the Occupation, Washington was apparently confident that SCAP understood the significance of the reconstruction program and would adjust the reform efforts accordingly. Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal, for example, congratulated MacArthur on his startling March 17 call for a speedy conclusion of a peace treaty with Japan. That pronouncement was based on the assumption that the bulk of the reform projects had been successfully completed and was initiated primarily to spur the end of the Allied “economic blockade” and restore Japan’s economy to self-sufficiency. Though the State and War Departments were gravely distressed by the diplomatic and military aspects of MacArthur’s peace treaty proposal, they, too, found the economic deterioration of Japan alarming and encouraged Occupation efforts to enlarge cotton spinning capacity for exports, restore the rayon industry, and reestablish private commercial relations. At the same time, however, directives for the dissolution of the Zaibatsu, decentralization of the police, land reform and so on remained in effect. MacArthur proceeded to implement them even though the premises on which these programs rested had been sharply revised.

The intervention of the American business community in the Zaibatsu dissolution program was the catalyst for the development of “reverse course” guidelines for Japan and for bringing SCAP into line with the new policies. Just as the
American public was losing interest in Japan, satisfied that MacArthur had affairs firmly in hand, powerful elements of the American business community grew restive. Norbert A. Bogden, vice-president of the J. Henry Schroeder Bank and former Finance Advisor to SCAP, wrote MacArthur in September 1946 that in numerous discussions with American businessmen he found them "disappointed that they cannot go to Japan to resume private trade or look over their property, particularly as they are now allowed to do so in Germany." Disgruntled executives at the National Foreign Trade Convention in the fall of 1946 heard John Carter Vincent, Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs of the State Department, explain that conditions throughout the entire Far East made a return of American business there "to state it mildly, uninviting." An inflated and unstable currency, inadequate transportation and communication, and the uncertainty over reparations were the most pressing problems that had to be solved in Japan before Americans could resume profitable trade and investment.

Once the grand objective of making Japan the workshop of Asia was announced, the prewar American investment community became even more active in pressuring for fundamental changes in Occupation policies. They called for an end to the entire reparations' program, attacked the contemplated arrangement for the resumption of private foreign trade as unworkable, and asserted that the purge of Japanese businessmen made the revival of Japanese industry impossible. They also denounced the narrow, selfish opposition to a reconstruction program in Japan by the ceramics, textile, and West coast fishing interests which had suffered from Japanese competition before the war. But most importantly, they hired attorney James Lee Kauffman to go to Japan in August 1947 to provide them with badly needed first-hand advice on the business climate there.

Kauffman's credentials for his assignment were impeccable. A cum laude graduate of Harvard Law School and editor of the Harvard Law Review, Kauffman worked in Japan from 1914 to 1926 as senior partner in the Tokyo law firm of Melvor, Kauffman, Smith and Yamamoto. He continued to practice in Japan off and on until the Japanese government in 1938 banished American lawyers. He also established a coordinate law office in New York. According to Kauffman, his Japanese firm "represented practically all of the American business interests there .... Among our clients were the National City Bank, Dillon, Read & Company, Ford Motor Company, Corn Products Refining Company, General Electric Company, Libbey-Owens-Ford Glass Company, National Cash Register, Standard Vacuum (sic) Oil Company, Otis Elevator, Radio Corporation of America, Westinghouse International Company, and Western Electric Company." In addition, Kauffman's firm represented individual Americans in Japan, marketed large bond issues in Japan and the United States for Japanese companies, and represented several European corporate giants. Kauffman himself at one time was chief executive officer of a major construction company that built three of the largest office buildings in Tokyo and had contracts in Manchuria.

Neither during nor after the war did Kauffman relinquish his interest in Japan. At the State Department's request he lectured at several Civil Affairs Training schools and helped train Army lawyers for Occupation duty in Japan. His law firm in Tokyo was placed under the direction of his Japanese law partner, a former student of his at Tokyo University Law School. Kauffman was also one of the five men recommended by President Truman's high-powered Business Advisory Council to the abortive "economic cabinet" for General MacArthur. The principal purpose of Kauffman's three-week visit in Japan at the end of the summer of 1947 was to prepare a report for his corporate clients "for use in determining what course they should pursue in connection with their Japanese investments." Somehow Kauffman learned of the confidential FEC-230 document on Zaibatsu dissolution and obtained a copy of it through an unnamed contact in Government Section. As his 31-page "Report on Conditions in Japan as of September 6, 1947" indicates, Kauffman was shocked by both what he learned had already taken place and what was about to occur. Though made in a private capacity for his clients, the report immediately found its way to the highest Washington policy makers as well as to Congressmen, appeared in a foreshortened and watered-down version in Newsweek, and circulated through SCAP and the Japanese Finance Ministry. The Kauffman report and its impact deserve careful attention, for it proved to be one of the most decisive documents in Japan's "reverse course."

"So long as present conditions continue in Japan," Kauffman warned America's most powerful corporate executives, "I believe it inadvisable to make any investment in that country." In a rather disorganized and crude fashion, Kauffman set out the reasons for such an alarming conclusion. SCAP, he claimed, was imposing an economic doctrine on Japan most closely approaching the "socialistic ideal," one that would lead to economic collapse "much to the delight of several hundred Russians ... attached to the Soviet Embassy in Tokyo." For SCAP proposed "to distribute the wealth of Japan to the workers, farmers and small traders through the medium of taxes, sales of valuable properties at nominal values, financial assistance and regulation." Kauffman cited and criticized specific provisions of the confidential FEC-230 document he had mysteriously obtained to illustrate his point. The disposal of Zaibatsu property to desirable purchasers even if at a fraction of its real value would permit "an administrative official with a donative turn of mind [to] give away much of the wealth of Japan." FEC-230 even went beyond the liquidation of the top Zaibatsu holding companies to those combines regarded as a threat to competitive enterprise. Under such a broad definition of excessive concentration of economic power "all business is to come under the knife of the economic quack ... [and] split into as many small units as some gentleman sitting in Tokyo may deem appropriate." One of the steps for accomplishing this breakup was of particular interest to American investors. FEC-230 directed Japanese companies licensing foreign patents to cease using the license if the foreign patent holder would not agree to renegotiation of the license with the dissolved Japanese firms. In short, what FEC-230 proposed

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was "good old socialism masquerading as economic democracy." 

Kauffman next reviewed the series of laws since October 1946 which the Japanese government had passed to implement FEC-230. The most important affecting industry was the Anti-Monopoly Law of April 1947. Incorporating many of the features of the American anti-trust legislation, this Japanese law prohibited trusts, international cartels, interlocking corporate controls, agreements "in restraint of trade," and other arrangements towards monopolies and created a Fair Trade Commission to insure a "free market" economy. For a critique of the Anti-Monopoly Law, Kauffman quoted approvingly from the Oriental Economist edited by former Finance Minister Tanzan Ishibashi, who was purged in March 1947 for having written two or three articles during the war praising fascism. Ishibashi also had made disdainful remarks about the professional competence of the Occupation's economic planners and SCAP believed his economic policies had generated inflation and unrest. Under the Anti-Monopoly Law, wrote Ishibashi, there would be no room in Japan "for such giants as the AT&T or U.S. Steel, nor for 'cornering' of a company's stocks by any person with sufficient financial backing, nor yet for interlocking directorates of unlimited scope and complexity as in the United States. The Japanese Act is undoubtedly many steps ahead of the present American legislation." Kauffman warned American investors that, despite denials from Edward Welsh, head of the Anti-Trust and Cartel Division of ESS, a former Office of Price Administration official and the butt of criticism throughout the report, the Anti-Monopoly Law was applicable to all foreign corporations in business activities in Japan.

The Zaibatsu dissolution program, Kauffman fully understood, was formulated as part of broader policy toward the whole of the Japanese business system. Labor and agriculture were close adjuncts of that system and measures concerning them were tied directly to the order to dissolve the combines. Labor especially was to be a beneficiary of the combine dissolution program and at the same time its indispensable auxiliary. A strong labor movement would knock out one of the main props of the Zaibatsu system and increase the ability of workers to protect themselves in the projected democratized economy. That Kauffman used some of his strongest language in attacking Occupation measures designed to improve the conditions of labor is not surprising. The most progressive of these laws, the Labor Standards Law of 1947, set the minimum standards for working hours, vacations, safety and sanitation safeguards, sick leaves, accident compensation, restrictions on women, child labor, and other matters.

Many of the provisions of the Labor Act are good but these benefits were thrust on Japanese Labor which was unequipped by experience either to understand many of them or to know how to use them. If you have ever seen an American Indian spending his money shortly after oil has been discovered on his property you will have some idea of how the Japanese worker is using the labor law. At present the labor situation in Japan is chaotic. The country is in desperate need of coal and yet the miners even at double time refuse to work overtime because they claim that working overtime is undemocratic. The miners work until they have made what they consider enough for the support of their families and themselves and then take the rest of the month off. Throughout industry strikes of all kinds are prevalent. The largest union is that modeled on C.I.O. lines... [and] which is the most radical in Japan and in which the leaders are mostly Communists... Many of the labor contracts go far beyond such agreements in this country. The agreement between the Japanese company in which a well known American Company had a controlling interest and the company union, in addition to the usual provisions for a closed shop, hours... etc., states that part of the profits (not stating what part) shall be paid to the union, and the election and removal of directors, inspectors and advisors of the company may be had only after consulting with the union.

Kauffman emphasized that the low productivity and radicalism of the Japanese working class in 1947 was not typical of Japanese labor. Rather, he blamed the policies pursued so vigorously by SCAP labor experts.

While Japanese labor... has gone hog wild for the present, it doesn't seem to me that the situation is hopeless. What has happened is what anyone with a knowledge of Japan would have anticipated when Mr. Cohen [Theodore Cohen, former chief of Labor Division of ESS] and his cohorts began dispersing benefits which the Japanese workers were unequipped to accept and handle. These workers are in many respects like children and have to be treated as such. You can imagine what would happen in a family of children of ten years or less if they were suddenly told that all restraints were off and that they could run the house and their own lives as they pleased. The Japanese workers are still the most law abiding, intelligent and industrious laborers in the Orient... As consumer goods become more available and inflation is checked, Japanese laborers will again work hard and efficiently under fair contracts for reasonable wages.

The principal measures taken by SCAP under the FEC-230 program at the time of Kauffman's visit were directed at the dissolution of Zaibatsu holding companies and the breakup of the ownership and management interlocks between the "subsidiaries" that remained. Many of these operating subsidiaries, however, were industrial, commercial, and financial empires in their own right. The trading subsidiary of the Mitsubishi complex, Mitsubishi Bussan, handled as much as 22 percent of Japan's total imports and close to that percentage of its exports. Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, a subsidiary of the Mitsubishi combine, from 1937 to 1946 accounted for more than a fifth of the physical volume of Japan's merchant and naval shipbuilding, ordnance output, and ship repair, and for nearly a fifth of its aircraft assembly. To the proponents of FEC-230 and its broad objective of establishing a competitive capitalism in Japan, it was simply assumed that such mammoth subsidiaries, comprised normally of unrelated
Kauffman concluded his report with several major recommendations, written more for Washington policy makers than his clients. “First, put an end to the economic experiment being conducted in Japan, and second, replace the theorists now there with men of ability and experience. . . . Such a modification in policy must be followed shortly by a withdrawal of the military forces and repatriation of thousands of highly paid American bureaucrats, lawyers, former members or employees of bureaus in Washington, clerks and secretaries.” These changes would in short order make Japan “self supporting, establish her once again as a country attractive to American industry and capital, insure the success of the Occupation, and over and above all give us a Far Eastern bastion.”

WASHINGTON’S RESPONSE TO THE KAUFFMAN REPORT

The impact of the Kauffman report on American policy makers was staggering. Through one of Kauffman’s clients, copies were handed to Secretary of Defense James Forrestal, Secretary of the Army Kenneth Royall, Under Secretary of State Robert Lovett, Secretary of Commerce Averill Harriman, and Admiral Sidney Souers, executive secretary of the National Security Council (NSC). The newly appointed Under Secretary of the Army, General William Draper, a vice-president on leave from Dillon, Read, was immediately dispatched to Japan. That he “confirmed the accuracy of the [Kauffman] report to Secretary Forrestal” was not surprising, for as chief economic adviser to General Lucius D. Clay, Draper had fundamentally opposed the reorganization of German combines and was correctly regarded at the time as largely responsible for the reversal of the decartelization program there.

Following Draper’s return, Washington policy makers moved rapidly to gain firmer control over the Occupation. Secretary of the Army Royall sent General MacArthur a memorandum, accompanied by a personal plea, to delay adoption of the deconcentration measure then being debated in the Japanese Diet. Draper himself, according to Newsweek, “warned the State Department that the application of the directive [FEC-230] would make Japan a permanent ward of the United States.” Defense Secretary Forrestal, a conservative Democrat who was keenly suspicious of New Deal reformers and regulators, anxiously inquired of Royall, “Are we taking any steps to modify the OPA-ing [i.e., regulation] of Japanese Economics?”

General MacArthur aroused Washington’s worst fears by his response to the pleas for delay and revision of the deconcentration measure. In a ten-page radiogram of October 24, he defended the statute as vitally necessary to the completion of the Zaibatsu dissolution program. Quoting liberally from SWNCC, JCS, and FEC documents, MacArthur reviewed the historical background of the attack on excessive concentrations of economic power in order to demonstrate that it was fundamental to the achievement of the basic Occupation objective of a democratized and peaceful Japan. “A radical change in pace or direction [in the dissolution program] at this time,” he warned, “would not only be extraordinarily embarrassing, but what is infinitely more important, it would introduce doubt and confusion into the program, delay and perhaps defeat its accomplishment and
play into the hands of those who have been bitterly opposed to it." 62

Opposition to the dissolution program, MacArthur argued, came from two main sources. First were those with vested interests in the "private collectivism" of the Japanese economy who stood to lose personal fortunes and business positions. Then there were the socialists and communists who feared that widespread ownership of industry and trade would erect a bulwark against the transition to a socialist state. Involved in the success or failure of the deconcentration of the economy was the "choice between a system of free private competitive enterprise . . . and a Socialism of one kind or another. State socialism, openly at least, retains lip service to the good of the common man, for the instruments of production are owned by the state ostensibly for the benefit of all the people, but even this fiction was not observed in Japan . . . for here the economy was in the grip of a system of private socialism largely owned and operated by and for the benefit of only 10 family clans." That his position not be misconstrued as radical, MacArthur reminded Washington that, unlike the Russians, he favored just compensation over confiscation of Zaibatsu properties and that, with the possible exception of England, "all the powers in Japan have been desirous of going much further in the reformation of the Japanese economy than US policy envisages." 63

In light of the Kauffman report, MacArthur's unequivocal support for the whole FEC-230 program convinced Washington policy makers of the dire need for immediate, top-priority consideration of Japanese policy. Secretary of Defense James Forrestal took the lead in sounding the general alarm. He regarded Japan as a nucleus of stability in the Far East and an anti-Soviet and anticommunist bulwark. In the early years of the Occupation he hoped to avoid there "a vacuum of power into which influences other than ours are bound to be attracted as much by internal suctions as by external pressures." 64 Until the Kauffman report and the October 24 cable from SCAP, Forrestal assumed that the best means to achieve that aim was to give General MacArthur a free hand in Japan. But on October 31 Forrestal recorded in his diary that at a luncheon meeting with Admiral Souers, Secretary Royall, and George F. Kennan of the State Department Policy Planning Staff discussion focused on FEC-230 and its meaning for American policy in the Far East. Kennan, whose staff had been making a full-scale review of Japanese policy since the end of August, argued that FEC-230 would lead to "a period of economic disaster, inflation, unbalanced budgets, resulting in near anarchy, which would be precisely what the Communists want." Reflecting his close reading of Kauffman's report, Forrestal emphasized that the most vicious feature of FEC-230 was the regulation that large businesses be sold to small buyers "not on the basis of their worth but on the basis of what the buyer could afford to pay, with the result that a fifteen-thousand dollar plant might be sold for seven-fifty. Another equally vicious feature is a provision by which labor unions are to elect the boards of directors and control management." 65 The next day Forrestal sent a memorandum to Secretary Royall calling for the formulation of a new general policy for the reconstruction of the Japanese economy. "I think we should do everything possible to get the State Department to reexamine its economic policy on Japan. The program as outlined in that letter [by James Lee Kauffman] and as subsequently verified by you, indicates a degree of socialization in Japan which would make it totally impossible for the country's economy to function if it were put on its own . . ." Forrestal requested Royall to have a report prepared on the "extent the socialization program has been completed, and what steps we are taking to change course." Economic affairs in Japan, he concluded, were a matter of the highest priority. "In my opinion it has a very direct bearing on the future security of this country." 66

The new Assistant Secretary of War, Gordon Gray, who was assigned the task of evaluating the dissolution program, believed that there could be little disagreement with SCAP's success in breaking up the control of the Japanese economy by the 10 major Zaibatsu families through the liquidation of their powerful holding companies. "The problem," he explained in his November 14, 1947 memorandum to Royall, "is how far down the scale we wish to go in breaking up Zaibatsu operating companies, and industrial and financial enterprises which were not necessarily evil concentrations." After a section by section analysis of the Deconcentration bill Gray concluded that it involved a "leveling process" of such extremes that economic recovery and stability would be hampered and would turn Japan into a "shopkeeper's economy." Gray recommended that "competent consultants" be sent to Japan to ascertain whether further "leveling of the Japanese structure is desirable." 67

Under Secretary of State Robert A. Lovett, a Republican Wall Street banker with considerable influence on General Marshall and State Department policies, agreed with Gray's report. But he also thought that the basic problem was less the need to clarify policy on the dissolution program than the Army's inability to get MacArthur to carry out its directives on the matter. He suggested to the receptive Under Secretary of War, William Draper, that Henry Stimson, ailing and aged but still with enormous prestige, be shown the key documents in the FEC-230 controversy. If the former Secretary of War judged (as Lovett was sure he would) that the deconcentration measure was "not truly representative of America's purpose," then two other elder statesmen, such as Owen D. Young and Bernard Baruch, might be called upon to lay down a plan of action and choose someone of great power to be sent to Tokyo to bring MacArthur in line with American policy. 68

Though he firmly refused pleas by Lovett and Royall to organize any committee on Japanese economic policy, Stimson added his voice to the growing consensus that the deconcentration measure was detrimental to America's global aims. It went beyond the Occupation's original purpose and "further into the regimentation of industry and business than we have done in the United States," Stimson claimed in a letter to President Truman and his top cabinet advisors. In addition deconcentration of industry would handicap Japan's "power and speed of recuperation and postpone the time
when she may become self-sustaining . . . We are there for the primary purpose of our future self-protection against possible aggression. We are not there to create an ideal state." In short, Stimson reiterated the outlines of a draft statement of American policy toward economic recovery of Japan included in his packet of FEC-230 documents. Under SCAP supervision the Japanese would develop plans to put their economy on a self-sustaining basis at the earliest possible time; existing directives to SCAP, such as those concerning the reform of the Japanese business structure, henceforth were to "be interpreted and implemented by the appropriate shift of emphasis so as to facilitate the early revival of the Japanese economy." 70

THE FINAL SHOWDOWN WITH MACARTHUR

Whether with tacit or explicit permission from Washington officials, a slashing Newsweek article on December 1, 1947, was the opening shot in what proved to be a four-month-long campaign to remove SCAP as the only defender of the original Zaibatsu dissolution program. The article featured excerpts from the still-classified FEC-230 document and a portion of Kauffman's report under the caption "A Lawyer's Report on Japan Attacks Plan to Run Occupation . . . Far to the Left of Anything Now Tolerated in America." The article also stated that FEC-230 had been withdrawn from the Far Eastern Commission, ostensibly for redrafting, and that its application in Japan had been ordered suspended.71

Published at a critical moment in the deliberations of the Japanese Diet on the Deconcentration bill, the Newsweek article encouraged Japanese businessmen and members of the upper House to stall consideration of the bill until the end of the Diet session on December 8. MacArthur was placed in the awkward position of having to choose between a reversal of his long-standing commitment to the passage of the deconcentration measure and defiance of the order suspending any action on FEC-230. Washington worked out a hurried solution to the impasse. One or two days before the close of the Diet, MacArthur received a joint State Department and War Department telegram authorizing the passage of the deconcentration measure with the crucial proviso that SCAP submit for review by Washington the standards by which excessive concentrations were to be designated under the law.72 In a hectic all night session of the Diet, with the clock set back at midnight and behind-the-scenes pressure from SCAP evident everywhere, both houses gave final approval to the already infamous Deconcentration Law.73

The passage of the Deconcentration Law did not end the controversy over it (or over FEC-230 of which it was a part). The struggle now shifted to how the law would be administered. Given the compromise reached before passage of the bill, the War Department believed that it was in a position to "see to it that wisdom and moderation rather than economic theorizing" guided SCAP in setting deconcentration standards and in enforcing the law.74 Its hand was further strengthened by a Senate debate touched off on December 17 by William F. Knowland of California. Knowland, already a leading Republican critic of the Truman Administration's China policies, requested that the State Department make available a complete copy of the FEC-230 document. (Actually Knowland had already obtained a copy of FEC-230 from Harry Kern of Newsweek.)75 After a review of various aspects of the Zaibatsu dissolution program, along the lines of the Kauffman report, Knowland called for a full scale investigation of American policy in Japan. If "some of the doctrine set forth in FEC-230 had been proposed by the government of the USSR or even by the Labor Government of Great Britain, I could have understood it," declared Knowland. "It was unbelievable to me that such a document could be put forward as representing the Government of which I am a part."76 Though Knowland only attacked the Far Eastern Commission, the State Department and the New Dealers in the SCAP bureaucracy, the effect, no doubt intended, was to help the War Department officials in their campaign against MacArthur. They wanted the General to immediately scrap the existing deconcentration standards which (as described by Kern in Newsweek) "would atomize the Japanese business structure as effectively as the famous bomb destroyed Hiroshima."77

Concurrently, administration figures began their public effort to impress on MacArthur the importance of reversing the direction of SCAP's economic policies. Major General Frank R. McCoy, American chairman of the Far Eastern Commission, was quoted by Senator Knowland as stating that the FEC-230 program was "undergoing extensive review . . . to determine to what extent the policy should be modified." Secretary Royall, in a major speech in San Francisco on January 6, 1948, noted the new conditions in world politics, the increasing costs of the Occupation, the need for political stability and a self-supporting economy. "We are not averse to modifying programs," Royall concluded in reference to FEC-230, "in the interest of our broad objectives . . . ." Robert A. Lovett leaked to the press that the United States was "restudying the whole picture of Zaibatsu matters in Japan with a view to revising its attitude."78 Of course, the whole dissolution program was no longer open for discussion.

Incredibly, as the Senate and public debate grew more heated during January and February of 1948, MacArthur stoutly and repeatedly defended the dissolution program against its critics. He claimed that since there had been no change in the initial directive, SCAP would implement the Deconcentration Law under existing standards. In a letter to Senator Brien McMahon read on the Senate floor, MacArthur emphasized that the Occupation's effort to replace a system of feudalism by one of free competitive enterprise was necessary to avoid "a blood bath of revolutionary violence. The Japanese people, you may be sure, fully understand the nature of the forces which have so ruthlessly exploited them in the past. They understand this economic concentration not only furnished the sinews for mounting the violence of war but that its leaders in partnership with the military shaped the national will in the direction of war and conquest."79 By 1948 such pronouncements, no matter how insightful, were regarded in Washington as dangerous anachronisms.

Convinced that there existed a "definite smear campaign" against him by someone out to undercut his
reported criticisms which had been made of policies adopted • what he mistakenly believed to be the most vulnerable of his presidential bid and that the "slightest slip" on his part would party," MacArthur launched a futile counter-attack against Newsweek's Tokyo bureau, took a leave in August 1947 and when he prepared to return to Japan early in January 1948, SCAP refused to re-accredit him. Newsweek protested to the Army Department and was informed that MacArthur felt that Pakenham's association with "reactionary Japanese" and his "marked antipathy" to Occupation policies made it inadvisable to admit him back to Japan. In obvious reference to the FEC-230 controversy, Newsweek then cabled MacArthur that "we are forced to conclude your decision is motivated by the fact that articles published in Newsweek reported criticisms which had been made of policies adopted by your command." In his reply MacArthur denied that his action against Pakenham was motivated by Newsweek's editorial policy and refused to lift the ban on Pakenham. Newsweek then published its correspondence with MacArthur, including a sharp rebuttal from Pakenham, and took its case directly to Secretary of Defense Forrestal. Meanwhile the Tokyo Correspondents' Club, composed of all foreign correspondents in Japan, had joined in the fray, seeing an opportunity to make public the constant harassment, intimidation, and censorship imposed on the press by SCAP. After two months of wide publicity of the affair (which proved extremely embarrassing to MacArthur's presidential primary campaign in Wisconsin), Secretary Royall upheld Newsweek's stand by announcing that henceforth unfavorable press criticism of Army policies or personnel would not be considered a basis for disaccreditation of newsmen in Occupied areas. Pakenham quietly returned to Tokyo in March 1948, apparently in exchange for Newsweek's agreement to make no further mention of the episode.80

In the midst of the Pakenham controversy, MacArthur did attempt to assuage the critics of his handling of the Zaibatsu dissolution program by suggesting the creation of a five-man board of American experts, the Deconcentration Review Board, which would determine whether the plans of reorganization under the Deconcentration Law would interfere with the primary goal of economic reconstruction in Japan. But announcements from Tokyo in February of the designation as "excessive concentrations of economic power" of 325 industrial companies, influencing or controlling almost 75 percent of all Japanese industry, clearly indicated that MacArthur had not understood Washington's desire to completely emasculate the dissolution program. If he had, MacArthur would not have permitted the naming of such a large number of companies as excessive concentrations, for the subsequent cancellation of these designations could not help but be embarrassing.81

The stubborn resistance of MacArthur's headquarters to pleas by the administration for a reversal of the dissolution program prompted two high-level missions to Japan in March 1948. George F. Kennan became the first important State Department official to visit Japan since the war. In a long and cordial conversation with MacArthur, Kennan claims he was able to persuade the General that he should not be concerned about world reaction to unilateral changes in American policy in Japan or feel himself bound by views the United States had expressed at earlier dates with a view to implementing the terms of surrender. Those initial directives for Japan, Kennan explained, were based on "unreal hopes for great power collaboration in the postwar period." The concept behind the FEC-230 program, for example, bore "so close a resemblance to Soviet views about the evils of 'capitalist monopolies' that the measures themselves could only have been eminently agreeable to anyone interested in the further communization of Japan." While in Japan, Kennan also criticized the continuation of the purge, land reform, reparations, and the decentralization of the police. In general, Kennan pressed on MacArthur (successfully by his own account) the views he had argued in Washington since the summer of 1947 and which he claimed met with wide, indeed almost complete, acceptance. "The regime of control by SCAP over the Japanese government should be relaxed. No further reform legislation should be pressed. The emphasis should shift from reform to economic recovery."82 Kennan did not record in his memoirs that in addition to recommendations to make Japan strong economically he thought the time was right to "go ahead and organize a Japanese army which ... might force the Russians to join us in a peace treaty."83

To further underscore changed American policy and reorient SCAP on the dissolution and other economic programs, William F. Draper returned to Japan early in March 1948 as head of an impressive mission of big business representatives. The group included such notables as Percy H. Johnstone, chairman of Chemical Bank and Trust Company, Paul G. Hoffmann, formerly president of Studebaker and administrator of the Marshall Plan, and Robert F. Loree, chairman of the National Foreign Trade Council, and formerly vice-president of the Morgan Guaranty Trust Co. Publicly and privately members of the Draper Mission stated that the reform phase of the Occupation had essentially ended and the first need of Japan was economic recovery. Though reparations and Japan's economic relations with the rest of Asia were their principal concerns, members of the Draper Mission made it evident that to break up the Zaibatsu firms would hamper their broad policy objectives. Even before the release of the Draper Mission's report on April 26, 1948, almost everyone in SCAP and in Japanese business circles knew that the Deconcentration Law, the economic purge, and other measures connected with FEC-230 were dead letters. "Before the visit of the [Draper] mission most of the 325 companies designated for reorganization were resigned to cutting their enterprises into a number of companies," reported the New York Times. "Mr. Draper's emphasis upon industrial rehabilitation, however, gave them the hope that they would not be obliged to go to extremes."84 Such hope was not misplaced. The Deconcentration Review Board whittled down the number of corporations to be dissolved from 325 to 30, then to 19, and finally, by December 1948, when only 9 corporations had been dissolved, SCAP announced the satisfactory completion of the program.85 Moreover, no one in Japan thought that the change in policy
was to be confined to business and reparations. The new policy, explicitly or implicitly, meant the removal of all restraints imposed by the Occupation in the name of reform, especially in the areas of labor, police, and the military. The settlement of the FEC-230 controversy resolved the ambiguities of early American Occupation policy in favor of reaction.

THE AFTERMATH

The reverberations from the FEC-230 controversy lasted for the remainder of the American Occupation in Japan. Neither the American business community nor Washington policy-makers allowed MacArthur the freedom of action he had enjoyed before March 1948. Spearheading the efforts of the American business community to give direction to the new policies was the American Council on Japan, headquartered in James Lee Kauffman’s law offices and organized mainly by Harry Kern. Former Under Secretaries of State Joseph C. Grew and William R. Castle were named honorary co-chairmen. Other members of the Council included Joseph Ballentine, former head of the Far Eastern Division of the State Department, Eugene Dooman, Ambassador Grew’s counsellor in Tokyo and head of the Far Eastern subcommittee of SWNCC during the war, retired Admiral Thomas C. Hart, and Compton Pakenham of Newsweek. The Council reflected the views of the once-discredited, but now ascendant “Japan Crowd” for a conservative Japan, reintegrated into the world economy and favorable to American investors and traders. In practice, Kauffman, Kern, and Dooman, the chief work-horses of the Council, embarked on a quiet lobbying campaign for a host of economic and political measures to solve “those problems that must be solved if victory is to be assured.”

After the FEC-230 controversy Washington reduced SCAP’s involvement in economic affairs in Japan to a minimum. A procession of advisers and consultants was regularly sent to Tokyo to oversee the implementation of highly technical matters of foreign exchange, tax policy, currency, export and import controls, and the Japanese government’s budget. In broad terms these measures were designed to create an economically strong Japan in Asia, incorporating the various features of Kennan’s recommendations and those of the Draper Mission. The National Security Council in November 1948 approved NSC 13/2 which formalized and hastened these developments in the context of containing China, finding substitute markets and raw materials for Japan in Southeast Asia, and laying the basis for a military-industrial economy. Joseph Dodge, conservative president of the Detroit Bank, was appointed Financial Advisor to SCAP with the rank of Ambassador. Dodge was given virtual dictatorial control over the Japanese economy throughout 1949 and 1950, bending to his will the Washington and SCAP bureaucracies and, with considerable more difficulty, the Japanese Government as well.

Once MacArthur had fallen in line with the new program for a reverse course in Japan, the balance of power within SCAP shifted markedly. Government Section, which had initiated the bulk of the reform directives, was reported by one liberal journal to have “gone out of business, purportedly because its mission has been accomplished.” Though certainly an exaggeration, Government Section increasingly lost control of any legislative proposals with fiscal implications to ESS. With MacArthur refusing to intervene on behalf of Government Section, and with the full weight of Dodge’s and other Washington appointees’ authority, General Marquat’s ESS staff enjoyed its new status.

The FEC-230 controversy marked a major turning point in America’s post-war policies in Japan. For a brief period after the surrender, Occupation authorities were intent on preventing the rebirth of a militaristic state, leftwing movements were encouraged, democratic ideas flourished, and a series of notable reforms were initiated. But by early 1947 Japanese workers threatened to shake the very foundations of capitalist society, and the ruling class balked at American directives unsuited to their needs and engaged in programs that caused the costs of the Occupation to soar. The social and economic crisis coincided with the intensification of the Cold War. The image of Japan as a strategic bulwark against the Soviet Union and then China appeared with increasing frequency. Of even greater importance was the American decision to encourage Japan’s reemergence as the “workshop” of Asia. The key to stability in Asia was the economic recovery of Japan under American auspices and United States military assistance to crush overt revolutionary movements in the region. Only at the end of the FEC-230 controversy in March 1948 did the implications for Japan’s internal development of this new international division of labor become fully clear. The Japanese ruling class, freed from the harassment of early Occupation reform measures, quickly consolidated its power, undercut the enormous gains of the trade union movement, purged communists from government offices and private industries, and easily adapted itself to Washington’s goal of reviving Japanese war potential. In short, the reorientation of American policy towards economic recovery in 1947 and 1948 entailed unmistakably reactionary social and political policies that have made much of the history of postwar “democracy” in Japan a hypocrisy.

NOTES


2. Eleanor Hadley, Antitrust in Japan (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970), 6-10. The inclusion of the dissolution directives as part of the initial postwar program for Japan is still a source of...

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controversy. Apparently they were inserted only after Joseph Grew and his associates resigned or were forced out of the State Department in late August 1945. In the deadlocked planning debates over Japanese economic policy, Grew had opposed any program for deconc:enuating controversy. Apparendy they were inserted only after Joseph Grew and Japanese industry. "Communism, and the Marshall Plan" in within it the basis for the later "reverse course."


15. Bisson, Zaibatsu Dissolution, 83-84.

16. Gayn, Japan Diary, 119, 239.

17. Helen Mears, Mirror for America's: Japan (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1948), 78. Gayn, Japan Diary, 341. Gayn remarked that if there were "graduations in extreme conservatism, Whitney was more liberal than Willoughby. Both were dedicated to the defeat of Russia and communism ... Willoughby believes in suppression ... Whitney feels that a small measure of reform might win more allies than the use of night sticks. Each hates the other."


21. New York Times, December 21, 1946. Crane later recalled that he was considered "right" because he believed that "if you wanted to make Japan run, you had to try to make it run with people who were equipped. Therefore, you could not purge all the business managers, all the industrial managers." In as much as Japanese businessmen could not be openly critical of the Occupation's Zaibatsu dissolution program in 1946 and 1947 without fear of being purged, Crane's close identification with these makers of policy in the Times, a valuable source for their views. Once Washington reversed the dissolution program, the problem of sources for business attitudes is less difficult. For example, the Federation of Economic Organizations (FEO) created an Anti-Monopoly Policy Committee in June 1948 headed by Kobayashi Ataru, President of Fukuoku Life Insurance Company and also President of the Federation of Life Insurance Associations. FEO adopted this committee's long list of particulars regarding the revision of the 1947 Anti-Monopoly Law and publicly announced its views. It held informal meetings with government officials who, in turn, submitted the recommendations to SCAP. All but three of the FEO suggestions were incorporated into the draft of revisions prepared by SCAP for adoption by the Japanese Diet. See the interview with Burton Crane, Oral History Collection, Columbia University, New York, and Chitoshi Yanaga, Big Business in Japanese Politics (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), 152-156.


26. Newsweek, January 27, 1947. The link between Newsweek, the American corporate and governmental elite, and the "reverse course" policies for Japan appears to be more than coincidental. Averell Harriman (Secretary of Commerce, 1946-1948, and an influential hard-line Cold Warrior) and his sister, Mary Harriman Rumsey, were key figures in founding Newsweek in 1937 and among its most important financial backers. During 1947 and 1948 E. Roland Harriman, Averill's younger brother and a partner in Brown Brothers, was a member of the Board of Editors. He was, of course, the Killingsworth's close associate and also a co-founder of Newsweek. Vincent Astor, was Chairman of the Board of Newsweek. See Raymond Moley, After Seven Years (New York: Harper and Row, 1939), 278-281, and Who's Who in America 1972-1973, v. 1, 1334-1335.

27. ibid.


28. ibid., February 10, 1947. Newsweek, of course, had the last word and gave space to Pakenham to renew his charges against the Occupation.


By mid-June Miss Hibbard, who taught English at Doshisha Women's College in Kyoto, reported that the food famine had gotten worse. "One of the theological students was so weak he couldn't stand up more than a few minutes at a time." Esther Hibbard to Family, June 15, 1947.


35. Kolkos, The Limits of Power, 323-325. Robert E. Wood, Chairman of the Board of Directors of Sears Roebuck and a longtime friend of MacArthur, was incredulous at the collapse of the Economic Cabinet Plan. "I do know that your economic problem in Japan is the biggest problem you have to solve, and with all your ability and your fine mind you have not the experience to solve it unless you get a satisfactory type advisor. From what I know you haven't a single man there who is top notch . . . Your economic staff is second rate," Robert E. Wood to General Douglas MacArthur, February 20, 1947, Douglas MacArthur Papers, MacArthur Memorial, Norfolk, Virginia.

36. Ibid., 511.

37. Howard C. Petersen to Clifford S. Strike, January 8, 1947, U.S. War Department, Civil Affairs Division (Record Group 165) Modern Military Records Division, National Archives, Washington, D.C.


40. Van Aduur, Japan: From Surrender to Peace, 75, 81. Harry Kern of Newsweek reported that the "workshop" plan for Japan probably meant the revival of Japanese military power as well. "Many an American general in Japan talks of commanding a Japanese army equipped and staffed by Americans . . . A Japanese army backed by the United States could probably take Russian Asia east of Lake Baikal. All Siberia lies within reach of American air forces . . . These nasty strategic facts are the reason Russia never, never will be missed at the Japanese peace conference . . . Opposition is anticipated from the British and the Australians against the announced American policy of restoring Japan as the 'workshop' of Asia." Newsweek, August 4, 1947.


42. Kolkos, Limits of Power, 510-511, 528. The ambiguity of American policy for Japan in the early years of the Occupation makes the problem of periodization enormously difficult. Some historians emphasize the reparations issue or General MacArthur's cancellation of the February 1, 1947 general strike as more important in shaping the "reverse course" than the FEC-230 controversy of the winter of 1947-1948. Even before these important events, numerous progressive journalists and "New Dealers" in SCAP who left or were expelled from Japan noted the rightward trend in American policies. Clearly the controversy so crucial was the way it catalyzed the comprehensive example, implied, but did not in fact lead to such an overall reappraisal, structure or labor laws as a question of implementation rather than of a changing policy in Washington. By contrast, the FEC-230 controversy, introduced in the context of economic chaos and Chinese Nationalist collapse, led to policies that resulted in the "reverse course." For the essence of these policies, imposed upon SCAP, was that any and all democratic reforms of the original postwar plan for Japan were expendable if they undermined the basis for social control of the pro-American capitalist ruling class.


46. James L. Kauffman to Robert L. Eichelberger, May 13, 1949, Eichelberger Papers. This letter is the chief source for the biographical information on Kauffman. Kauffman was writing Eichelberger, then working at the Pentagon on Japanese economic affairs, to secure assistance in reestablishing his law office in Tokyo. General MacArthur refused to allow Kauffman back in Japan because of his role in the FEC-230 controversy. Kauffman finally returned to Japan in 1951 (after MacArthur was relieved of his command) as senior partner of the Mctvor, Kauffman, & Christensen law firm. He died in Tokyo in 1968 at age 82. See obituary in New York Times, June 7, 1968.

47. Ibid.


50. Kawai, Japan's American Interlude, 94, 140.


52. Bisson, Zaibatsu Dissolution, 37-38. See also Kawai, Japan's American Interlude, 163.


54. Bisson, Zaibatsu Dissolution, 11-17, 129.


56. Ibid., 29.

57. Ibid., 31.


59. James Stewart Martin, All Honorable Men (Boston: Little, Brown, 1950), 176-177. Martin, who served in the Decartelization Branch of the Military Government in Germany, recalled that in "one of my first talks with General Draper, I found that the investment banker's view was uppermost. He was fundamentally opposed to the idea that the cartels and combines required immediate reorganization, and was convinced that the 'experienced German management' had to be retained."

60. Newsweek, December 1, 1947. The strategic dimension to the termination of the dissolution program was reported by the Army and Navy Journal of October 4, 1947: "The problem of the future defense of Japan against aggression was discussed by Draper when he visited Tokyo. Since the new Japanese constitution renounces any military establishment, Draper 'assumed' that some defense position must be written into the Japanese peace treaty."

61. James V. Forrestal to Kenneth Royall, October 15, 1947, Forrestal Papers.


63. Ibid.

64. James Forrestal to Douglas MacArthur, April 20, 1946, Forrestal Papers.

65. Millis, ed., The Forrester Diaries, 328-329. See also Frederick S. Dunn, Peace-making and the Settlement with Japan (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963), 59-62, for a summary of the Policy Planning Staff's views on Japan in 1947. That these views closely paralleled those of the "Japan Crowd" was hardly coincidental. Joseph Ballentine, former head of the Far Eastern Division of the State Department and a close associate of Joseph Grew, recalled that Kennan asked him to come down to the State Department from his job at the Brookings Institution and give "advice on how to induce the Japanese to take greater responsibility toward their economic recovery. He said
that they were just lying down on us. I said, 'Well you can’t give me an
easier chore than that. My advice is that you let the first team come
back into action, the first team that you have purged. They were able
to raise Japan from an insignificant ... feudal state into a first class
power in the course of seventy-five years. They can do it again if you
give them a chance.' George Kennan agreed with me, that what I said

was perfectly sound." Interview with Joseph Ballentine, Oral History
Collection, Columbia University, New York.
66. James Forrestal, "Memorandum for Mr. Royall" November 1,
1947, Forrestal Papers.
67. Gordon Gray, "Memorandum for the Secretary of the
68. Robert A. Lovett to Henry L. Stimson, November 17, 1947,
Stimson Papers.
69. Henry L. Stimson to Kenneth C. Royall, November 21, 1947,
Stimson Papers. See also draft of letter not sent from Henry L. Stimson
to William H. Draper, n.d., and Henry L. Stimson to McGeorge Bundy,
November 24, 1947.
70. "Statement of U.S. Policy Toward Economic Recovery of
Japan" [November 1947]. This three-page sketchy policy statement
bears no date or any indication of its origin. Most likely, it was done by
the Army in answer to Forrestal's November 1 request for some such
statement and completed before November 17 when turned over to
Stimson.
71. Newsweek, December 1, 1947.
72. Ibid., December 22, 1947.
73. Bisson, Zaibatsu Dissolution, 140.
Eichelberger Papers. Knowland identified Kern only as a
"nongovernment source" in a Senate speech January 19, 1948.
76. Congressional Record, December 19, 1947.
77. Newsweek, December 29, 1947. Also see Congressional
Record, January 19, 1948.
78. Bisson, Zaibatsu Dissolution, 140-141. See also Hadley,
Anti-Trust in Japan, 138.
79. Ibid., 141. See also Congressional Record, February 17, 1948.
79a. Col. H. E. Eastwood to Hanford MacNider, December 8,
1947, Hanford MacNider Papers, Herbert Hoover Library. Eastwood
was reporting to MacNider, then the key organizer of the
MacArthur-for-President movement, on one of his numerous private
discussions with MacArthur regarding strategy for the primaries,
Republican convention, and election campaign of 1948.
80. William J. Coughlan, Conquered Press: The MacArthur Era in
81. Hadley, Anti-Trust in Japan, 144.
83. Robert L. Eichelberger Diary, March 10, 1948, Eichelberger
Papers. Eichelberger went on to report that Kennan "said that up until
the present time all our endeavors with reference to Japan had been
ones that would be satisfactory to the Russians. We had thrown out the
conservative right; encouraged the group in Japan which would be most
likely to fall into the laps of the Russians and that nothing had been
done in an economic way which was against their interests; that insofar
as Russia was concerned it would pay her to sit tight and let us go on.
We both agreed that an occupation 20 years long ending up in success
for the Russians would be a failure."
84. Cited in Bisson, Zaibatsu Dissolution, 143.
85. Kawai, Japan's American Interlude, 147.
86. New York Times, August 7, 1948. The most important work
of the American Council on Japan on was its "Report on Japanese Policy,"
April 12, 1949, circulated within the Army Department. The report
made numerous recommendations in the areas of recovery, investments,
development of raw material resources in the Pacific, the creation of a
"well armed and well trained constabulary of at least 140,000," and
Japanese political affairs. In addition to reports and recommendations,
the Council held regular luncheon meetings for discussion of Japanese
policy. A tentative list of guests for a meeting to hear a speech by
General Eichelberger in October 1948 included Ivar Baker, vice-president Westinghouse International, William R. Herod, president of
International General Electric, Colonel A. Moreno of International
Telephone and Telegraph, Charles E. Meyer, vice-president of Standard
Oil, Arthur B. Foyle of the Far Eastern Council of Trade and Industry,
and Harry R. Johnson, executive-secretary of the Committee for
Economic Development. See Harry Kern to Robert Eichelberger, April
24, 1948, and October 21, 1948, Eichelberger Papers.
87. See for example Harry F. Kern to Robert L. Eichelberger,
March 8, 1950 and September 24, 1950; and Robert L. Eichelberger to
Harry F. Kern, April 26, 1949 and October 26, 1949, Eichelberger
Papers.
88. Kolokos, Limits of Power, 518-524. See also Herbert P. Bix,
"Report from Japan 1972, Part II," Bulletin of Concerned Asian
Scholars (December 1972), 18-19.
89. New Republic, August 9, 1948.
90. Justin Williams, "Completing Japan's Political Reorientation,
Historical Review, (June 1968), 1457-1459.
91. Charles A. Willoughby, MacArthur, 1941-1951 (New York:

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To the Editors:

Your December 1972 special section on imperialism usefully gives us all a focus for discussion.

1. Surely imperialism however defined cannot be completely disentangled from the expansion of Europe since the accession of Prince Henry the Navigator. Surely Europe's expansion is not a good-or-bad, yes-or-no, question but a complex event too big to characterize in moral terms. If it was bad, can man's history be good?

Human history is an organic seamless web which we can periodize only artificially and at our peril. The making of our observers' distinctions is the beginning of arguments among us. Arbitrarily but still with some consensus we can distinguish phases in Europe's expansion such as the commercial phase of the chartered companies, the Victorian free trade era, the Hobson-Lenin stage of finance capitalist imperialism, or the new and current phase of multinational corporations. Such distinctions if based on profound study can help our understanding of the history that largely dominates us (it is not popular to admit the degree of this domination).

Simplicistic generalities fit in with the political movements and moralizing of our day. Being human we are moral creatures just as much as we are political animals. Let no historian kid himself that his own moral judgments do not enter into his history. Of course they do. In the Chinese tradition the historian actually realized he had a duty of moral judgment to perform. But in the modern era of attainable objectivity in science, it has taken us some time to realize that history, being a human creation, cannot be so scientific. Ask not whether you are morally biased but how. The historian must understand the complexity of a search for reality in which the searcher is himself part of the reality to be found out and investigated, and not by the simple appreciation of formulae.

The whopping generalities—like capitalism, imperialism, communism—have their valid role in moral sloganeering and mobilizing political action but they are less helpful in the search for historical reality. One cannot use an axe for an appendectomy, not with much success. (Indeed we have reached the point where the term "China," perhaps the greatest creation of the Chinese political-cultural genius and the stock in trade of the genus "China specialist," is no longer meaningful in many of its uses. When the whole Chinese population gets into the act and we learn more about it, there is going to be simply too much going on to let us generalize as we used to about "the Chinese family," "the Chinese village," "Chinese thought," or overall "Chinese" anything.) Among the oversize generalities I would include the theory of class struggle as the main "law" of history, and so I would doubt that an historian's moral bias has to be that of a certain class. The history that so largely dominates us is a good deal more than class-struggle history.

In the same way I favor avoiding isms, which may be only reified generalities, and instead using adjectives: imperialistic, exploitative, aggressive, unconscionably rapacious, etc. The point is that a situation may be bad and yet not a product of evil or the devil; the latter may be our mental constructs to account for the bad situation. (I do not expect Hu Shih's anti-ism view to prevail but it is still as sound as ever intellectually.)

2. Viewed in this context, I think Joe Esherick's picture of imperialism in China is unrealistic in leaving the Chinese too passive. He has them victimized from the start, invaded, overwhelmed, dominated, crushed, restructured, distorted, impoverished, and all by imperialism coming from outside. What does all this imply? Surely it demeans the Chinese. What were they doing all that time? Actually they still ran their own country throughout the period, and the greater disaster was that so many Chinese participated in anti-social activities. It took Sino-foreign collaboration, for example, to produce the opium trade. Chinese Marxist historians at least avoid short-changing their forebears as helpless victims by ascribing the strength of imperialism to its
interplay with domestic feudalism. To ascribe the preponderant influence to imperialism is really to regress to the old Victorian blue-book history of modern China that out of ignorance used to have Christianity initiating the Taiping rebellion and Chinese Gordon suppressing it.

This oversimplified stress on the foreigner creates an imbalance between nei and wai [internal and external relations—ed.] which seems illogical on the face of it. It seems very unlikely to anyone who has experienced the pervasive ethnocentricity of Chinese life. It is also distasteful to Chinese patriots because it leads the foreigner into a patronizing posture as if to say guiltily, "Look what we foreigners did to these unfortunate Chinese! How frightful of our ancestors! How can we atone? Let us make up for it, not only by sympathetic indignation in retrospect but also by helping the poor Chinese today."

In other words, a too unilateral view of the history of Sino-foreign contact leads to unilateral moral sentiments, which are not a good basis for human partnership. Typically the guilt-ridden foreigner has catered to Chinese self-pity, one thing Mao Tse-tung is dead against.

3. To find oneself part of a "school" is like Molière's character who found he spoke prose. A school is in the eye of the beholder, who usually has to feel himself outside it in order to see it. Those inside are aware of all the differences there (from Selden to Myers, for instance), which they do not see as forming a unity. From the still greater distance of Leningrad, Professor Bereznii, who specializes on American bourgeois historiography on China, will probably lump the "Harvard school" and the CCAS Bulletin, the Fairbanks and the Eshericks, all together as ripe for the dustbin. Sooner or later some son of Bereznii will cut us all down to size, probably as "American intellectuals of the Nixon era."

Let me enter one protest for the record. The late Professor Hsin-pao Chang was a scholar of great ability and integrity whose research on the opium question was conceived and begun before he came to Harvard (see his foreword), and his book was not "the detailed working out of Fairbank's views" but corrected my views. We all learned from him. Professors may at first be ahead of their students, but students grow and their professors wind up ahead only in age. Seminar students teach their instructor.

Poilencs over the interpretation of Chinese history bulk large in our future, if we may judge by the extent of Chinese pride, concern for history, and admiration for the style of Marx, Engels, Lenin, Stalin, and Mao. This present discussion is just practice. In any case, poilencs by definition require targets, and indignation over the apparent misperception of reality by others may lead one to impute to them not only a wrong standpoint but also hidden motives. It is only one more step to a conspiracy theory: people so wrong could not get that way naturally, they must be wrong on purpose, using history for purposes of conscious "apologetics." Perhaps this is only a passing American style, like putting one's feet on the conference table. But instead of sniping back at Joe Esherick as simplistic and imbalanced, I should rather join forces in the effort to seek more understanding of the American expansion and aggressiveness.

4. We have all been struck with this paradox:
   a) During the last eight years our moon landings have constituted the all-time greatest technological feat of mankind, not only because we got our men there but because we all could see and hear it.
   b) During the same eight years our Vietnam warfare, generally condoned and supported by the American people, has constituted the greatest all-time crime of one people against another because it has been carried on for so long a period by such an "advanced" country with so little agreed upon justification.

The contradiction between our technological capacity and the way we use it, between our high ideals and low performance, reminds us that the growth of technology in the Nuclear Age since 1945 has produced an unprecedented new problem, how to use the power that the new technology has made available to mankind. Mr. Nixon evidently sees that the new technology creates not only new power but also centralized power, requiring him to make his "lonely decisions" (at the same time that he does not believe in big government). My own feeling is that he has confronted the new potentialities of our technology with an out of date and inadequate moral system. Thus he has put the national interest of the United States ahead of the humanitarian interest of all mankind. Caught up in the new means, he has lacked new ends.

But Mr. Nixon's problem of the moral use of technology—or technology and power outrunning our moral sense—has been present through the whole century and a half of gunboat diplomacy. Intervention by the advanced countries has been part and parcel of their growth process. As growth continues (can we stop it?) we must try to mitigate its increasingly bad effects. We need action on two levels, distinguishing between them. The first level is intellectual, to identify, diagnose, and describe these effects and the processes involved—in the words of your editorial, "accurately describing human reality." This may be less fun than simplistic generalities, less immediate satisfaction, because it is piecemeal work that can only be done by individuals in case studies one by one. The second level is practical and political, to criticize public policy, formulate improvements in it, and seek better action accordingly. This union of theory and practice is what CCAS is all about, but I doubt whether insights formulated in the nineteenth century, even by the brightest people, can be adequate to our problem of understanding in the 1970s. Rather than view all the many aspects of Sino-foreign contact as mere expressions of a vast devil called Imperialism, it is more realistic and less culturally egotistical to understand Sino-foreign contact through all the social sciences and humanities as a process of interaction.

John K. Fairbank
Harvard University

May 18, 1973

To the Editor:

Despite some disappointment that Professor Fairbank chose not to discuss any of the substantive issues of my essay, I am not inclined to be niggardly in my gratitude for some of the views expressed. His reply (in the April-July 1970 Bulletin: Vol. 2, No. 3) to Jim Peck's initial article in this debate on imperialism in China made many of the points he has repeated here. There, however, he was inclined to treat American actions in Vietnam as an instance of "over-extension," while now he can clearly label our Vietnam warfare "the greatest all-time crime of one people against another." This is indeed a
sign of progress. We should be grateful that the criticisms and struggles of CCAS have apparently not been entirely in vain.

I also find myself in sympathy with Professor Fairbank’s distaste for over-simplification and over-generalization. Consequently I find it a little difficult to swallow his objection to my stress on the role of imperialism: “Actually they [the Chinese] ran their own country throughout the period....” Leaving aside the fact that the Unequal Treaties placed certain constraints on Chinese sovereignty and thus on Chinese ability to run their own country, it seems to me that we have to ask who precisely “they” were at any given point of time, how representative “they” were of the Chinese people, and to what extent any tendency of the elite to be less representative of the people could be attributed to the impact of imperialism (or to “intervention by the advanced countries,” if that is the terminology Professor Fairbank prefers).

Finally, while I obviously endorse—now and in the essay which Professor Fairbank criticizes—the attempt “to identify, diagnose and describe these effects [of intervention by the advanced countries] and the processes involved,” I am not certain that I would endorse the sort of (what we used to call “vulgar Marxist”) technological determinism of Professor Fairbank which sees all these phenomena proceeding from the growth of technology. While that view effectively places history at the farthest possible remove from morals, it also involves us in a hopeless reductionism which would do little to elucidate the “organic seamless web” of human history.

Joseph Esherick
University of Oregon

May 8, 1973

To the Editors:

With your kind permission I should like to accept Prof. Fairbank’s invitation to a polemical practice session. In the past he and I have crossed swords (foils really) on the issue of imperialism at any number of professional gatherings. The form of these exchanges has become ritualized. “Imperialism,” say I; “original sin,” Prof. Fairbank responds. It’s fun, but it doesn’t get us very far.

1. To trace the current debate to Henry the Navigator seems foolish. This is historicism with a vengeance. The advent of European traders and explorers upon various shores previously unknown to them may look like a seamless web of expansion, but this is surely to distort history. There is a relationship, but one that must be seriously discussed within a firmly defined context. Similarly 19th century European, American and Japanese imperialism is related to post-1945 American imperialism but it is not the same phenomenon. Let us try to clarify what we are talking about, not obfuscate it.

2. Esherick does not offer us a passive picture of China or the Chinese. Hardly. He asserts how difficult it is to “factor out” one force and declares that he does not expect to “get back to imperialism as the ‘first cause’ or ‘prime mover’ of some particular historical development.” Rather, he wants to assess “the role of imperialism in interaction with the complex forces shaping the development of modern Chinese history....” (my emphasis; page 9)

3. One cannot account for the simplistic categories which may one day be framed by some male progeny of Prof. Bereznii. That’s their problem. Since we are inside, the differences matter.

Fairbank’s last point summarizes a leitmotif running through the entire article: that we are the victims of history (p. 1: “the history that largely dominates us”; page 2: “the history that so largely dominates us....”). This is convenient. Somehow these things just keep coming down on us poor mortals. Technology (framed by whom? for whose purposes?) is screwing us to the wall because we haven’t got a modern, up-to-date morality to fight it. But technology does not produce, it is produced. Technology did not one day walk into a laboratory and say (in a great deep bass voice): “Let me have a half-dozen cluster bombs, 4 lbs. of white phosphorus, 89% worth of people-sniffers, and a dozen of those great big 500 lb. mothers.” Someone ordered these developments, ordered them for specific reasons, reasons communicable in human language. Of course Mr. Nixon’s morality is outmoded in larger human terms. Why? Did he just fall asleep when they were giving out new moralities? Where does Prof. Fairbank think moral systems come from? Fairbank claims that Nixon “has put the national interest of the United States ahead of the humanitarian interest of all mankind.” National interest? It is not in my interest, nor in the interests of the majority of Americans. Oh, I see, the people think it is in their interest. How come? Nixon’s policies serve interests, of course (and just: how narrow these interests may be we are just beginning to
One very minor, even picky point. Words matter. Thus I cannot let Prof. Fairbank's description of the crime of the Indochina war pass without comment. He says it is the all-time greatest crime "because [my stress] it has been carried on for so long a period by such an 'advanced' country with so little agreed upon justification." Never mind how this squares with the notion of Nixon acting in the "national interest." Suppose we had all agreed. What then?

Finally, it is not a question, as Prof. Fairbank suggests, of whether we can stop "growth" (whatever that word means). The question rather is if we can shape an economic system that does not so regularly express itself in exploitation, both domestic and foreign.

Just a few words on Prof. Nathan's essay itself. Why are the non-Marxists the most vulgar determinists of all? Nathan argues that imperialism was something that happened in the brains of elite Chinese. He explicitly separates its "psychological, cultural and intellectual impact" from its "social and economic impact." What a paltry way to do history this is. How much more fruitful is Esherick's approach: "imperialism was a total system—economic, political, social and cultural—and its component parts were intimately interrelated." (p. 13) Besides, were all those Chinese who were freaked by imperialism stupid? Why did imperialism seem dangerous to them? Did they have twisted paranoid minds? Or had they, perhaps, noted the fate of India, the problems Mexico faced, the disasters visited upon Egypt, Cuba, Korea, etc. After all, they didn't know the game would soon be up. They were facing, and resisting, an ongoing process. Nathan understimates the effects, the total integrated effects, of this process.

Marilyn B. Young
University of Michigan
Agrarian Conditions in Luzon prior to Martial Law

by Ben Kerkvliet

Introduction

One hot day in May 1970, I sat with several villagers on a dusty road in the village (barrio) of San Ricardo in Central Luzon. The peasants had been describing how arduous life was and how difficult it was to do anything politically to improve the situation. Then one peasant who was a member of the MASAKA, a local peasant union, said “You know, we in the MASAKA wouldn’t be totally surprised if martial law were declared in order to wipe out groups like ours who are seeking justice for people.” This was a prophetic statement indeed—said over two years before martial law in fact was declared. In order to understand better the statement and those who believed it, one must understand some major aspects of rural conditions in Luzon since World War II.

Major Social and Economic Conditions in Luzon

Luzon is one of the major islands in the Philippine archipelago. It is the most populous one, and much of the country’s major agricultural and urban industries are also found there. About sixty percent of the nation’s 39 million people live in Luzon. And like the country as a whole, the population growth there has been high—about three percent per year since the end of World War II. Meanwhile the occupational profile of the population has changed little over the last three decades—roughly seventy percent of Luzon’s population still depends on agriculture and fishing for a living. And an increasingly larger percentage of the agricultural farmers are tenants and landless agricultural laborers; in other words the percentage of landowners has declined over the years.

The table below gives the rounded figures for the total number of farmers for each of the five major regions of Luzon and the percentage of those farmers who were tenants. There are two sets of figures, one from the 1939 census and the other from the 1960 census (the latest available data). The pattern is clear: for Luzon as a whole, the percentage of tenant farmers has risen from 38 percent in 1939 to 46 percent in 1960. And in some regions, the growth has been even larger—from 53 percent to 64 percent in Central Luzon, from 42 to 53 percent in Southern Luzon, and from 30 to 42 percent in the Bicol region. The increased percentages in the Cagayan Valley and Bicol areas are particularly noteworthy because, relative to the other three regions, these two were underpopulated prior to World War II.

Over the years, more virgin land has been planted in rice and other crops by tenant farmers, not small landowners. This is a duplication of the same historical process which created intense cultivation in Central Luzon. Land was claimed by rather wealthy families, who then had tenants clear and plant it. For their labor and services, tenants received between forty and fifty percent of the harvest each year.

The figures in the table do not include agricultural laborers—people who work usually seasonal jobs on other people’s lands. Reliable figures for agricultural laborers are not available. Nevertheless, the fragmentary evidence shows that the percentage of agricultural workers is also rapidly increasing. Because of the population growth, a shortage of unoccupied cultivatable land, and other factors, the amount of land available even for tenant farming has decreased relative to the number of men in the barrios who need land to work. This means unemployment and underemployment, especially among men in their twenties and thirties, who nevertheless have families to support. What work they do find is only temporary, such as helping with harvests. Consequently, life is even more insecure for them than it is for tenant farmers. At least the tenant can count on a piece of land to till; the casual laborer instead must go out each day, each week, or each month to look for work.

Since the 1950s, prices of commodities have also been rising, generally at a faster rate than wages. For example, a sack of unhusked rice that was worth ten pesos in the late 1940s now costs twenty pesos. These figures are from Central
Luzon where rice is relatively plentiful; the prices might be even higher in other regions. Meanwhile, real wages for agricultural work in the Philippines were the same in the 1960s as they were in the 1950s. To make matters worse, peasants in recent years have had to buy more things than they previously did. Wood, for example, used to be free for the taking because it was plentiful. But as it became scarce with the increased clearing and cultivation of land and with some people needing to cut and sell wood for a living, peasants have had to buy it. Wood is a necessity for cooking and building materials. Peasants sometimes use substitutes for wood in building their homes, but of course buying a substitute also requires having cash.

The village of San Ricardo where I had conversations with the residents is typical in the region of Central Luzon, where conditions are especially impoverished because the population is denser, land is scarcer, wild vegetation is rarer, and tenancy conditions are worse than elsewhere.

While conditions in San Ricardo before World War II were already bad, since then they have become even more oppressive. Would-be tenant farmers find no land to tenant farm. Indeed, several former tenants in the village of 1,200 people have lost plots of land that they had farmed for years; now they are agricultural laborers. People eat rice supplemented with vegetables; only two meals per day is not uncommon. Meat and fish are rarely eaten because they are too expensive. Relations between landlords and tenants were miserable prior to the war, and have become even worse in recent years. They did improve slightly in the late 1950s after the Huk rebellion. Landlords reduced rates on loans somewhat and some also reduced rents. But those reforms were only temporarily helpful to tenants. Lately, large landowners in the area have been switching from labor intensive to capital intensive farming; that is, they have been getting rid of tenant farmers in order to use tractors and other implements. In the San Ricardo area, the two large landowners have "mechanized" over 330 hectares of land since 1950. That would be enough land to support roughly ninety-five to one hundred tenant farmers and their families (roughly 600 people). In the case of one of these landowners, he had no tenants after 1972, whereas he had eighty in 1950. His 216 hectares of rice land will be farmed entirely by machinery and a few hired hands to run it. For some seasonal work requiring more labor, these landowners simply hire some of the unemployed people in the villages.

Peasant Responses

In response to these apparently worsening conditions, peasants in Luzon have tried to cope in a variety of ways, usually combining several at once. These responses can be grouped into three categories: internal (within the peasantry's families and barrios), external (the peasantry's relations with nonpeasants), and collective (joint efforts by peasants themselves from different barrios).

There is in the barrios a kind of "share the poverty" ethic. This ethic guides the villagers in their everyday efforts to find enough to feed their families. Thus, for example, those who have steady work or have a plot of land to farm as a tenant know that others less fortunate have first claim to any casual labor that might turn up in the barrio and its vicinity. Another illustration is the practice of tenant farmers hiring others to help with the harvest. This is done rather than exchanging labor with other tenants. One reason is that peasants see this as an important way to bring more cash into the barrio in order for people to buy things they need. And since the landlords pay half of the expense, the tenants do not assume the full burden.

Another internal response is for people to wander out of their barrios in search of temporary work, then return on weekends or whenever they can to their families left behind. Many end up doing casual agricultural work, but some find jobs in towns and cities. By going out to look for work, these people figure they have more chance to make ends meet. And

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>1939</th>
<th>1960</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Northern Luzon</td>
<td>99,000</td>
<td>105,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cagayan Valley</td>
<td>115,000</td>
<td>177,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Luzon</td>
<td>272,000</td>
<td>259,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southern Luzon</td>
<td>165,000</td>
<td>172,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bicol</td>
<td>122,000</td>
<td>165,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>773,000</td>
<td>878,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Santos promised "the second coming" and in May 1967 he moved peasants from Bicol and Southern Tagalog regions. De los Santos initiated a project to build a local schoolhouse or road. Congressional patronage jobs, even if merely as temporary laborers on a project to build a local schoolhouse or road, can expect a payoff in the form of interest-free loans or help with medical expenses when the tenant falls ill. But paternalism today in rural Luzon is far weaker than it was a half century ago; peasants cannot actually expect much security from their patrons. This is especially so in Central Luzon.

Partly because of the deterioration in landlord-tenant relations, peasants have had to rely more on numerous, but less lasting, ties with other nonpeasants, particularly politicians. Peasants frequently sell their votes in return for a small but vital sum of money. Usually they are part of a local political faction whose leader delivers the faction's votes to a candidate in return for some kind of payment. A small number of peasants on the side of a victorious local political candidate, a mayor or congressman, can expect a payoff in the form of patronage jobs, even if merely as temporary laborers on a project to build a local schoolhouse or road. Congressional pork barrel funds are a regular part of the national budget. Each congressman uses pork barrel in order to build and maintain his following made up of faction leaders and members.

Peasant unions and similar organizations are collective efforts, another form of peasant response to worsening conditions. The two most important in post-war Luzon have been the Federation of Free Farmers (FFF) and the Malayang Samabang Magasaka (Free Farmers Union, abbreviated MASAKA). The major goals of these and others have been to improve tenancy arrangements, increase the wages for agricultural laborers, and protect tenants from eviction. On the whole these efforts have not been very successful and the peasant unions have not been too strong since the days of the Huk rebellion.

Another important example of collective efforts are millenarian groups that abound in the provinces and attract between 250,000 and one million rural people. Generally their religious beliefs are syncretic versions of Christianity. They also believe that the good life on earth is near and can be reached through certain religious practices and by faithfully following their local prophets. Given the social and economic conditions, one can understand why such acts of faith are rational efforts by these people to come to grips with their precarious situation.

The Lapiang Malaya (Independence Party) is one illustration of such a millenarian organization. Its spiritual and political leader-prophet was Valentin de los Santos. In 1967 it had an estimated membership of 40,000, mostly peasants from Bicol and Southern Tagalog regions. De los Santos promised "the second coming" and in May 1967 he and his followers believed that the day was at hand. Several hundred of them marched into Manila, where de los Santos declared himself President of the country and pledged to institute radical changes to improve the lot of all impoverished people. A detachment of Philippine Constabulary (PC) met the march and ordered the peasants, some of whom had guns, to turn back and leave the city. When the peasants and de los Santos refused, the PC opened fire killing thirty-three peasants and wounding many more. It was later reliably determined that President Marcos himself had ordered the PC to shoot. As for de los Santos, he was captured and then put in a hospital, where he soon died. Newspapers speculated that he was in fact murdered inside the hospital.

The Huk rebellion in the late 1940s and early 1950s was another kind of collective effort, limited mainly to Central Luzon. Its goals were also limited: to reform, not abolish, the tenancy system. By 1955, the rebellion had pretty much died out, partly because of internal difficulties. Another reason was that the government did make some convincing promises that agrarian reforms would be on their way. As recent as the late 1960s, there were still some old Huks fighting in Central Luzon, but more as bandits than as revolutionary guerrillas. In a sense, however, they too have been an expression of discontent because latter-day Huks had a reputation among the peasantry for protecting them against overbearing landlords and implementing "Huk justice," which people thought to be fairer and swifter than the government's version.

The most recent rebellious group, made up of peasants and middle-class revolutionaries from the cities, is the New People's Army (NPA). It is presently rather small—about 1,200 armed men according to most government and non-government sources—and is concentrated in the Cagayan Valley. Nevertheless, it is reportedly very radical in its political objectives, and its support among the peasantry is said to be growing. In particular, peasants say that the NPA protects them against corrupt units of the PC and against private armies which intrude into the barrios, harass people, and even murder them.

Government Responses

Government programs to help rural people have been minimal. Certainly there has been no systematic effort to do what would have to be done if life for the peasantry were to improve—namely, to redistribute the wealth and stop the rich from getting richer and the poor from getting poorer. Government assistance has mainly come through the "trickle down" effect of pork barrel projects.

Land reform, for example, has been promised by every president in the country since it became a republic. Yet all presidents were rather vague and all equally half-hearted. Some legislation has been passed over the years, but none of it tackles directly the inequitable structure of the society and its economy, nor, certainly, does the legislation question the right to have large private landholdings. Indeed, the two major pieces of land reform legislation—one in 1954 and another in 1963—protect large landowners and even allow them to replace tenants with machinery.

38
While the local and national governments have been slow to help peasants, they have been quick to stifle attempts to protest and push for reforms. The repression has been both subtle and direct, ranging from intimidating and "warning" local activists to imprisonment and murder. These are not secrets in the country; one need only talk, for example, to people—peasants and nonpeasants alike—in Central Luzon. That the MASAKA member in San Ricardo I referred to earlier mentioned the possibility of martial law is in itself indicative of the repressive atmosphere that has existed.

Some Implications of Martial Law

Before the declaration of martial law, large-scale peasant unrest or rebellion was not likely in Luzon—or anywhere else in the country for that matter. Poverty and harsh conditions are perhaps necessary conditions but certainly not sufficient ones to make a large number of people rebellious. Now, however, after martial law, I think rebellion in the countryside is more likely. This is not to say it is inevitable, just more likely. The reason is that now even heavier repressive measures have been added to the oppressive conditions people face each day. Repression in this situation can be a self-fulfilling prophecy; rather than stop dissent and unrest as its implementors claimed it would do, it may do precisely the opposite.

The impoverished conditions seem likely to continue because the Marcos regime is incapable or unwilling to make the gigantic changes that would be required in order to take from the rich capitalists and landowners and give to the vast majority of people. The reforms that Marcos has promised will be entirely inadequate to narrow significantly the huge gap between the rich and the poor. Indicative of this is the Marcos government’s much publicized “land reform” program. As of March 1973, six months after martial law was declared and the land reform program launched, no tenant farmers had become landowners. A handful, roughly 8,000, have been given “land transfer certificates,” but those are not titles. Perhaps more peasants will be given these certificates, but none will become landowners until they have paid for the property over a fifteen-year period. The land reform program will expropriate none of the large landowners’ holdings nor will it give any land free to tenants. Large landowners will be reimbursed for any land of theirs that is redistributed, and the new owners (ex-tenants) will have to pay for the land on an installment basis. Missed payments will constitute delinquency, and several missed payments will mean repossession.

Even if implemented, the land reform program would affect at most only a small percentage of tenants and, it follows, an ever-smaller percentage of large landowners. The program excludes all the large plantations for sugar, coconut, and pineapple. It excludes the rice and corn lands of large landowners who want to “mechanize” the farming operations by replacing tenants with machinery. And it will not affect rice and corn landowners who own 100 hectares or less. As one well-informed government official noted recently when passing through Hawaii, land reform at best would affect only three percent of the land in the Philippines farmed by tenants.

Meanwhile, the Marcos government is relying heavily on the military. Yet in the countryside, the military has a bad reputation for lawlessness and corruption. The Philippine Constabulary is particularly disreputable in the eyes of peasants. While out on missions or patrols, the PC has been known to destroy barrios, steal people’s livestock, abuse women, and otherwise harass people. In addition, the PC has traditionally served the interests of the local elites rather than been a partisan for the common folk. How the military has behaved since the declaration of martial law is not entirely clear because news has been so closely censored. But from published and personal news sources, there are frightening signs of increased military action in the provinces. In late October 1972, one month after martial law was declared, a news story reported that 50,000 people from 100 to 120 villages were forced to flee their homes in Isabela province (in the Cagayan Valley) because the military commander wanted to “sanitize” the area. Soldiers were forcing people to leave before a big operation that was to include saturation bombing and similar counter-insurgency actions in an attempt to overpower an estimated 500 NPA guerrillas there. The commanding officer was quoted as saying, “Everyone who remains in the area is an NPA. I can swoop upon them and pound them.” The government, according to the story, made no arrangements to feed, house, or otherwise provide for those forced to leave their villages. Shortly thereafter, rumors circulated that napalm had been used in Isabela and elsewhere in Northern Luzon. Since then at least one government official

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has confirmed those rumors. A consul from the Philippine
Consulate in Honolulu admitted in a public symposium that
the Philippine Air Force, using American-supplied planes, has
been dropping napalm in the region, "but not indiscriminately."18

A recent television broadcast in the United States
showed Philippine soldiers banging down doors and rounding
up innocent civilians during raids in the Greater Manila area.5
And friends in the Philippines write that the military is
engaged in "zoning" operations in many areas throughout
Luzon. Zoning, which is reminiscent of military methods
during the Japanese occupation, involves arresting "suspect"
people at will and putting a tight military guard around
selected residential areas. Perhaps the Muslim Filipinos know
best how indiscriminate the military can be. While fighting
rebels in Mindanao, the Philippine navy uses off-shore batteries
to bombard towns and the countryside, and the Air Force flies
jet fighters and bombers against "insurgents" even in the
cities.10

It is important to note in this context of military action
that the Marcos government has proudly announced that
American soldiers now accompany Filipino soldiers on "civic
action missions" in Central and Northern Luzon.11 Exactly
what these soldiers are doing is unclear. Military spokesmen
describe the purpose as "bringing government to the rural
people." But it is alarming that the missions include American
troops and that they are in so-called "insurgent" areas.

This paper has argued that life was hard in rural Luzon
even before martial law. Since then the situation seems to have
become even more arduous. The promised "reforms" probably
will do little, even if implemented, to improve the average
peasant's lot. On top of that, the military is increasingly
administering policy in the countryside and has a tendency to
be harsh and brutal. Thus, if peasants become even more
rebellious than they have been up until now, they will do so
for good, logical reasons that must be understood in terms of
basic social, economic, and political conditions. Explanations
that the government favors--"outside agitators," "Maoists,"
and "foreign agents"—simply will not do and should be
vigorously refuted.

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2. For a fuller discussion of conditions in San Ricardo since the
   war, see my "Post-Rebellion in the Philippines: A Microcosmic Look,"
   which is a revised version of a paper presented to the Western
   Association of Asian Studies' Annual Meeting, Salt Lake City, Utah,
   November 9-11, 1972.
3. This is a conservative figure, based on 1963 data reported in
   D.J. Dwyer, "The Problem of In-Migration and Squatter Settlement
   in Asian Cities: Two Case Studies, Manila and Victoria-Kowloon," Asian
   Studies, 2 (August 1964), 153. In the decade since then, the percentage
   of squatters has probably increased.
4. For a fuller account of Lapiang Malaya, see David Sturtevant,
   Agrarian Unrest in the Philippines. (Athens: Ohio University, Papers in
5. This figure is the total of figures appearing in articles about
   land reform published in daily newspapers from Manila. See in
   particular, Bulletin Today (Manila), December 23, 1972, p. 1; and Daily
   Express (Manila), March 7, 1973, p. 2.
6. In October, Marcos vowed that under his land reform
   program no one would be allowed to own more than seven hectares of
   rice or corn land. Gradually, however, he began to renge on this, and
   as of March the "maximum allowed" has been raised to 100 hectares.
8. The government official is Consul Honario T. Cagampan
   speaking at the University of Hawaii during a symposium about the
   For a newspaper story, including the admission of napalming, see Ka
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    March 12, 1973, p. 28.

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Tasks of the Communist Party of the Philippines in the New Situation


The setting up of the U.S.-Marcos dictatorship through the declaration of an “unlimited form of martial law” and under the fascist principle that “all power can be given to the military” has brought about a new situation. Through the crude employment of armed coercion, dictator Marcos as commander-in-chief has arrogated unto himself and concentrated in his hands all executive, legislative and judicial powers. All of these powers are used not only against the Communist Party of the Philippines and the New People’s Army but also against the broad masses of the people and all opposition to the perpetuation of a fascist dictatorship. Upon the setting up of this fascist dictatorship, the objective conditions for a civil war of a national scale have arisen. The entire Filipino people vehemently condemn the U.S.-Marcos dictatorship as anti-national, anti-republican, anti-democratic and decadent and are more determined than ever before to struggle for national democracy and, therefore, for a genuine republic that belongs to them.

It has long been pointed out and stressed to the U.S.-Marcos clique that people’s war is the answer to martial law. Now that martial law is here, large masses of revolutionary militants and allied leaders of various forces all over the country have gone underground or have gone to the countryside from cities and towns and are resolutely taking every possible and necessary step to overthrow the U.S.-Marcos dictatorship. Many times more than the previous suspension of the writ of habeas corpus, the setting up of the fascist dictatorship has resulted in an increase of men and women eager and ready to do their share of fighting in the battlefield. With every national and democratic right suppressed, the broad masses of the people have more deeply realized the need to support or participate in people’s war. The revolutionary stand of the Communist Party of the Philippines that armed struggle is the principal form of struggle at the present national democratic stage of the Philippine revolution has never before been clearer than now.

In the new situation, there are three things that stand out. First, the Communist Party of the Philippines is the most prepared to lead the revolutionary struggle because it is the most prepared to do so ideologically, politically and organizationally. By virtue of its adherence to and practice of Marxism-Leninism-Mao Tse-tung Thought, it can be relied upon to fight steadfastly in a protracted people’s war and to deal with the problems of the Philippine revolution in the most comprehensive and correct manner. By virtue of its revolutionary politics, it can be relied upon to serve the toiling masses of workers and peasants, respect the legitimate interests of the petty bourgeoisie and national bourgeoisie and mobilize the biggest mass force to overthrow the tyrannical regime. By virtue of its organizational strength, it has emerged practically unscathed from the vicious blows so far made by the enemy under Proclamation No. 1081.

In so many years, the Communist Party of the Philippines and the New People’s Army have been the target of all kinds of enemy operations and task forces and yet they have not only managed to preserve themselves and destroy the enemy part by part but have become even stronger through revolutionary struggle. To ensure the growth and development of people’s war as a mass undertaking, the Party has indefatigably created Party branches and groups, organs of political power, mass organizations, people’s organizing committees and various forms of fighting units such as the militia, the local guerrillas and the regular mobile (or several guerilla units concentrated at appropriate times for big operations or a campaign of several battles). In the countryside, the Party is at the core of the New People’s Army and is also in the localities and has gained wide support from the peasant masses and inhabitants of towns, provincial capitals and small cities. In the cities, the Party has carefully developed an underground for the worst of emergencies and has at the same time developed unbreakable links with the workers, the urban petty bourgeoisie and others.

While we consider the present situation far more favorable to the revolutionary movement than ever before, we should not relax in the false belief that the objective conditions are enough to carry us forward. We have to build up the revolutionary forces courageously, not only by waging the principal form of struggle which is armed struggle in the
form a national alliance or local alliances of revolutionary forces. Those who can no longer conduct legal work or underground work in cities and towns should be dispatched to the people's army in the countryside but also by employing effective underground methods in the cities and towns and by using every possible means, legal and otherwise, to facilitate coordination of efforts, propaganda work, intelligence and internal communications as well as communications with allies throughout the archipelago. We should avoid rashness in our actions because the fascist dictatorship carries with it the license to do the worst possible harm against the Party, people's army and the people. We should advance carefully and steadily.

The Communist Party of the Philippines is determined to join hands with all those who are opposed to the U.S.-Marcos dictatorship. All those who are interested in achieving national freedom and democracy are welcome in joining with the Party in a broad national democratic front. Those who may participate in this united front are the democratic classes and strata, parties, groups and individuals. Independence and initiative are enjoyed by participants in this united front. But the single common objective of all is to overthrow the U.S.-Marcos dictatorship and institute a truly national and democratic regime. The success of the national democratic front can pave the way for a national coalition government where the working class, peasantry, urban petty bourgeoisie and the national bourgeoisie are fairly and justly represented. The Party's Program for a People's Democratic Revolution and also the ten-point guide drafted by the Party in connection with the drawing up of the program of the National Democratic Front should be referred to as guides for forming a national alliance or local alliances of revolutionary forces.

In addition, we are hereby making a pledge to ourselves, to all our allies and to all our countrymen in the context of our program for a people's democratic revolution:

1. To join up with all forces that are opposed to the fascist dictatorship of the U.S.-Marcos clique and conduct a firm revolutionary struggle to overthrow it;
2. To strengthen the New People's Army, boldly organize guerrilla units all over the archipelago and draw all possible cooperation from everyone opposed to the U.S.-Marcos dictatorship;
3. To help re-establish the democratic rights of all anti-fascist forces, including individuals, political parties, trade unions, mass organizations, mass media, religious organizations and all other people, and to take all steps towards a democratic coalition government;
4. To fight for the nullification of all acts of the fascist dictatorship that favor U.S. imperialism and the Marcos fascist clique, and to make possible the abrogation of all unequal treaties and agreements with the United States, especially those pertaining to direct investments, military bases, military assistance, military aggression and cultural aggression;
5. To pave the way for the arrest, trial before a people's court and punishment of the dictator Marcos and his diehard accomplices for the setting up of a fascist dictatorship, bloody crimes against the people and enrichment in office, and make possible the confiscation of all ill-gotten wealth (capital holdings and landholdings) of the Marcos fascist clique and likewise those of all U.S. imperialist firms and agencies collaborating with it; and
6. To welcome to the revolutionary ranks those officers and men of the reactionary armed forces who turn at any time against the U.S.-Marcos dictatorship, provided they are not a mere faction of the military directed by U.S. imperialism to groom another puppet dictator.

Hereunder are a number of guidelines for developing or dealing with the various forces opposed to the U.S.-Marcos dictatorship.

1. The Party should vigorously fulfill its 1972 organizational and educational plan. Despite what appears to be the tightening of the situation due to the U.S.-Marcos dictatorship, the fact is that the entire country has been made far more fertile than before for revolutionary seeding and growth. There is a great need for cadres and their nationwide deployment. So, the Central Committee is seeing to it that cadres are dispatched from certain regions to other regions. The correct relationship between expansion and consolidation and between the number of cadres in urban areas and that in the rural areas must be settled from time to time by regional party committees in their respective territories. They must take more initiative in building the Party, the New People's Army and the united front. Stress must be laid on mass work. The gauge of achievement is the quantity and quality of Party branches and groups, fighting units of the New People's Army, organs of political power, people's organizing committees and mass organizations of workers, peasants, youth, women and cultural activists. Due to the emergence of the U.S.-Marcos dictatorship, special attention must be paid to improving underground methods, especially in cities and towns, and in maintaining links over extensive areas.

2. The Party should assign more cadres of workers as well as petty-bourgeois background to the New People's Army. Those who can no longer conduct legal work or underground work in cities and towns should be dispatched to the people's army through the various regional Party committees. The people's army is the Party's principal form of organization and should be built as such. Party branches should be established at the company level or platoon level as the case may be and Party groups at the squad level and, in addition, Party branches should be established in localities. The main objective of the fascist dictatorship in the countryside today is the suppression of the Party, the New People's Army and the revolutionary masses. We should be good at preserving ourselves by destroying the enemy (fascist troops, spies, local tyrants and bad elements) on the wider scale of the countryside. The New People's Army is based mainly on the peasant masses, the majority class in Philippine society. Special attention should therefore be paid to realizing a genuine land reform program among them. Nothing will ever come out of the decree of the U.S.-Marcos dictatorship proclaiming the implementation of the reactionary "land reform code" all over the country, except intensified feudal and semi-feudal exploitation and oppression and, therefore, intensified resistance by the peasant masses. Whenever possible, land should be distributed free to the tillers who do not own land or who do not have enough. The nonpayment of land rent and other related measures can easily be effected when the peasant masses have been sufficiently aroused, organized and mobilized on a wide scale. This is also the best way of creating stable base areas. Wherever the guerrilla units of the New People's Army are, the least that should be done for the welfare of the peasant masses is to reduce land rent, eliminate usury and initiate mutual aid and exchange of labor.
associations, with poor and lower middle peasants prevailing, should be established. Local militia units and guerrilla units should also be raised from the peasant ranks so as to defend their democratic gains. From the ranks of the guerrilla units, we draw the Red fighters for the regular mobile forces of the New People’s Army.

3. The Party should continue to build revolutionary trade unions and other suitable organizations (including open associations and secret workers’ organizing committees) among the workers in workplaces and communities, despite the fascist ban on mass organizations and strikes. However, care must always be taken to prevent the enemy from identifying Party cadres and members. The more the fascist dictatorship madly goes after all kinds of workers’ organizations, the more it will aggravate its already isolated position. The longer the workers’ rights are suppressed, the more will the workers become fearless of the U.S.-Marcos dictatorship. Their wages are buying less and less. They are also under greater threat of unemployment. The fascist dictatorship is mad enough to prevent the workers indefinitely from demanding through their unions and through strikes better working and living conditions. The violent suppression of workers’ unions and strikes can only yield more determined fighters for the revolutionary cause, provided the Party does well its duty of arousing and mobilizing the workers. The Party should organize the workers in factories, mines, haciendas and other areas and raise their political consciousness in the light of the current political and economic crisis. Workers are quick in grasping the Marxist-Leninist ideology, provided this is properly communicated to them by Party cadres. The Party should accelerate its efforts to build Party branches in the workers’ places of work and communities. Trade union work should always be combined with ideological and political work.

4. The Party should vigorously arouse and mobilize the student masses against the U.S.-Marcos dictatorship. Although the democratic cultural revolution has already brought out a high degree of militance among them, the student masses could be further guided by the Party in the new situation so that they can link up with the broad masses of the people and deliver the most effective blows against the fascist dictatorship. If it were not for the fear of the U.S.-Marcos dictatorship of the student masses, the schools should have been opened on the Monday following Proclamation No. 1081. But the closure of schools for sometime cannot stop the student masses from recognizing what is wrong and acting against it. The longer the schools are closed, the more ready are the student masses for mass actions. First, the probing mass actions and other propaganda activities; then increasingly bigger mass actions. Various forms of open student organizations and underground coordinating committees can be set up to defy the fascist ban on basic democratic rights. In the case of quite a number of student leaders and other youth leaders, who are blacklisted and who will only be immobilized upon arrest, it is the Party’s policy to dispatch them to the countryside or the underground, so long as they are already Party members or are willing to become Red fighters even if they are not yet Party members or even candidate members. Party groups which are in the midst of the student masses should systematically deploy groups of students to various provinces and towns to condemn the fascist dictatorship and arouse the people.

5. The Party should encourage not only the student masses but also all other sections of the intelligentsia to assert their national and democratic rights and speak out their views against the U.S.-Marcos dictatorship. It is anti-national to allow foreign-owned mass media like those owned by the Sorianos to make propaganda in support of the U.S.-Marcos dictatorship and at the same time prevent the Filipino people from speaking out their minds. It is anti-democratic to have only those reports and views supporting a fascist dictatorship disseminated. Teachers at all levels should be persuaded to propagate the national and democratic line among their co-teachers, students and the people and not to make anti-communist propaganda which would only serve to prolong the life of fascist dictatorship in the country. Special efforts should be exerted to get the active support of public school teachers. All government civilian employees should resist attempts of the U.S.-Marcos dictatorship to shift public funds to the military from their departments, disregard their civil service eligibilities or turn over their functions to military personnel. Like the teachers and ordinary government civilian employees, all professionals (doctors, nurses, engineers, journalists, lawyers and others) should be won over to the anti-fascist united front. If positive and progressive, their political influence on many other people is of great value to the revolution. Their direct services and material contribution to the revolution are much needed. The most progressive elements in the ranks of the intelligentsia can become Party members.

6. The Party should, aside from the intelligentsia, win over other sections of the petty bourgeoisie. In many various ways, they can extend practical support to the revolutionary cause. They can help spread the correct political line against the U.S.-Marcos dictatorship and they can also extend material support to the revolutionary movement. They are hard-pressed by the political and economic crisis worsening under the fascist dictatorship. The Party should consider the entire petty bourgeoisie as a basic motive force in the national democratic revolution and win it over in order to tilt the balance securely in favor of the revolutionary side.

7. The Party should win over members of the national bourgeoisie, in the cities and in the countryside, to give political and material support to the revolutionary movement. Since they themselves cannot be expected to bear arms against the enemy, they can extend to the revolutionary movement support in cash or kind or allow use of their facilities. The Party should protect their legitimate interests against the wanton assaults of U.S. imperialism and the puppet dictatorship. The national bourgeoisie can join the anti-imperialist and anti-fascist united front and it will be amply represented in the national coalition government to be set up in the future.

8. The Party should support the struggle for self-determination or autonomy and also for democracy among the national minorities, especially those of Mindanao who have taken up arms. The armed struggle of the Maguindanaos, Maranaos, Tjurays, Tausugs and others is very significant. Efforts should be exerted in developing revolutionary forces in various parts of Mindanao, especially those outside of the “Muslim” areas; and unity between the national minorities and the poor settlers everywhere should be aimed for in accordance with the general line of national democratic revolution. The armed struggle in Mindanao can be
so coordinated with the revolutionary armed struggle in Luzon and the Visayas that the U.S.-Marcos dictatorship would become exhausted from running to and fro, from far south to far north of the archipelago and vice versa. It should be the general policy of the Party all over the country to welcome all national minorities into the ranks of the revolutionary movement and to develop Party cadres and Red fighters among them.

9. The Party should seek and develop an anti-fascist united front at every possible level with the Liberal Party, with certain sections of the Nacionalista Party and various political groups and figures who are opposed to the U.S.-Marcos dictatorship. The attempt of the Marcos fascist puppet clique to monopolize power in the country has seriously harmed or put a serious threat to the interests of other reactionaries. The violent split developing among the reactionaries has been obvious since the emergence of the "private armies" and especially since the second Plaza Miranda massacre. Although the U.S.-Marcos dictatorship will try to create the myth of "bipartisan" support for the "Marcos party," the political and economic contradictions among the reactionaries cannot be erased. There are various ways of cooperating with other political groups and figures. Since the U.S.-Marcos dictatorship is bent on disarming them at any cost, they might as well contribute or merely lend their arms to the New People's Army. They can also advise their following to cooperate with the people's army and they can give other kinds of material support. In return, such legitimate interests of theirs as those which do not harm the people can be protected. In cases where there are already armed groups fighting or determined to fight the fascist dictatorship, the New People's Army should be willing to reorganize them or integrate them into its ranks or simply coordinate with them as the case may be.

10. The Party should seek and develop an anti-imperialist and anti-fascist united front with religious groups and semi-religious groups that are opposed to the U.S.-Marcos dictatorship. It is noteworthy that there are a considerable number of patriotic and progressive priests and ministers who have merited being in the fascist blacklist. It must be always borne in mind that there are religious people who do not agree with the Party's ideology but who would agree with the Party's political program and line.

11. The Party should draw all possible support from Filipinos abroad, especially the half million Filipino immigrant workers, professionals and students in the United States. Together with their American and other foreign friends, they can form committees and associations, engage in mass actions and raise funds for their own propaganda activities all in support of the revolutionary struggle of the Filipino people against the U.S.-Marcos dictatorship. Eventually, they will be able to channel their material support to the revolutionary forces in the Philippines. Revolutionary friends of the Filipino people all over the world should also be encouraged to initiate committees and associations in support of the Filipino revolutionary struggle. The Filipino people should get all possible international support in the same spirit and manner as other peoples have done for their own revolutionary struggles. The peoples of the world are profoundly interested in the victory of the Philippine revolution against U.S. imperialism and its running dogs. The Party should be guided by the lofty principle of proletarian internationalism in this regard.

12. The Party should perseveringly conduct by various means revolutionary propaganda among the officers and troops of the reactionary armed forces. Quite a number of them are opposed to the U.S.-Marcos dictatorship. As a matter of fact, there are three definite trends in the reactionary armed forces: the first one consists of those who support the U.S.-Marcos dictatorship and who are gloating at the chance to abuse the people; the second one consists of those who oppose the Marcos fascist gang but who wish to have it replaced by coup d'etat with another reactionary regime which they consider "democratic"; and the third one consists of those who oppose the U.S.-Marcos dictatorship and who agree with the principles of the Corpus-Tagamolila Movement. The second trend can be subdivided into two: one is biding its time for the near-collapse of the Marcos fascist clique and will move only with assurances from U.S. imperialism; the other has various notions of anti-imperialism. Enemy officers and troops who are opposed to the U.S.-Marcos dictatorship should be encouraged to take the people's side and take the anti-imperialist, anti-feudal and anti-fascist line. They can bring over their arms and join the New People's Army or temporarily establish and lead guerrilla units until such time that they can establish relations with the people's army. The Party should also see to it that the policy of leniency is taken on captive enemy officers and men in order to disintegrate the reactionary armed forces. As the U.S.-Marcos dictatorship conscripts more troops and the people's suffering becomes even more unbearable, there will be more enemy officers and men who will recognize what is right and what is wrong and will gladly turn their arms against the people's exploiters and oppressors.

The Communist Party of the Philippines, together with the New People's Army which it leads, declares that conditions for revolutionary armed struggle in the countryside have been tremendously enhanced by the emergence of the U.S.-Marcos dictatorship. Whereas before Proclamation No. 1081 only certain limited parts of the country were battlefields, these can now be boldly expanded throughout the archipelago. Furthermore, whereas before this proclamation it was not yet timely to launch certain limited forms of military operations in urban areas, these can now be done with due consideration given to the strategic line that the revolutionary forces will seize the cities from rural base areas.

The broad masses of the people know how to deal with a mad bull like the U.S.-Marcos dictatorship and they are determined to encircle it with the flames of people's war. The day will surely come when the U.S.-Marcos dictatorship is turned to ashes and is finally consigned to the garbage heap of history. By that time, the comprehensive revolutionary movement against U.S. imperialism, feudalism and bureaucratic capitalism shall have become a gigantic force, capable of carrying the Philippine revolution through to the end.

CENTRAL COMMITTEE
COMMUNIST PARTY OF
THE PHILIPPINES
(Marxist-Leninist-Mao Tse-tung Thought)
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New Letters from Hiroshima

by Alexander Kuo

All armies prefer high ground to low, 
and sunny places to dark.  
—Sun-tzu, *The Art of War* (500 B.C.)

1.

7:25 A.M., August 6, *Straight Flush*.  
We are six miles over Hiroshima  
a speck against the sun.  
We have flown west  
across the city, and are flying east  
back across it. We are doing  
what we have been told  
we must. My sergeant has just  
tapped the weather report back  
to Colonel Tibbets flying  
the *Enola Gay* with the 9,000 pound 
*Little Boy*  
200 miles south of us over Shikoku.  
Our advice: BOMB PRIMARY.  
Hiroshima.  

With your permission, sir  
the biggest gamble in history  
will be done.  

2.

It's a quiet morning here  
on this little island.  
The sun is almost up  
and a deep blue has settled  
over the base. There is  
no sound or movement  
all around, more silence  
than the last two days  
after the bad weather  
the first days of this month.  
Over the squawk box by the tower  
just now I heard Colonel Tibbets  
radio for clearance: "Dimples  
Eight-Two to North Tinian Tower. 
Ready for take off on runway Able."

He's quite a man  
that colonel. I hope you'd  
get to meet him some time.  
I'd heard that he is commanding  
the first personal air force  
in history, that he reports  
to no one but the very top.  
My buddy Jim told me  
that Tibbets had changed  
the code name from *Victor*  
to *Dimples* just this afternoon  
on a hunch  
the Japs were tuned in.

What a guy. You'd like him.  
Just a few days ago he changed  
the name of his B-29, you know  
the biggest bomber we have  
from #44-86292 to *Enola Gay*  
after his mother  
in Glidden, Iowa.

Well. Since they all took off  
at 0245 this morning, no one  
on the base had said much.  
They all seem to be waiting  
for something to happen.
Which reminds me. There was something sometime ago that happened that I forgot to tell you. When I was training at the Manhattan District in Salt Lake City (that’s when I first met the colonel) Bob Hope and Bing Crosby entertained us. Bob named the base Leftover Field, and Bing, Tobacco Road with slot machines. Anyway I thought you’d like that.

How’re things at home? How’s the football team look for next year?

You know, the Senators have a chance to move within a half game of first place if they sweep both games from Boston today.

Well, I better head off and see what everyone’s so quiet about.

4.

How are they treating you these days? Do you have enough to eat? The war must end soon you just wait and see.

We haven’t felt the blast or flames of the United States 20th Air Force bombs yet. You remember neighbor Segoyi? He said yesterday that Truman’s mother lives around here, that’s why Hiroshima’s been spared.

But we are beginning to anticipate the worst. People are openly saying that this insulation is only preparing us for some irrevocable fate.

Already 70,000 dwellings have been demolished to make three east-west fire-breaks in the city. And with the Ota River’s seven north-south channels they think we’re ready. I’m not so sure.

Things get worse by the day. Only 150 stores are open now. There is less of everything but money. The banks are flourishing though they said that savings are higher by 28% than a year ago.

There are very few soldiers left here any more. There is no more banzai sounding in the streets. The war must be getting worse for us.

My son, you must serve your Emperor well. Do it with honor to your country too.

5.

First a flash
A noiseless blast
Then white heat
A great wind
A fire wind

That burned for two and a half miles
That fused quartz crystals in granite blocks
That roasted exposed children only their shadows remained
That welded women into asphalt and stone forever
That made eyes into holes

Black letters of newsprint burned right out of the white paper a mile and a half away
Dark garment patterns of flowers burned into the skin of women
Workers’ brown shoulder straps burned into their chests

The white was untouched, unscorched, only slightly singed And the dark, the darker, the darker, always the darker burned into enemies forever

And then the rain
The strange rain
Drops big as marbles
The Black Rain
The peeling skin

And much later
No bodies to be counted
Only parts to be named
From the beginning

6.

By the time you get this you would have heard what happened today.

I was in that plane instant D.S.C. It had to be done.

To end the war quickly. To save countless lives.

If I had to, I would do it all over again for you.
There I was alone in the tail turret with my goggles on watching the mushroom get bigger and bigger the farther we flew away from it.

No one to talk to up there. Only the icy silence six miles above the earth next to nothing.

7.

Why didn't you make the Army keep its promise?

Why wasn't the uranium 235 activated over Mt. Fuji?

Why was another dropped on Nagasaki three days later?

20,000 tons of TNT for 200,000 killed. One for every ten.

Tell me. Tell me, now, Dr. Einstein, in 1952.

8.

WASHINGTON—The demilitarized zone—the strip of land between the two Vietnams so crucial to diplomatic progress on the war—is in a comparative lull.

This reading by the military officers came Thursday along with the official report from Saigon that Americans killed in the war totaled 177 for the week ending Aug. 17.

Military officers noting the lull in the DMZ were frank to say that nobody really knows where the enemy has gone from his old positions.
Opium and Empire: McCoy on Heroin in Southeast Asia


by Peter Dale Scott

 Syndicate administration of the saloon-with-entertainment business is equally smooth, a man on a theatrical publication told me. . . . "One man arrives and says he is from City Hall, and he is a partner, drawing down a hundred and a half a week" . . . "But is the fellow who declares himself in really from City Hall or from the Syndicate?" I asked. "Well, he's known as a Syndicate fellow, but the police enforce what he says," the man said. "I don't know what the split is." "Maybe the Syndicate is just a front for the city government," I suggested, "instead of its being the other way around." And maybe, I have thought since, the city government is just a front for Colonel McCormick and for the railroads that don't want to be moved off the streets and for the landlords who don't care to lose the swollen rents from their bowels. . . . If no Syndicate existed it would be necessary to invent one, to blame it for the way things are."

—A. J. Liebling

More and more, as scholars search to understand the history of U.S. intervention in Southeast Asia, they are forced to study the largely submerged operations of crime. The tripartite symbiosis which A. J. Liebling a generation ago described in Chicago—between local government, the Syndicate, and less visible economic interests—operates with the same brutal efficiency in the Far East as well. There too the tightly-knit, ruthless bagmen and enforcers from narcotics and other vice operations become the indigenous local cadres for venal and demoralized regimes, which in turn are fronts for more powerful imperial and economic forces. Al McCoy has written a fascinating and exhaustive analysis of the interpenetration between crime and local government in Southeast Asia. But, as we shall see, he has less to say about the political influence behind the scenes, and as to economic interests he is largely silent.

In Southeast Asia as in Chicago, the roots of this tripartite symbiosis go back more than a century. Opium, illegal in China after 1729, was nonetheless a prime inducement to Western penetration in the nineteenth century, when its profits contributed to the Forbes and other great New England fortunes. Opium later became a political instrument in the demoralization of popular nationalism, and finally the cadres from narcotics traffic were directly incorporated by intelligence agencies (French, Chinese, Japanese and American) into factitious local "governments" as alternatives to indigenous revolutionary movements.

The great value of McCoy's timely and well-documented book is to have shown clearly the extent to which the strength and motivation of pro-Western governments since World War II in Vietnam and Laos have been a function of their involvement in narcotics traffic, both domestic and international, sanctioned and criminal. McCoy's book was apparently completed before similar evidence linked the new Phnom Penh government to international heroin traffic, through a commando training camp organized by the CIA and headed by Lon Nol's brother Lon Non.)

From his historical chapters one also derives a picture of the importance of Pacific Asia to the emergence of a world traffic for heroin. In the 1920s the flow of heroin was from Western countries to the Far East. Today, as if by Hegelian vengeance, the flow has reversed itself, reaching beyond the ethnic ghettos of America's inner cities into the wealthy suburbs as well.

The outlawing of narcotics in these countries has not improved matters. On the contrary, profits once earmarked for public revenues now go to private traffickers and for protection, while the criminal corruption of local police, military, and intelligence officials has become systemic. Thus not only the traffic but the urban social structure is progressively delegalized as the prospects for non-criminal enterprise and administration decline. McCoy's book suggests strongly that, in Indochina as in China before it, the export of heroin to world markets will end only with colonialism itself.

In this last phase of delegalized colonial politics, U.S. intelligence agencies have actively exploited the profits and tightly-knit controls of the drug traffic. At first this intelligence-crime alliance may have been tactical only, as in McCoy's opening chapters on the 1940s, when OSS and CIA picked up anticommunist allies from the Mafia in Sicily and the Corsican Guerini gang in Marseille. Later, in Asia, the U.S. and/or its local puppets have depended almost without break on this alliance (with its own trade links to the Mafia and the Corsicans of Marseille).

In Southeast Asia narcotics and related forms of organized vice (gambling, lotteries, alcohol, all oriented towards the important overseas Chinese communities in particular) had traditionally been prominent, even central, in governmental revenues and influence. Take for example...
Thailand, a current heroin-exporter from which the United States is not likely soon to withdraw. By Thailand’s own official statistics, opium alone accounted for between 15 and 20 percent of Thai government income between 1903 and 1921, and for 20 percent (according to a U.S. Treasury publication) in 1950. In the early 1900s the income from all four government vice franchises ran from 40 to 50 percent (McCoy, p. 67). In 1938, likewise, the opium régie supplied 15 percent of all tax revenues in French Indochina, a fact which led the French to increase Indochinese opium production by 600 percent when foreign supplies were cut off during World War II (McCoy, pp. 76-87). One of Ho Chi Minh’s initial complaints to his OSS companions concerned the forced sale of opium and alcohol to village administrations by the French government monopolies. A Vietminh five-point memorandum of demands, transmitted to the French by OSS, included as its fifth point that “the sale of opium shall be prohibited.”

**OPIUM AFTER 1945**

The expulsion of the Kuomintang from mainland China constituted a double threat to the Thai status quo. The CIA shared Thailand’s first concern, the foreseeable replacement of Kuomintang and right-wing influence among the Thai Chinese (some five million, by far the largest overseas Chinese community) by Communist influence. But a second, more practical concern was the shrinking of supplies for the Thai opium monopoly, in the wake of the Chinese People’s Republic’s opium eradication program. The solution to both problems was a crash program of opium production in the remote “golden triangle” area of east Burma, north Thailand, and Laos, mostly under Li Mi’s expelled Kuomintang forces with subvention from Bangkok Chinese syndicates.

From official international and U.S. documents, McCoy demonstrates the staggering increase in opium production which ensued. Between 1945 and 1962 Burma’s annual production increased from perhaps 40 tons to 400 tons, Thailand’s from 7 tons to over 100 tons (p. 145), that of Laos from perhaps 30 tons to 100-150 tons (p. 87). McCoy quotes from a 1970 U.S. Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs (BNDD) report that

> *By the end of the 1950s, Burma, Laos, and Thailand together had become a massive producer and the source of more than half the world’s present illicit supply of 1,250 to 1,400 tons annually.* (p. 145)

He identifies a key factor in this forced economic “take-off in the Burma-Thailand opium trade” (p. 144) as “CIA support for Phao [Thailand’s former police chief] and the KMT” through “CIA front organizations” such as Sea Supply Corporation and Civil Air Transport (or CAT, later Air America). As a possible explanation for the CIA’s modernization of the opium trade, he points to United States decisions, recorded in the Pentagon Papers, “to interfere with communist activities in Southeast Asia” (April 1950), and “activate anti-communist groups and activities” among “the overseas Chinese communities in Southeast Asia.” (January 1954)

McCoy argues furthermore that little changed with the fall of Phao, the ending of the official opium monopoly in 1959, and the supervision of illicit traffic by Phao’s successors Sarit Thanarat and Praphat Charusathien.

While the laws signaled a crackdown on opium smoking and served to drive the addict population to heroin, [they have] in no way affected the other aspects of the drug trade; Bangkok remains a major Asian opium capital. Little has changed since General Phao’s heyday: today, rather than being directly involved, high-ranking government leaders are content to accept generous retainers from powerful Bangkok-based Chinese syndicates that have taken full responsibility for managing the traffic. There can be little doubt that CIA support was an invaluable asset to General Phao in managing the opium traffic. (p. 144)

Turning to Indochina, McCoy demonstrates an analogous survival of the narcotics traffic under various regimes, in Laos (under the supervision of Generals Phoumi Nosavan, Ouane Rattikone and Vang Pao), and in Vietnam. In what is perhaps his most original and valuable section, McCoy is able to demonstrate that the survival and growth of the narcotics traffic in Vietnam is no accident, but a necessary by-product of U.S. policy, for chaos has been the result of all efforts to construct a non-communist power apparatus on any alternative organizational and financial base. McCoy looks behind the succession of official leaders to their “power brokers” (Nhu for Diem, Loan for Ky, Khoi for Khiem, Dan Van Quang for Thieu), whose task it has been to meld intelligence and illicit traffic into a viable control network.

Others have told this story before, but never in such detail; and McCoy is able to document his most controversial charges by exhaustive footnotes. Many of these cite interviews with U.S. or allied officials, above all with U.S. intelligence advisers and case officers who were on the scene. Members of General Lansdale’s Vietnam teams (Lansdale himself, Lucius Conein, Charles F. Sweet) are frequently quoted, along with some of Lansdale’s confidential dispatches not in the Pentagon Papers.

It is, for example, Conein, the case officer in the Diem assassination, who explains

> that Loan [Ky’s power broker] was given wholehearted U.S. support because “We wanted effective security in Saigon above all else, and Loan could provide that security. . . . the same professionals who organized corruption for Diem and Nhu were still in charge of police and intelligence. Loan simply passed the word among these guys and put the old system back together again.” (p. 168)

The word that “a principal in the opium traffic” was Thieu’s power-broker, Premier Khiem’s brother Tran thien Khoi, is quoted verbatim from a 1971 U.S. provost marshal’s report. (p. 207)

The novelty and immense value of McCoy’s book lies not so much in these charges, as in his meticulous and often official documentation. But the book’s chief strength—its access to U.S. government officials and their reports—is also its chief weakness. The price for access to valuable revelations seems to have been a certain reluctance to evaluate them against published sources. In part this is the predictable outcome of venturing, like Livingstone the explorer or Freud the psychoanalyst, into the dark and largely uncharted realms of organized crime. At times, however, McCoy seems unduly selective and uncritical in his transmission of important new information.
In general, McCoy seems unwilling to go beyond the admissions and hypotheses of his chief informants—Landsdale, Conein, and members of the BNDD. The outcome may be viewed as a powerful weapon in the current intra-governmental struggle over two related policies, narcotics and the Kuomintang. His book can thus be compared to the first wave of U.S. press revelations about the KMT opium airlift in April 1953, in the midst of U.S. efforts to disengage in Korea and a rumored showdown between Dulles and the China Lobby backers of Senator Knowland. And the book may be compared to the second wave of revelations in February 1961, when Kennedy’s moves to disengage in Laos were actively resisted by local CIA elements, the Kuomintang, and the radical U.S. right. The issue is not yet dead. Marine General Walt is still, with some Congressional support, challenging U.S. recognition of Peking with the old but recurring story of the Maoist heroin conspiracy that emerged two decades ago from the propaganda mills of the KMT and the CIA’s right wing. If McCoy’s book has helped in any way to end the Indochina hot war, cut down the flow of Asian heroin, and normalize relations between Washington and Peking, one should not be too ungrateful.

But McCoy’s heavy reliance on official U.S. sources leads frequently to an underestimate of U.S. responsibility for the local criminalization of politics. For example, Tu Yueh-sheng, the Shanghai “opium king” used by Chiang and the foreign banks to crush the 1927 communist uprising, is cited as “the most influential resident, French concession.” (p. 227) It is only in Leonard Adams’ trenchant and objective (though unfortunately abbreviated) “Appendix” that we learn that Tu was also “an employee of the American-owned Shanghai Power Company,” a local subsidiary of the American and Foreign Power Company. (p. 381) The book says nothing about Shanghai Power’s Wall Street interlocks (through Italian Superpower), with Italian financial backers of Mussolini and the Sicilian Mafia, or with the National City Bank of New York, the landlords for Meyer Lansky’s pre-war racetrack operations in Havana (though McCoy does note that Lansky leased his racetrack “from a reputable New York bank,” p. 26).

McCoy is equally silent about allegations that the world opium traffic helped finance elements of the 1950s China Lobby, and that Chinese-American tong leaders like the Hip Sings, identified as prominent in domestic U.S. opium distribution in the 1930s and again in the 1950s, were also utilized by the KMT-linked Association of the Six Companies to control San Francisco’s Chinatown. The recurring importance of opium-linked secret societies to the KMT’s control of overseas Chinese appears to have been no accident, but a tribute to the far-flung intelligence network established for Chiang by Tai Li, who worked closely with Tu Yueh-sheng’s Green Gang and also recruited (and almost certainly financed) his own apparatus through opium operations. Yet Tai Li and his “Bureau of Investigation and Statistics” are not mentioned once in McCoy’s book. There is only one passing reference to the opium activities of its successor manifestation, the so-called “Asian People’s Anti-Communist League” (now the World Anti-Communist League), whose Taiwan secretary admitted responsibility for the illegal 1961 plane flights to the KMT traffickers in Burma. Could this silence be partly because Bernie Yoh, a former Tai Li contact with Tu Yueh-sheng who was later “an intelligence adviser to President Diem,” was one of McCoy’s informative Washington sources? (McCoy, pp. 162, 408)

In the prewar Nye Senate Hearings into the U.S. munitions industry, one finds evidence for the triangular economic base which made the post-war China Lobby so powerful. Kuomintang China in the 1930s was one of the most important foreign markets for the burgeoning U.S. aviation industry and was almost the only place where U.S.-built military aircraft could be tested under combat conditions in anticipation of World War II. In the fierce competition for these sales, a key role was played by private American agents like William Pawley (a representative through Intercontinent of Curtiss-Wright and DuPont interests) and private Chinese agents like George Sokolsky (for the Soong family), both these men would become prominent in the postwar China Lobby. These agents handled a wide range of plane and arms deals, including the hiring of U.S. “instructors” (with the cooperation of the U.S. Commerce Department) to fly the planes. Many of these deals were with unrecognized governments like that of Canton (through Pawley and the Soong Bank of Canton), and quite possibly illegal under U.S. neutrality laws.

Because of the decay of the Chinese economy and corruption at its center, much of the financing for these important deals came from the overseas Chinese communities, such as, specifically, the Cantonese “Six Companies” of San Francisco. From other sources one gathers clues that at least some of the vast sums involved came from narcotics. Take, for example, the San Francisco celebrity Dr. Margaret Chung, once famed for her “club” of U.S. servicemen which she organized in 1931, for the private fliers engaged as “instructors” as part of the plane deals for the Chinese Air Force. Years later, when William Pawley organized Chennault’s Flying Tigers (the precursor of the CIA’s Civil Air Transport and Air America, which flew Asian opium in the 1950s and 1960s), “Mom” Chung became known as the “Doctor of the Flying Tigers” and “the unofficial liaison between the Chinese Government and the United States in the organization of the Flying Tigers.”

In the early 1940s, federal narcotics agents became interested in Dr. Chung’s very close relationship with Virginia Hill, the exotic mistress of West Coast crime figure (and narcotics smuggler) “Bugsy” Siegel. According to Virginia Hill’s biographer, Dr. Chung was in fact an intimate of many of Virginia’s conferees in the Mafia-controlled brotherhood of crime—including Bugsy Siegel, the Fischetti brothers . . . Frank Costello, and Joe Adonis. . . . A West Coast narcotics agent filed a report during the early forties which states that “Dr. Margaret Chung also known as Madam Chung is in the narcotic traffic in San Francisco and is also very intimate with Virginia Hill . . . . and with Siegel. . . . It is known by federal agents that she accepted large cash payments from Bugsy and Virginia, delivered packages to Virginia in various cities . . . made a trip to Mexico City with Virginia in 1943 . . . They suspected Dr. Chung of trafficking in drugs and also of subversive activities but were never able to make a case against her. . . . Virginia . . . often used her friends as cover for her criminal activities—some knowingly, others unknowingly or unwittingly, at best, possibly like some of
the Flying Tigers who were indicted for smuggling in “Mom” Chung’s boy.t.y. 14

This sinister background to the establishment of the Flying Tigers (and hence ultimately of Civil Air Transport with its opium connections) casts light on the demonstrable postwar links between the China Lobby and figures in organized crime. More specifically it elucidates the tripartite role of Senator McCarran at the heart of the China Lobby, the aviation lobby (more specifically as a lobbyist for Pan Am, the U.S. airline which was expropriated in China and later staffed Air America), and the organized crime lobby. 15

Clearly the politics of opium affects not only the victims but also the manipulators of narcotics. The abolition of the French Opium Monopoly in 1946 helped inaugurate the last criminal era of French interference in Indochina: the resulting boost to corruption and gangsterism was comparable to the lasting political effects of Prohibition in the United States. The delegated traffic in opium became only one of the profitable trafics which completely venuzzed politics not only in Saigon but also in Paris—as the 1949 affaire des généraux was to make obvious. 16 More prominent and influential was the trafic des piastres—the huge inside deals in currency and import licenses—which handed both vast profits and political leverage to all of the last-ditch colonialists from the Banque de l’Indochine down. Opium became only one of the operations in this vast criminal polity—symbolized by the opium factory which Bay Vien and his Binh Xuyen gang operated in the back of the huge Grand Monde Casino, while the Binh Xuyen, with the support of the Corsican money-changers in the Rue Catinat, ran Saigon for the French the way Tu Yueh-sheng’s Green Gang had run Shanghai. 17

There are three reasons why Americans, and not just Asian scholars, should study closely the impact of the French trafics, including opium, on the political processes of both Saigon and Paris. First, political corruption by the trafics became a major factor underlying France’s inability to disengage from Indochina (and a factor ultimately in the political overthrow of the Fourth Republic). Second, McCoy’s denials notwithstanding, there are signs of American involvement in this politics of corruption from as early as 1947. Third, the apparatus and personnel of the trafic de piastres have continued with little abatement from the French through the American phases of the Indochina War. 18 In 1969 Senator Ribicoff announced that a Senate investigation of only 13 New York bank accounts “uncovered evidence of black market money transactions [in Saigon] amounting to about $360 million during each of the past 5 years.” 19

McCoy’s focus on the narcotics traffic at the expense of the related currency manipulations has the effect of falsely silhouetting the U.S. Government as a foe of local corruption. For while it is true that Washington has shown interest in preventing the flow of heroin in this country, it is also true that local corruption, subsidized in the end by the metropolitan taxpayers of France and later the United States, has, since the decline of legitimate trade after World War II, been the mainstay of the isolated pseudo-economies of Saigon and Vientiane. McCoy notes (p. 250) that

Laos’s low duty on imported gold and its government’s active participation in the smuggling trade have long made it the major source of illicit gold for Thailand and South Vietnam. . . . As thousands of free-spending GIs poured into Vietnam during the early years of the war, Saigon’s black market prospered and Laos’s gold imports shot up to seventy-two tons by 1965. The 8.5 percent import duty provided the Royal Lao government with more than 40 percent of its total tax revenues. . . . When the establishment of a gold market in Singapore in 1969 challenged Laos’s position as the major gold entrepot in Southeast Asia . . . [Finance Minister] Sisouk na Champassak told a BBC reporter, “The only export we can develop here is opium, and we should increase our production and export of it.”

The South Vietnamese economy’s dependence on organized corruption may be less overt. Its lack of self-sufficiency is, however, readily discernible by comparing Saigon’s exports in any given period ($15 million in 1970) to its imports ($584 million in 1970). 20 The corrupt diversion of official U.S. support programs has the side-effect of enriching a local comprador Honda-driving “new class”: this is obvious. 16 More prominent and influential was the trafic des piastres—the huge inside deals in currency and import licenses—which handed both vast profits and political leverage to all of the last-ditch colonialists from the Banque de l’Indochine down. Opium became only one of the operations in this vast criminal polity—symbolized by the opium factory which Bay Vien and his Binh Xuyen gang operated in the back of the huge Grand Monde Casino, while the Binh Xuyen, with the support of the Corsican money-changers in the Rue Catinat, ran Saigon for the French the way Tu Yueh-sheng’s Green Gang had run Shanghai. 17

The Indochinese War is like a stiff breeze for the French economy. . . . The war costs the French state a billion a day (U.S. $3 million in those days), but it brings in far more than that to the French, not just here but at home. . . . the profits wind up in France, finally, and are invested there. That’s the kind of inflation you want. 21

One of the most significant revelations of the Senate inquiry into U.S. currency manipulations in Vietnam was the prominent if largely passive role of leading New York banks, including some of the very same bank officials who had once been numbered among the “American Friends of Vietnam.” One of these banks, First National City, had even set up a special branch to handle the burgeoning traffic in Vietnamese black-market profits and smuggled gold through the tiny Arabian sheikdom of Dubai.

The U.S. Government, even if it moved sporadically to combat the narcotics activities of these corrupt comprador classes in Southeast Asia, had no interest in alienating either of these classes—particularly the overseas Chinese of Bangkok and Saigon—or the structures which have given them anticomunist “protection.” McCoy (relying on first-hand accounts from Lansdale, Conein, and a former Binh Xuyen protege) gives a good account of two apparent U.S. crackdowns on narcotics-smuggling apparatus—the Binh Xuyen in 1954 and the Loan apparatus in 1968. 22 But both of these crackdowns occurred only after the gangs were judged to have turned anti-American (Loan, though McCoy does not mention this, was suspected by some Americans of a secret accommodation with Hanoi along with other members of the northern Dai Viet party.) 23

About the U.S. alliance with the Binh Xuyen McCoy is silent. “Through the Binh Xuyen,” he writes

the French 2ème Bureau [Intelligence] countered the growing power of the nationalist parties, kept Viet Minh...
terrorists off the streets, and battled the American CIA for control of South Vietnam. (p. 117)

These words may serve to describe the situation in 1954. But the Pentagon Papers tell us that in 1947, a period of closer French-U.S. collaboration, Binh Xuyen leader Bay Vien "was persuaded to cooperate with the National United Front," an anticommunist coalition of nationalist parties then working closely with public and secret U.S. efforts (involving Ngo dinh Diem and William Bullitt) to reinsert Bao Dai into Vietnamese politics as a "Third Force." 24 To some informed French observers, this national United Front appeared "xenophobe [anti-French] and encouraged instead "by the Kuomintang, the Chinese War Lords, and the United States." 25

Again McCoy, from French sources and Conein, tells how in the early 1950s in Indochina "the French intelligence community, having secretly taken over the opium trade," (p. 95) used it to finance special force operations with Montagnards (Operation X). He is silent about U.S. connections to Operation X. Instead, he notes how Major Roger Trinquier, with the sanction of General Raoul Salan

assured Operation X a steady supply of Meo opium by ordering his liaison officers serving with Meo commander Touby Lyfoung . . . to buy opium . . . Trinquier had the mountain guerrillas fly it to Cap Saint Jacques (Vungtau) near Saigon . . . where the Action Service school trained hill tribe mercenaries at a military base. From Cap Saint Jacques the opium was trucked the sixty miles into Saigon and turned over to the Binh Xuyen bandits, who were there serving as the city's local militia and managing its opium traffic, under the supervision of Capt. Antoine Savani of the 2eme Bureau . . . Any surplus opium the Binh Xuyen were unable to market was sold to local Chinese merchants for export to Hong Kong or else to the Corsican criminal syndicates in Saigon for shipment to Marseille. (p. 96)

McCoy describes elsewhere how "the clandestine intervention of the CIA" in 1947 displaced the Communist control of Marseille by "a Socialist-underworld alliance" with the Guerini brothers of the milieu. (p. 38) In 1958 Trinquier, Salan, and other veterans of their Vietnam/Action Service cadres, would successfully plot the overthrow of the Fourth Republic with the criminal support of the Corsican power structure in Marseille. 26

But McCoy does not mention that in the 1951 period Trinquier had already won the favor of American military advisers in Saigon, had attached two American officers to his staff, and had received American equipment for his guerrilla units. 27 And in keeping with the current line of the BNDD, he actively contests (e.g., p. 258) the former contention of U.S. narcotics officials that opium shipments (i.e., from Trinquier's Special Forces)

when French Indochina existed . . . were shipped to the labs around Marseille, France, to the Corsican underworld there, and then transshipped to the United States. . . . The Corsican underworld element are cousins to the Sicilians. . . . and . . . base an efficient interchange in criminal activity. 28

Such links of Asian opium to the continental United States before 1968 seem in McCoy's book to be systematically ignored or even effaced. Given the size and geographic limitations of his book, one can hardly fault him for his simple omissions, even for his silence about the role of private economic interests (such as the Banque de l'Indochine and their close allies the Soong banking network). 29 But to have distorted or even falsified the evidence he uses is a more serious matter, even if it can be referred back to McCoy's choice of sources.

For example, McCoy quotes U.S. narcotics officials today to ridicule the 1950s claims by then-U.S. Narcotics Commissioner Anslinger (and his government) about Communist China's "twenty-year plan to finance political activities and spread addiction" in the United States. 30 But McCoy subscribes to the equally dubious "Turkey hypothesis" which replaced Anslinger's in the 1960s: namely, that all the U.S. plague of heroin produced in the laboratories of Marseille could be attributed to opium grown in the Middle East. 31 McCoy even claims that

Throughout the 1960's . . . the U.S. Bureau of Narcotics paid almost no attention to Asia, there were few seizures of Asian heroin and little awareness of the colony's growing role in the international traffic. It was not until American GIs serving in Vietnam began using . . . heroin refined in the Golden Triangle region that any attention was focused on the Asian heroin trade. (pp. 223-24)

This is an important claim, and it is quite false. In 1960, as he knows, the United States officially listed Hong Kong as the first of the "principal sources of the diacetylmorphine [heroin] seized in the United States", 32 and the Federal Bureau of Narcotics showed its concern by opening a branch office in Hong Kong in 1963. Anslinger himself, while transmitting KMT propaganda about a Red Chinese opium conspiracy, proved himself to be well-informed about the worldwide significance of the Northern Thailand traffic, even to such details as the roles played by a Macao financial syndicate, and a Bangkok official of the Soong Bank of Canton. 33

Again, McCoy writes that the KMT troops in Burma received "enormous quantities of U.S. arms" from "a mysterious Bangkok-based American company named Sea Supply Corporation." (p. 130) In fact, the company's headquarters was in Miami, Florida. Its Miami counsel (Paul L. E. Helliwell, a former OSS officer and Thai consul) was employed by a firm which later interlocked with the same Miami National Bank used as a conduit for syndicate funds by John Pullman, whom McCoy identifies (p. 216) as Meyer Lansky's "courier and financial expert" and 1965 contact man with narcotics elements in Hong Kong. 34

What we may call the delegeralization of politics in postwar French Indochina (the passage of power to an unscrupulous coalition of criminal gangs, financial interests, and intelligence agencies) led to a visible delegeralization of politics in the Fourth Republic as well. (And even the Fifth Republic: the ongoing involvement of the Service de Documentation Extérieure et de Contre-espionnage (SDECE) with narcotics gangsters was revealed by the Ben Barka scandal of 1965; while Col. Paul Fournier, a top SDECE official and successor to Trinquier in Indochina, was indicted for conspiring to smuggle narcotics by a U.S. court in November 1971). 35 The story of opium and related traffics points to a similar corruption of domestic United States politics after this country took over the imperial and criminal legacy of the

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French.

McCoy himself mentions the 1968 visit of Santo Tramontinino, a Florida Mafia chieftain and former associate of Meyer Lansky, to the Corsican gangsters of Saigon (p. 216); and how Frank Furci, son of a Tramontina lieutenant and himself a Tramontina contact in the Far East, helped finance the Marech Company formed by Sergeant William O. Wooldridge (who was appointed in 1966 to be senior NCO of the U.S. Army) to draw off illegal profits from the operations of NCO Clubs in Vietnam. (pp. 214-15)

Senator Ribicoff’s Hearings into fraud and corruption heard the even more omenous testimony that the “actual source” of the $5,000 which Furci put up for Wooldridge and his partners was the currency exchange house of Nicholas Deak. Nicholas Deak, the OSS Chief in Saigon in late 1945, was then in charge of liaison to the counterguerrilla operations of Massu and Trainquier; since then he has been accused of handling the CIA’s black operations against the currencies of governments (e.g., Iran and Indonesia) which it wishes to overthrow.

The political scandal of the Watergate break-in, too complicated to get into here, revealed the existence of a criminal-financial milieu in Miami with links (through heroin) to that of Marseille and (through military corruption) to that of Saigon. Two of the former CIA agents arrested in that break-in (Barker and Fiorini) had close links to the gun-running and gambling activities of that milieu (which are so frequently associated with narcotics). So did the Republic National Bank of Miami through which Barker channeled his funds from the Committee to Re-elect the President. In addition the first President of this bank, Ernest Janis, was also a former chairman of the Miami National Bank, some of whose directors later set up a third Miami bank and brought in James Angloine, one of James McCord’s senior associates in the CIA.

Senate committees have noted the importance of Miami as a meeting place for international narcotics traffickers (including Tramontina) and also Tramontina’s control of the bolita numbers racket in the Cuban exile community. Proceeds from such ventures have found their way into Florida real estate. Bebe Rebozo was associated in one construction deal with “Big Al” Polizzi (said by Narcotics officials to be “one of the most influential figures of the underworld in the United States” and “associated with international narcotics traffickers”); and Rebozo was also “involved” (according to Jack Anderson) in the land deals of Bernard Barker.

Another of those arrested in the Watergate, Eugenio Martinez, allegedly worked for a Syndicate-linked Miami real estate company (Keyes Realty), whose purchases on Key Biscayne have been linked not only to Rebozo but also to Mafia funds transmitted through Cuba by Lucky Luciano. The lawyers for this firm, named with it in the Kefauver hearings, once included a young veteran of Army Intelligence with Vietnamese experience in 1951-52, Dinty Warrington Whiting. Whiting, convicted and disbarred in 1961 for mail fraud, is now a fugitive from a 1971 stock fraud indictment involving John Lombardozi, brother of Mafia boss Carmine Lombardozi.

Another CIA agent in Saigon, who in 1950 worked up a proposal for support of Tramontina’s Montagnard operations, also emerged in Miami real estate deals along with Whiting—as short-term secretary for a real estate company, controlled by Jimmy Hoffa’s friend Arthur Desser, which by 1964 interlocked heavily with the Miami National Bank. Desser’s company bought $13 million worth of the Key Biscayne land handled by Whiting’s law firm. After Desser’s company defaulted on payments, some of the same land was taken up by Bebe Rebozo and Richard Nixon. Nixon seems to have been aware of the potential embarrassment: he delayed registration of his title for four years, until two previous mortgages held by Desser had been paid off.

Others from this Miami milieu include former China Lobbyist William Pawley (a client of Whiting’s law firm and one of Nixon’s key connections to the Cuban exile community) and J. Lawrence King, a Nixon-appointed judge who in 1964 was a director of the Lansky-linked Miami National Bank and also of an insurance company, with the former counsel of the sea supply Corporation in Bangkok. Arthur W. Arundel, a member of Lansdale’s Saigon Military Mission in 1954-55, was later named in connection with a suspicious bank “loan” in the Miami-linked Bobby Baker scandal (just as his father, a Pepsi-Cola bottler, had earlier been named for his important “loan” to Senator Joe McCarthy, the so-called “Pepsi-Cola Kid”).

Daniel Ludwig, a rich developer of a Bahamas casino, leased it to Lansky associate Sam Cohen, of the same Miami National Bank. Ludwig was also director of a holding company whose subsidiaries, Sea-Land and Equipment Incorporated, were by 1968 among the largest contractors for the war in Vietnam. In 1963 Ludwig’s National Bulk Carriers gave its legal business to the firm of Nixon, Mudge, Rose, Guthrie and Alexander, after Richard Nixon entered the firm. The firm’s roster of clients also included Mitsui of Japan, the most prominent Japanese representatives in Indochina during World War II (Mitsui’s American representative, Henry Kearns, traveled to Asia with his old friend Richard Nixon in 1964); Pepsi-Cola (for whom Nixon secured a favorable franchise in Taiwan in 1964), and above all the Banque de Paris et des Pays Bas (or Paribas), the sanitized investment reincarnation of the Old Banque de l’Indochine.

These are elements of the delegitimization of politics in the U.S. analogous to that which occurred in France. Watergate has begun to reveal the threat of criminal corruption not only to local government but to the heart of the American constitutional process. Though the full story of corruption in Indochina is not likely to be told—at least, not without a massive attack dwarfing Watergate—we ignore the symptoms at our own peril.

That Al McCoy has chosen to stay close to the political line of the U.S. government’s liberal faction is understandable: a symptom of our own corruption is that one cannot write a completely candid book about America and expect its message to be heard. Yet it seems unlikely to think that one can dismantle the U.S. machinery of oppression in Southeast Asia without exposing the coalition of corrupt interests which have profited from that machinery. This McCoy does not do: he explores the links of heroin to the politics of Vietnam, Laos, Thailand, but not the United States.

To resort to similes: McCoy looks at Vietnam as through a telescope. As a result he sees in great detail what appears at the other end of his instrument. What we need now is a scholar who will peer into Vietnam as into a mirror. For what is ultimately needed, and what will be found there, is a better image, not just of Asia, but of ourselves.
NOTES

1. Interview with Judy Coburn, news correspondent in Phnom Penh, 1972. This Special Forces camp was in Laos, in the same area where McCoy reports that Vietnamese special forces contingents under Gen. Dang Van Quang have also been recently involved in heroin smuggling. New York Times, August 8, 1971, p. 11. McCoy notes that “General Quang’s apparatus did not become heavily involved in the narcotics trade until the Cambodian invasion of May 1970,” which opened up the Mekong for transshipments.

2. Heroin, McCoy reminds us, was originally the Bayer Company’s brand-name for its “non-addictive” morphine substitute, advertised as “best for coughs.” In America it was called the “antiomium pill” in China. After heroin sales were severely restricted by the Geneva Convention of 1925, world heroin production shifted to clandestine laboratories in China, some controlled by the anticommunist labor gangster Tu Yueh-sheng. The “Lion and Globe” trademark of the Bayer Company is still the model for competing brands of heroin in the Burma-Laos-Thailand “Golden Triangle,” and through them for the “Tiger and Globe” flag used in the 1960s by the rebel Shan National Army, headed by a dissident Burmese agent of the CIA.

3. McCoy, p. 67; U.S. Treasury Department, Bureau of Narcotics, Traffic in Opium and Other Dangerous Drugs for the Year Ended December 31, 1950, p. 3.


8. Bernard Yoh appears to have been a source for McCoy’s conclusion that the Laotian opium trafficking of Tran Kim Tuyen’s CIA-financed intelligence network (under Ngo dinh Nhu) was probably reduced after the introduction of Nationalist Chinese personnel (McCoy, pp. 162–63, 408). Nothing in McCoy’s book even hints that Yoh was himself a Nationalist Chinese and former agent of Tai Li’s (Miles, A Different Kind of War, p. 179).


16. L’affaire des généraux of 1949 involved an MRП-organized leak to discredit certain Socialist competitors with American backing who supported the “Third Force” solution of General Nguyen Van Xuan. It suggested corruption at the highest levels of the French SDECE and indeed of the government. Cf. Philip M. Williams, War, Plots and Scandals in Post-War France (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1970), pp. 37–48; Thyraud de Vosjoli, Le Trafic des Piastres (Paris: Deux Rives, 1953), pp. 85, 125; Alexander Werth, France 1940–55 (Boston: Beacon, 1956), p. 443: “Here was the piastre swindle, the corruption, the shady deals between a crook called Peyré and important personages of the Republic; the Socialist politicians who were trying to hush up leakages; the puppet regime of Bao Dai set up by the Movement Republican Populaire (MRП) politicians and President Auriol; the Socialists and the MRП who were jockeying for places in the gigantic swindle of the Indo-China war; and the rival and ‘parallel’ police services who were cutting each others’ throats in Paris and Saigon, and the Saigon gangs, with their dollar rackets and their piastre rackets and their trafficking in military secrets.”


18. James Hamilton-Paterson, The Greedy War (New York: David McKay, 1971). At least one of the French import houses that profited from the piastre traffic, Alcan et Cie., was represented at a New York Economic Conference organized in 1958 by the so-called “American Friends of Vietnam.”


21. Bodard, Quicksand War, p. 87.

22. Without formally charging that the U.S. plotted the downfall of Loan, McCoy notes the “mysterious incident” in which five of Loan’s closest supporters were killed by a U.S. helicopter in 1968, four days before a concerted and lasting purge of the remaining Ky-Loan cadres.

23. Richard Critchfield, The Long Crusade (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1968), passim. Critchfield transmits a story (p. 393) that one year before the dramatic Loan purge, three U.S. military counterintelligence officers had been murdered while investigating a Loan-Dai Viet “massive opium-smuggling operation from northern Thailand and Laos into Saigon in which Vietnamese air force planes [under Ky] had figured. . . . Pierre Ferri-Pisani, a Corsican who had...
committed suicide in Paris in 1967, had allegedly also been involved in the ring." Perri-Pisani has long been identified as the organizer of the "elite criminal terror squad" recruited by the AFL and CIA with the support of the Guerini gang to break the Communist control of the Marseille docks. (McCoy, p. 46).


25. Werth, p. 446. One of its covert organizers, a former Giraudist named Meynier, who is today a French admiral, had worked during World War II with right-wing OSS and KMT agents against Guallist resistance projects for Indochina (Smith, OSS, p. 324). There are many signs of an essential continuity between the 1947 Front, the Binh Xuyen Front of 1954 (in both of which the Dai Viet participated), and the Dai Viet apparatus today. By 1957 Tran Van Yuen, the pro-KMT Front lawyer who negotiated the 1947 Bay Vien alliance, was a prime suspect in U.S. fears of northern Dai Viet accommodations with Hanoi (Warner, p. 76; Crichtfield, pp. 337-38).

26. Williams, pp. 137, 151; Edgar S. Furniss, Jr., France, Troubled Ally (New York: Praeger, 1960), p. 320; Alexander Werth, The De Gaulle Revolution (London: Robert Hale, 1960), pp. 81-83. The "integration" demonstrations of May 1958, which provide such a rousing and misleading climax to the film The Battle of Algiers, are also said to have been organized by Trinquier.


29. A French study of the Banque de l'Indochine claims that the germ of the post-war trafic des piastres came from an October 1945 meeting in Kunming between Jean Laurent of the Banque de l'Indochine and T. V. Soong and Soong's secretary Linh Chian (Arthur Laurent, La Banque de l'Indochine et la Piastre, [Paris: Deux Rives, 1954], p. 82). The same study identifies T. V. Soong as the principal stockholder (p. 113) in the Banque Franca-Chinoise, a Banque de l'Indochine subsidiary named elsewhere (Despuech, Le Trafic des Piastres, pp. 92-98) as prominent in the piastre traffic and also the affaire des généraux. Before World War II up to 75 percent of the Banque de l'Indochine's operations were in China (Laurent, pp. 51, 203).

30. UN Commission on Narcotic Drugs, Report of the Ninth Session (1954), E/ CN.7/283, p. 22. With Anslinger on this U.S. delegation was Nathaniel Goldstein, a prominent anticommunist and leading opponent of proposals to treat heroin as a medical (rather than crime) drug. One of Mr. Goldstein's law partners, OSS-veteran Murray Gurfein, helped negotiate the postwar pardon for Lucky Luciano, allegedly for Mafia help in the 1943 invasion of Sicily (McCoy, p. 21; Scott, p. 222). Another partner, OSS-veteran Henry Hyde, took part in the Giraudist liberation of Corsica in 1943, which is said to have involved the Corsican Mafia.

31. A high BNDD official recently admitted publicly that the Bureau simply assumes a Middle East origin for all Marseille heroin.


37. R. Harris Smith, OSS, pp. 346-47.

38. Two of the bank's directors have been Col. Jacob Arvey (allegedly associated through Charles "the Babe" Baron with Syndicate gambling interests in Cuba) and Luis Botifoll, who was involved in 1958 with the anti-Batista operations funded and supplied in part by convicted Miami gunrunner (and former Cuban premier) Carlos Prio Socarras, with Syndicate assistance. Fiorini (alias Sturgis) was part of this operation; while in 1972 Barker's real estate office occupied the same obscure Miami building as Prio's political headquarters.


41. Jeff Gerth, "Nixon and the Mafia," Sundance (November/December 1972), pp. 36, 38. Whiting, stationed in Hanoi and Saigon under State Department cover in 1951-52, was listed in the Martindale-Hubbell legal directory as a veteran of Department of the Army General Staff Intelligence Directorate.


44. Jeff Gerth, p. 44; Kirkpatrick Sale, p. 12.

45. Scott, The War Conspiracy, p. 211; Kirkpatrick Sale, p. 12. Cf. Jeff Gerth, p. 42: "In October 1970, Nixon appointed King to be a judge in the U.S. District Court for Southern Florida. . . . One of King's first cases as a judge involved a suit against Bebe Rebozo's Key Biscayne Bank. It involved the passage of some stolen stock through the bank, and, according to several Miami reporters, King was in the process of quietly dismissing the case until the Miami News began looking into it." Gerth links King's former law partner, Marion Sibley, to the real estate dealings on Key Biscayne involving Nixon, Rebozo, Keyes Realty, corrupt former Cuban officials, and perhaps Lucky Luciano.


47. Gerth, pp. 42, 65.


Restructuring the Empire:
The Nixon Doctrine after Vietnam

by Michael T. Klare

Ever since Richard Nixon announced that the United States would adopt a "low profile" defense posture in Asia, American foreign affairs analysts have sought to construct an accurate model of the new policy. Senate Majority Leader Mike Mansfield, who analyzed the Nixon Doctrine in a 1969 report to the Congress, concluded that henceforth "The United States will avoid the creation of situations in which there is such dependence on us that, inevitably, we become enmeshed in what are essentially Asian problems and conflicts." 1 Lest this conclusion alarm any of our more insecure clients in the area, Vice President Agnew toured Asia in early 1970 to announce that the President had never intended such a sweeping reversal of policy: "Let me make it very clear," he told newsmen in Canberra, "that despite a great deal of speculation and rumor, we are not withdrawing from Asia and the Pacific .... As a Pacific power, we will remain in the Pacific." 2 Nixon himself seems to have encouraged this dichotomy: thus the invasion of Cambodia in 1970 and the massive air attacks on Hanoi in 1972 suggested that he was committed to the interventionist stance represented by Agnew; while the cease-fire in Vietnam and the initiation of diplomatic contacts with China suggest that he leans toward the more restrained position of Mansfield.

In Open Secret, Virginia Brodine, Mark Selden and John Dower attempt to clear away some of the ambiguities surrounding the Nixon Doctrine in order to expose its neo-colonial foundation. They argue convincingly that the "Kissinger-Nixon Doctrine" is a plan for continued U.S. domination of Asia, embracing the "containment" policies of the early Cold Warriors, but clothed in the new rhetoric of regional cooperation and international détente. American economic penetration will henceforth be disguised as participation in "multinational" ventures, while military intervention will be portrayed as "advisory support" to indigenous troops. At no point, however, has the United States abandoned its long-standing goal of restructuring Asian societies so as to most efficiently serve the needs of America's corporate system. The Nixon Doctrine, according to Dower, "represents little more than the new face of American empire. It applies cosmetics to the scarred strategies of the past; here and there, where the old features of the imperium have become particularly battered, there is even a little bit of plastic surgery." (pp. 134-5)

In "Henry Kissinger's Diplomacy of Force," the first of two major essays in Open Secret, Brodine and Selden trace Nixon's Vietnam war policies to the theoretical writings of National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger. As a professor at Harvard, Kissinger attempted to plug the gaps in American defense strategy that had developed as a result of our dependence on massive retaliation; he recognized that the United States would not use thermonuclear weapons in situations which did not threaten our critical national interests, and that therefore we were vulnerable to attacks on the periphery of the empire where nuclear retaliation was not perceived as a likely U.S. response. As an alternative to defeat in "brush-fire" wars or mutual annihilation in an all-out nuclear war, Kissinger proposed the use of "tactical" nuclear weapons to assure U.S. battlefield supremacy. Arguing that "international order" cannot be maintained without "a stable domestic system in the new countries," he also advocated a U.S. "police" role in the suppression of national liberation struggles in the Third World. 3 On this basis, he subsequently endorsed the U.S. intervention in Vietnam and advocated the use of overwhelming force to protect our client governments in Asia. As Brodine and Selden point out, Kissinger also provided the model for America's "game plan" in Indochina: the purpose of limited war, he wrote in 1957, "is to inflict losses or to pose risks for the enemy out of proportion to the objectives under dispute." Such conflicts should be fought by applying "graduated amounts of destruction" alternating with "breathing spaces for political contacts." 4 Thus follow the sequence of events in Vietnam.

In "The New Face of Empire," the second major essay in Open Secret, John Dower argues that the Nixon Doctrine represents little more than a timely readjustment of the Cold War policies which governed U.S. operations in Asia since World War II. One of the principal ingredients of the Doctrine—the reliance on indigenous troops to provide a "first line of defense" against insurgency—has always, according to
Dower, been a goal of U.S. strategy in Asia. Thus a 1952 National Security Memorandum cited in Open Secret calls for the U.S. to "Assist in developing indigenous armed forces [in Indochina] which will eventually be capable of maintaining internal security without assistance by French units." France has long since been chased out of Southeast Asia, but, as Dower shows, the United States is still trying to develop indigenous forces capable of maintaining internal security without assistance by Western units. The cost of such mercenary forces is rising rapidly, however, and the Nixon Administration hopes to persuade Japan to help train and equip indigenous counterinsurgency troops, and generally to serve as a junior partner in the management of our Asian empire.

Many of the points made by Brodine, Selden and Dower are given visual emphasis in a series of extraordinary maps drawn up by Keith Buchanan, Professor of Geography at Victoria University, Wellington, New Zealand. (Many of the maps first appeared in the Summer 1972 issue of the Bulletin.) Using official U.S. statistical data, Buchanan demonstrates that American military resources (troop deployments, bases, aid programs, etc.) are overwhelmingly concentrated in a chain of nations that surround mainland China. Similar patterns are indicated for the distribution of U.S. police assistance expenditures, and for the training of foreign military personnel. Another series of maps focuses on U.S. economic and cultural penetration of the Third World; particularly striking are the maps showing the expansion of U.S. banking institutions abroad over the past ten years. Together, these maps and charts provide strong visual support to Dower's thesis that American policy in Asia has followed a relatively consistent pattern of expansion and penetration since the end of World War II.

Brodine, Selden and Dower all suggest that the United States is prepared to employ the full measure of its military technology including nuclear weapons in its effort to impose a dependent status on Indochina. However, in the year since Open Secret was composed, it has become possible to detect the growing erosion of our military power in Asia, and to begin calculating the magnitude of U.S. setback in Indochina. When all is said and done, it is clear that America's vaunted military machine proved inadequate for the task of defeating a People's War in Vietnam, and that therefore any permanent settlement of the Indochina conflict will have to recognize the military and political authority of the National Liberation Front (NLF). American power has been checked before, of course—for example, in Korea—but never have we been humbled by a military force so primitive technologically as the NLF. This setback has already forced the U.S. to scale down its goals in Asia, and further deterioration of our client apparatus is bound to follow.

The American war machine emerged badly scarred from Vietnam: not only was our expeditionary army fought to a standstill by poorly-armed guerrillas despite overwhelming U.S. superiority in the air and at sea, but public support for the military dropped to its lowest point since World War II as millions of people joined the antiwar movement at home. As we enter the post-Vietnam era, it is evident that the military establishment will have to operate under the following constraints:

- The American public will not sit by docilely and permit large numbers of U.S. ground troops to be deployed in another protracted counter-guerrilla war in Asia.
- The growing concern with domestic issues, coupled with rising inflation and mounting balance-of-payments deficits, suggests that less federal funds—on a relative basis—will be available for military spending in the years ahead.
- The spread of antiwar sentiment to the armed forces and growing G.I. resistance to racism and authoritarianism have substantially eroded the combat-worthiness of many military units and have compelled the Defense Department to abandon many manpower-intensive strategic doctrines. (Even with an all-volunteer Army, the Pentagon cannot expect to find a formula that will motivate ordinary soldiers to risk their lives in defense of colonial outposts.)

Most serious, however, is the collapse of the ideological consensus which assured popular support for all Cold War measures based on a firm stance of anticommunism. It is no longer sufficient—as in the heyday of Korea and Berlin—to invoke the image of communist aggression to secure public backing (and Congressional funding) for the deployment of U.S. forces abroad. In a major essay on the military's present predicament, Admiral Stansfield Turner of the Naval War College observes: "The American people appear to be desirous of reducing the world-wide roles we have been filling for the past 25 years.... Thus, it is becoming increasingly difficult to pay for all the forces needed to support the strategy of containment of Communism that has remained largely unchanged over the past quarter-century." The intense national preoccupation with the conflict in Vietnam has also dulled our perception of changes taking place elsewhere in the world. Only now, with a peace settlement finally signed, is it possible to appreciate the magnitude and quality of the power shifts that have occurred over the past decade. Whereas once it was common to define all international crises in terms of the great power struggle between the United States and the Soviet Union, today most analysts agree that this bipolar balance has given way to a multipolar world in which five major powers—China, Japan, Western Europe, the Soviet Union, and the United States—contribute to the global power equation. This equation (more accurately, a series of equations—each reflecting the gradations of power in the different regions of the world) is further complicated by the presence of crucial new parameters: the international currency crisis; trade rivalries within the capitalist camp; competition for control of energy supplies, etc. In this new strategic environment, the United States must exercise much more restraint and caution than ever before; while we are still stronger militarily than any other great power, we must be prepared to face situations in which we wind up on the weaker side of a new power realignment. Moreover, unless the military establishment is willing to use nuclear weapons in any situation considered detrimental to U.S. overseas interests, it cannot expect to emerge victorious from every armed encounter that it may be drawn into. As noted by Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Thomas H. Moorer in a 1972 statement to the Congress, "our relative military power throughout the world has peaked and is declining. We no longer possess that substantial strategic superiority which in the past provided us with such a significant margin of overall military power that we could, with confidence, protect our interests worldwide. Henceforth, we will have to chart our course with much
greater precision and calculate our risks much more cautiously.17

These global developments notwithstanding, the Administration has not abandoned America’s Cold War goals of containing communism and expanding its share of international trade; rather, the White House has found it necessary to set new priorities for U.S. overseas interests and to husband its resources for what are perceived as the more important struggles ahead.8 Thus, under the Nixon Doctrine, U.S. overseas forces will no longer be scattered all over the Far East, but will be concentrated in a few key areas (Thailand, Okinawa, Micronesia) whose strategic location provides a commanding position over the rest of Asia. An analysis of recent U.S. military activities in the Pacific suggests a post-Vietnam posture based on these principles:

—Increased support for the internal security forces of our client regimes, and the conversion of some states into local “gendarmeries” that will be used to “police” the region against revolutionary uprisings.
—An enlarged role for Japan in the management of America’s client apparatus in East Asia.
—The consolidation of U.S. military capabilities in a tight network of well-defended strategic bases.

On a global scale, these measures will be complemented by continuing diplomatic and political activities designed to exacerbate the Sino-Soviet Split, thereby compelling China and the USSR to concentrate their own military resources on their long common border (thus reducing their capacity to defend revolutionary movements in Southeast Asia). At the same time, the United States is hoping to gain Soviet (and ultimately Chinese) acquiescence to “a stable world order” that would legitimize great power intervention against revolutionary “outlaws” in the Third World.9

RESTRUCTURING THE EMPIRE
I. MARTIAL LAW IN ASIA

No group of people have been concerned with the meaning of the Nixon Doctrine more than the client rulers whose very survival is dependent upon continuous infusions of U.S. currency through the foreign aid program. Although the United States has established an elaborate military and police apparatus in each of these countries, American troops have always been on hand to provide a final bulwark against revolution and dissent. Now, however, these rulers are being told that they can no longer depend on an automatic U.S. response in times of disorder, and that they must therefore strengthen their capacity to overcome internal threats to their continued rule.

This aspect of the Nixon Doctrine, which became increasingly apparent during 1972, has already had major consequences in Asia: many rulers, anticipating the departure of their American protectors, are taking extreme measures to consolidate control over the people of their countries. Presidents Park of Korea, Thieu of Vietnam and Marcos of the Philippines have all declared martial law and assumed dictatorial powers within the past year, while the governments of Thailand, Cambodia and Taiwan have all imposed new restraints on political activity. Although most State Department officials have expressed disapproval of the increasing pattern of repression in “Free” Asia, it is quite clear that the United States Government expected such action and had in fact planned for it by requesting increased military assistance appropriations. In mid-1971, the State Department informed Congress that our allies in Asia faced a difficult “adjustment period” occasioned by the departure of U.S. ground troops, and that higher levels of military aid would be needed to help defend these countries against revolutionary upheaval and popular unrest. Thus Secretary of State William P. Rogers stated that military assistance “is an essential element of the Nixon Doctrine’s emphasis on the primary responsibility of each nation to provide for its own security,” and that additional funds would be required to provide our allies with “a foundation of stability during the adjustment period.”10 In a similar vein, Defense Secretary Melvin Laird told a Senate committee in 1972 that “Given sufficient time, our allies can reduce uncertainties as to their [military] capabilities,” but that for the interim period, massive transfusions of U.S. aid would be necessary “to help our friends and allies establish these capabilities [and] to reduce this degree of uncertainty.” Ultimately, Laird indicated, the development of strong local forces will “enhance prospects for a more stable international environment” and thus “contribute to the protection of our own vital national interests.”11 Clearly, Rogers’ avowal of the need for a “foundation of stability during the adjustment period” can be read as an endorsement of the steps taken by Park, Marcos and Thieu to suppress dissent and silence critics under the guise of martial law. Certainly the pattern of military aid funding suggests that we reward those regimes which “maintain stability” through the institutionalization of military rule: among the most favored recipients of military aid under Nixon are South Korea, Taiwan, Laos, Cambodia, Thailand, Vietnam, Turkey, Greece and Iran.12

In order to further strengthen our client apparatus against revolutionary and insurgent threats, the United States is seeking to enhance the military capabilities of selected local powers that can be persuaded (or obliged) to provide native troops for counterinsurgency operations in neighboring countries. This practice, which is gradually becoming evident throughout the Third World (witness the militarization of Iran in the Persian Gulf, Israel in the Near East, and Brazil in Latin America), is most pronounced in Thailand. The U.S. Ambassador to Laos, G. McMurrtrie Godley, recently told a Senate committee that the United States was financing an army of 15,000-20,000 Thai “irregulars” in Laos, a force over twice the size of any previously reported.13 Thai troops have also been reported in Cambodia, and Thai police units regularly cooperate with counterinsurgency forces in Malaysia. Total U.S. military aid to Thailand during the period 1970-73 amounted to $415 million, and Vice President Agnew promised increased U.S. assistance during a 1973 visit to Bangkok.14 As new outbursts of insurgency appear elsewhere in Asia, it is safe to assume that new groups of Thai irregulars will be formed to safeguard American interests.

RESTRUCTURING THE EMPIRE
II. THE EMERGING ROLE OF JAPAN

Although Japanese officials have consistently argued that there are no plans for the deployment of Japanese troops in post-Vietnam “police operations” in Asia, pressure is building both at home and abroad for Japan to assume such a
Correction

In the book review section of Bulletin issue V:1 (July 1973) information about publishers, prices, pages and dates was inadvertently omitted. The relevant data are:


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Okinawa. With one-third of Guam’s surface area already covered with military installations, the Pacific Command is also rehabilitating its World War II airstrip on neighboring Tinian, and surveying other sites in Micronesia for the construction of additional bases. Although there is a vociferous independence movement in Micronesia, the Pentagon is determined to expand its basing apparatus there as a key link in the restructured U.S. military apparatus of the 1980s and 1990s.20

Soon after the Kissinger-Tho peace negotiations got underway in 1972, the Department of Defense began moving its Southeast Asia command post from Tan Son Nhut airport in Vietnam to Nakhon Phanom air base in Thailand. The move was completed sixty days after the signing of a peace pact in Paris, and now Nakhon Phanom (NKP to U.S. airmen) serves as the operational headquarters of all U.S. forces still committed to the war in Indochina (including the 550 fighter-bombers and 50 B-52s engaged in the air war in Cambodia and Laos). NKP—located only nine miles from the Laotian border—also houses the "Igloo White" computer center used for monitoring the automated air war in Laos. American officials have stated publicly that the build-up of U.S. airpower in Thailand is designed to provide the Administration with a capacity for reintervention in Vietnam should it consider such action appropriate.21 (Thailand-based U.S. jets have already increased operations in Cambodia to a level commensurate with peak levels in Vietnam.) The presence of this force in Thailand, and the confidence with which the Pentagon shifted its headquarters there after the cease-fire, suggests that the United States has signed some secret protocols with the Thai government permitting an unrestricted American presence, and providing for U.S. support of any measures taken by Marshall Thanom Kittikachorn to defend his regime against domestic insurgent threats.

* * * * *

It is now obvious that the United States overreached itself in Southeast Asia, and that in a calculated effort to match its ambitions with its capabilities, the Administration may be forced to abandon some clients whose continued support would exact a disproportionate drain on the resources of imperium. In the short run, however, the Nixon Doctrine will entail increased levels of repression as local despotcs fight for survival, and growing economic dependency as Japanese-and U.S.-based multinational corporations maneuver for control of the region’s resources. By restructuring the empire, the Nixon Doctrine may gain some “breathing space” for American investors, but no policy based on repression and domination is likely to bring lasting peace and stability. “If the economic development of Southeast Asia proceeds in such a way as to exacerbate the hardships of the majority,” Dower concludes, “insurgency can be expected to increase, with an increasingly high content of revolutionary nationalism directed against the foreign presence” (p. 203). Even now, as Nixon talks of a “generation of peace,” there are significant insurgencies in Thailand, Burma, and the Philippines, and a continuing war in Laos and Cambodia. It is certain that as long as there are U.S.-backed client governments in Asia, there will be a revolutionary nationalist opposition and thus a need for a permanent American interventionary apparatus.

NOTES

7. U.S. Senate, Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee, Foreign Assistance and Related Programs Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1973, Hearings, 92nd Cong., 2d Sess., 1972, pp. 881-2. (Hereinafter cited as Foreign Assistance FY73.)
11. Foreign Assistance FY73, p. 830.
12. Ibid., pp. 1049-76.
17. Ibid., pp. 22-3.
18. Ibid., p. 25.

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Communications

April 16, 1973

To the editors:

Prof. Vogel's letter of October 1972, avoids the serious issues raised in the summer 1971 CCAS Bulletin Special Supplement on Modern China Studies ("How the Foundations Bought a Field"). For example, in explaining the need for a joint AAS-CCAS committee to investigate the JCCC, the SSRC, and the East Asia Division of the Ford Foundation, I proposed the following series of questions:

(1) Have the funding agencies sought to influence the topics, methodology, or political perspectives of academic scholarship? (2) Has the profession been in a position to perceive any such influences and to approve, amend, or cancel them according to its own independent criteria? (3) In particular, has the field been induced to respond favorably to the well-documented demand of military and other governmental agencies for information and analysis of a social scientific nature for use in furthering objectives of U.S. foreign policy in Asia? (4) What steps, if any, should the profession take to safeguard, strengthen, or re-establish its independence? We submit that no one sincerely concerned for the self respect of the profession and the well-being of the peoples whose cultures we study can ignore these questions or move to dismiss them frivolously. (Special Supplement, p. 115)

Consider these four points in Prof. Vogel’s letter. (1) The JCCC refuses to allow independent researchers access to its records on the grounds that private estimates of individual talent must remain confidential; (2) the history of the JCCC commissioned by the JCCC and written by the JCCC’s first chairman, Prof. G. Taylor, is an acceptable substitute for an independent inquiry, and, by implication, a sufficient response to CCAS criticism; (3) pursuit of “uninformed and massive” criticism could well lead to a reduction in funding; and (4) recipients of JCCC grants are more concerned with “basic research than with work that has any immediate implications for government action.”

Prof. Vogel suggests that the records of the JCCC, the SSRC/ACLS, and the Ford Foundation—where the answers to CCAS’s questions and the verification of Prof. Vogel’s contentions could be found—cannot be opened to independent researchers because to do so would compromise those “private estimates of individual talent” and “confidential evaluations” the JCCC claims it needs to award its grants. It cannot be denied that privacy is a serious consideration— with respect to certain types of documents. However, only a certain percentage of the documents of the JCCC are “sensitive” in this way and we have made it plain, publicly and privately, that this category is not our primary concern, though obviously projects denied funds are relevant data.

Of primary concern are documents such as the John Howard-Doak Barnett proposal to the Ford trustees in 1959 urging major funding for China studies and the memo of A. M. Halpern (RAND/JCCC) to the SSRC in 1963 initiating the JCCC’s largest conference, the Greystone Conference. We believe these documents could help to resolve important questions concerning the JCCC without jeopardizing “private estimates of individual talent.” After all, it was not in the public record but in records made available by Prof. George Beckmann that we learned that one of the JCCC’s first scholarly undertakings was to sponsor the compilation of a dossier on the political sympathies and attitudes of foreigners who had visited China and to convey that information to various governmental agencies. And it was in the files made available by Prof. Franz Schurmann that we learned how studies of Chinese leadership dynamics sponsored by the JCCC, as well as by Columbia University’s East Asian Institute, were closely related to the research interests of a State Department intelligence unit under Prof. Whiting. These disclosures, while of the greatest relevance to the issues raised by the CCAS, did not in any way entail the breaching of privacy Prof. Vogel alleges he fears. To the contrary, such information belongs in the public and professional domain.

Prof. Vogel indicates that at one time some JCCC members “hoped that the problem of trust could be solved by making our files universally available.” As with other actions of the JCCC, we obviously have no records to verify that they seriously considered making their files “universally available.” We do know from an earlier letter of Prof. Vogel’s that Prof. Fairbank’s proposal for a three-man committee to review the records was rejected by the JCCC. However, none of the reasoning behind this decision has been made available. Such ad hoc, informal, and incomplete means of communicating with members of the profession are but another unfortunate example of how the JCCC operates.

Finally, Prof. Vogel implies that “uninformed and massive attacks” will lead to a reduction of funding. Why? What does Prof. Vogel really mean by this? He offers no clear answer—though the suggestion that funding will be lost due to criticism goes to the very core of the problem of the impact of funding raised in the Special Supplement. And, to call our criticism “uninformed” simply reinforces the appropriateness of our request for all the documents which would “inform” us. The principle of secrecy, however common, is in contradiction to the principle of academic freedom. There can be no substitute for open debate and substantive discussion based on full documentation.

If Prof. Vogel is seriously concerned with the issues raised by the CCAS and at the same time wishes to protect applicants for grants against breaches of confidentiality, then I would urge him to recommend that the JCCC devise a means to make available all files with the exception of those involving “private estimates of individual talent.” The above-mentioned Halpern memo and the Howard-Barnett proposal are but two examples of such documents.

What has been offered (apparently in response to CCAS criticism) is an in-house history of the JCCC by its first chairman, Prof. George Taylor, commissioned by the JCCC itself “to recount with candor all the basic decisions and the basic approach reached by the Joint Committee over the years.” There is a self-evident conflict of interest in the JCCC’s approach to the problem, and a clear case of special pleading on the part of Prof. Taylor as a comparison of his Report with the Special Supplement will immediately establish. How can the JCCC seriously expect critics to accept Taylor’s history as
a sufficient response to the Special Supplement?

Furthermore, it must be asked, did Prof. Taylor enjoy access to the records of the JCCC, the records denied CCAS researchers? Or did he write his history without benefit of these source materials? This whole procedure demonstrates the extent to which political calculation dominates the decisions of the Joint Committee, and makes manifest their disregard for academic due process—open, fair and responsible methods which would allow all interested people to examine the source materials and draw their own conclusions. If, in commissioning and making public the Taylor Report as a candid history, the JCCC evinces such political partiality and biased judgment, what confidence can we have in their procedures in general, their responsibility to the profession, and their awards in support of faculty research, past, present or future?

Prof. Vogel also informs us that after commissioning the Taylor Report the JCCC “offered to meet individually with a variety of people concerned about the funding issue. A number of interested people took use up on this offer, and it is with some disappointment that I must report that our explanations were not fairly reported to larger numbers of concerned people.” Whatever meetings may have taken place, none has produced, to our knowledge, any new explanations, but we look forward to having a text at the earliest convenience of anyone concerned.

Let us now turn from the procedural to the substantive questions. What kind of an organization is the JCCC?

Shortly after the JCCC was founded, it sponsored a study called Scholarly Communication with Mainland China. The principal investigator, Prof. Herbert Passin, compiled dossiers on nationals of seven countries who had traveled to China. Passin’s project correlated his subjects’ political views and activities with the type of reception they had in seeking admission to China and during their stays there. The project was carried out without the knowledge of its subjects; funding and disposition of the data paper produced were purposefully concealed. In a letter dated July 5, 1961, the then JCCC chairman, George Taylor, wrote: “we have recommended that the data paper (Passin’s Report) be given to several government agencies” and “I have been instructed to transmit our views to the State Department in person.” The questions we put were: “Was the profession informed of the active relationship that the JCCC developed with the government? Did the Committee discuss the propriety of forming such a relationship? Did the Committee consider the uses to which various government agencies might put ‘Professor Passin’s data paper?’” (Special Supplement, p. 122)

In the same letter, George Taylor wrote: “It is very important for the Government to know that it can turn to a responsible group representing the interests of American scholars for some indication of how they feel.” The questions we put were: “By what right did the JCCC appoint itself the representative of American scholars in any case, let alone to the Government? Has this ‘serious responsibility’ in the field been fulfilled continuously over the past decade? If so, what ‘indications’ has the JCCC been giving the Government about how the profession ‘feels’?

George Taylor also wrote: “I think that a process of political education has gone on in the Committee which I trust is deep enough to prevent ill-considered political statements being made by American scholars who are interested in getting into China.” The questions we put were: “In making Professor Taylor chairman of the JCCC, did the SSRC and the ACLS intend that he should organize internal political education? Is such a process a legitimate function of the JCCC? How can a Committee which claims to be non-political justify undergoing political education corporately?”

Thus from its very inception the JCCC established a principle of service to government agencies. The nature and extent of that relationship over the past 15 years can be clarified only as new documentation comes to light. In the Special Supplement we have indicated other instances of significant coordination between the JCCC and governmental agencies. Therefore, when Prof. Vogel tells us that “the concern of our recipients has been far more with basic research than with work that has any immediate implications for government action,” then I think we are being taken into a very problematical grey area where cynicism and naivete fraternize. For though we cannot, in the absence of documentation, fully understand the disparities between what the recipients think they are doing and what the donors have done, we believe that the record will show that in its meetings with government agencies the JCCC has only nominally defended the academic prerogative and in the main sought the common ground, the “relevance”—however potential, long-range or disguised—of “basic” research to the needs of government agencies. Certainly the effort of the JCCC to stimulate studies of the Chinese elite is an outstanding example of their receptivity to the intelligence needs of government agencies. (Cf. Special Supplement, pp. 138-34.)

What is even more serious than the length of the continuum between “basic” and “mission-related” research is the effect in the university of this orientation to government interests. Insofar as the JCCC has played a role in creating or sustaining that relationship, however “mediated,” it has profoundly diserved the Asian studies profession and the cause of academic freedom.

These are the consequences that flow from allowing a group like the SSRC, whose leadership has long been oriented to the policy and intelligence needs of government agencies, and not to the organic needs of academic fields, to assume a dominant role in the Asian studies field. This essential characteristic of the structure of the field was determined immediately after the Gould House Conference of 1959 when the president of the SSRC, Pendleton Herring, and Prof. John Fairbank arranged to reverse the vote of the Gould House Conference by establishing the JCCC under the SSRC/ACLS instead of the AAS. (Cf. Special Supplement, p. 117, “The Gould House Puzzle.”)

The refusal of the JCCC to discuss the issues has made it difficult to research and discuss freely and openly these basic questions confronting Asia scholars: how can the field be organized in a democratic or representative way? how are we to understand the historical context in which we work? how do government and the funding system shape our intellectual work? how can we safeguard this work against improper external influences? how can scholars conduct their studies with true independence and objectivity? The CCAS holds these to be some of the most pressing questions related to intellectual integrity and honesty in the field today.

Moss Roberts
New York City

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Resolution on Korean Political Repression

Passed at CCAS summer retreat, Boulder, Colorado, August 29, 1973

The Committee of Concerned Asian Scholars expresses its support and solidarity with the Korean people in their resistance to the political repression of the Park Jung Hi regime which is supported by the U.S. government.

We call upon the U.S. government to bring pressure to bear on the Park regime to free opposition leader Kim Dae Jung who was kidnapped from Japan and is currently under house arrest in Seoul.

We particularly protest various forms of pressure and intimidation carried out against Korean citizens living in the United States by agents of the South Korean C.I.A. and other Republic of Korea government agents. We call upon the U.S. government to demand the removal of all R.O.K. C.I.A. operatives from diplomatic stations in the U.S. We urge all members of the CCAS to find ways to support and protect Korean citizens living in the U.S. in their attempts to exercise free speech, free assembly, and other political rights guaranteed to persons living in the United States.

C.C.A.S. Books in Print


*D. Gareth Porter is a research associate at Cornell University specializing in Southeast Asia.

*Howard Schonberger teaches history at the University of Maine at Orono.

*John K. Fairbank is professor of history at Harvard University and is author of The United States and China and many other books.

*Joseph Esherick is co-author with Orville Schell of Modern China: The Story of a Revolution and teaches history at the University of Oregon.

*Marilyn Young, author of several articles and a book on the American "Open Door" policy in China, teaches history at the Residential College of the University of Michigan.

*Ben Kerkvliet, currently spending a year at the Woodrow Wilson Center for Scholars in Washington, D.C., teaches political science at the University of Hawaii.

*Alexander Kuo, a poet, lives in Ellensburg, Washington.

*Peter Dale Scott teaches English at the University of California at Berkeley and is the author of The War Conspiracy (rev. BCAS, 5:1, July 1973).

*Michael Klare works with the North American Congress on Latin America and is the author of War Without End: Planning for the Next Vietnam.
